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Introduction
In times of falling and changing political and economic barriers. it appears as a
challenge to attempt analysing how these altered barriers may influence the location of
economic activity and people. "Will a completely new economic geography appear'!" •
and "Will we observe increased international specialisation'!" are questions that are
constantly subject to discussion. So is the question of to what extent falling barriers
imply that location actually ceases to matter. Motivated by the renaissance experienced
during the last few years by the location theory and Alfred Marshall's concept of
external economies of scale, this thesis therefore seeks to explore how the inclusion of
a geographic dimension and agglomerative forces in traditional economic models can
help us understand how changing trade arrangements and different levels of integration
may affect the location of firms and people. Furthermore, we elucidate how new
geographic structures influence trade volumes, trade patterns and welfare, and whether
we may expect a divergent or convergent development internationally. as time passes
by.
An overview of new and older location theory is found in the first essay. while the
three succeeding essays propose theoretical models aiming to study further aspects of
the location of economic activity within a microeconomic framework. In the fifth essay
an empirical model is introduced. We try to test for the importance of an academician's
location to his research productivity. Hence. we aim to elucidate whether the kind of
forces determining the location and productivity of firms, are also at work as regards
the location and productivity of academicians.
Introduction
Essay 1, "Economicgeography and trade -A survey o/the literature", is divided into
three chapters. The first chapter gives a short introduction to traditional location
theory, while the second chapter touches on what has been done on industrial
localisation within the business strategy literature. The main part of the essay
concentrates on what is often referred to as the "new" location theory or the "new"
economic geography. We review the literature as well as the microeconomic tools most
commonly applied. As the detenninants of geographical concentration are central in the
work that has been done on the "new" location theory, a discussion of different kinds
of external economies encouraging agglomeration is provided. We elaborate on how
policy may affect the location of economic activity when external economies enforcing
agglomeration are present, and close the essay with a series of examples of topics that
have been and can be analysed, applying the tools of the "new" location theory.
Essay 2, "Uncertain trade costs and industrial localisation - Concentration versus
diversification", was motivated by the situation currently faced by firms based in a
couple of smaller European countries - countries that decided not to join the EU. The
essay studies how uncertainty about future trade arrangements affecting firms'
competitiveness and market access, may influence firms' investment behaviour and
choice of location. Our analysis is based on a model of imperfect competition, and we
show that risk aversion is not a necessary condition for firms to respond negatively to
trade cost uncertainty. Despite being risk neutral, firms may be encouraged by
uncertain trade arrangements to diversify their investments, and reallocate part of their
production to abroad in order to secure market access to a large foreign market We
find that the number of national competitors committing to the same investment
strategy, the degree of export dependence, as well as the perceived probabilities of
"good" and "bad" future states respectively, are decisive for manufacturers' investment
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behaviour and locational choice. What distinguishes this essay from the other essays,
is the absence of external economies of scale and the presence of uncertainty. An
interesting extension of the article would be to include in the model some kind of
externality encouraging industrial agglomeration.
Essay 3, "Technological spillovers, industrial clusters and economic integration ",
considers the effect of economic integration on industrial structure and trade patterns.
We introduce a general equilibrium model of intra-industry trade with two sectors, one
perfectly competitive and one imperfectly competitive. In the imperfectly competitive
industry, external economies of scale create a tendency towards geographical
agglomeration. Within the "new" location theory, different mechanisms leading to
agglomeration have been explored. It has been demonstrated that inter-regional labour
mobility as well as input-output structures between firms in imperfectly competitive
industries, can serve to create linkages and hence agglomeration (see essay 1). But an
alternative possibility, that so far has received less attention within the "new" location
theory, is that oftechnological or knowledge spillovers - and it is on this mechanism
we focus in essay 3. Localised knowledge spillovers are assumed to be present in the
imperfectly competitive sector, and the vehicle for spreading information among firms
is the intra-market mobility of skilled personnel. Economic integration implying a
reduction in trade costs, is found to encourage agglomeration. The industry subject to
external economies concentrates in one region, i.e., divergent industrial structures
across countries are observed. Which country that ends up with the industry where
spillovers are generated, will depend on the initial distribution of firms between
countries, as well as on the level to which trade costs are reduced.
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Knowledge spillovers caused by intra-industry labour mobility does also playa major
part in Essay 4, "International trade, technological development and agglomeration"
(co-authored by Jostein Tvedt). However, unlike in essay 3, perfect competition
prevails in all markets. We focus on how localised external economies of scale created
by knowledge spillovers, encourage industrial agglomeration, and cause uneven
technological development internationally. Technological advantage and national
industrial structures evolve over time, and we elucidate how the creation of clusters
may contribute to explaining regional specialisation. Two cases are considered, one in
which we allow for trad~ in goods only, and one in which there is trade in capital as
well. Consistent with results in the "new" location theory, it appears that the critical
size of a region regarding its ability to sustain an industrial cluster, is substantially
reduced as trade is extended to include capital in addition to goods.
Finally, in essay 5, "Does it matter where you are? The importance ofbeing localised
in the academic world", we aim at applying the theory oflocalised external economies
of scale in an empirical model. While the preceding essays analyse the location of
firms, in this paper, however, we focus on the location of academicians. In order to
shed some light on possible determinants of individual and departmental performance,
a cross-sectional study of 175 economists is conducted. In particular, we seek to test
the hypothesis that an economist's environment, i.e., colleagues, matters to his
research productivity. - And we find that there is reason to believe that localised
knowledge spillovers may be present, not just in industries, but in academic milieus as
well. Hence, in the same way as industrial clusters may increase firms' productivity,
being in an efficient academic cluster may enhance an economist's performance.
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Economic geography and trade - A survey of the literature
Introduction
Most of the traditional trade theory rests on the simplifying assumption of constant
returns to scale and perfect competition. Although it has been known for a long time,
that the presence of increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition may have a
significant impact on the results in trade theory, trade theories based on constant
returns technologies have been predominant. The reason for this, is mainly the lack of
analytical tools to model imperfect competition. As soon as the assumption of constant
returns is relaxed, the market structure can no longer be ignored (except under special
circumstances'), and it is necessary to know the precise nature of competition, and
how it works.
The predominance of the competitive models lasted until about 1980. Due to the
progressing theory of industrial organisation, trade economists were no longer limited
to the models of constant returns - the assumption of perfect competition could be
relaxed. During the 1980s a new trade theory based on imperfect competition
ernerged.s
It is important to see the development within the trade theory in connection with the
general trends in economics. The importance of economies of scale has become
gradually more accepted by economists during the last years.3. There is probably a
close connection between this acceptance and the improvement of the analytical tools
for the modelling of economies of scale. Beside the theory of trade, topics such as
1 See Helpman and Krugman (1985), page 31.
2 For contributions to this new trade theory see Helpman and Krugman (1985); Brander and Krugman
(1983); and Krugman (1980) among others.
3 See Helpman and Krugman (1985).
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growth theory+ (with keywords such as "increasing returns to scale" and "endogenous
growth") and business cycles> have also experienced a ransfonnation due to the
consideration of increasing returns to scale.
But although several consequences of the existence of technologies with decreasing
costs have been analysed lately, there is one aspect of increasing returns that has been
fairly neglected by economists: the impact of increasing returns on the location of
economic activity in space.
A common feature of general microeconomics and trade theory is that, with few
exceptions, the geography of economic activity is ignored. As long as the models rest
on the simplifying assumption of constant returns to scale, such an ignorance is, in
fact, not that serious. According to Krugman, the study of economic geography is
actually condemned to be more or less excluded from economic analyses, as long as
constant returns are assumed.s - Almost all competitive microeconomic models are
consistent with the assumption of a "wonderland of no dimensions?". But as soon as
the assumption of constant returns to scale is relaxed, the study of industrlallocation
becomes a natural consequence.
In other words: it was not possible for an economist to say very much about location
until the theory of economics had been developed so far that the modelling of
increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition were possible.f But having
4 See especially Romer (1986).
5 See Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989).
6 See Krugman (1991a), page 4.
7 See Isard (1956).
8 See Krugman (1991a), page 4.
7
Economic geography and trade-A survey o/the literature
reached so far, the study of location appears as an opportunity of making the models
even more realistic, elucidating further interesting aspects of economics.
Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that location theory could give valuable contributions
to economic models, little work has been done in this field until recently.? Currently,
literature on economics and geography is emerging. Ideas concerning the role of
location of economic activity, increasing returns and imperfect competition, multiple
equilibria, the influence of chance and history, and endogenous growth are becoming
popular. But, although different economists have been occupied with this subject
lately, only a few path-breaking articles have been published on the specific topie of
international economics and geography.t? An important reason for economists to do
geography is the fact that the lines between international economies and regional
economics are becoming vague in important cases. The completing of the internal
market is one example of this evolution.
The aim of this paper is to study what has been published on the topic of linking
economies and geography, and especially in the field of geography and international
economics. We shall first take a brief look at what has been done on industriallocation
within the theory of economic geography. Lately, also business strategy literature has
been occupied with the importance of location. Especially the contributions of Porter!'
have received much attention. In the last part of chapter one we shall try to elucidate
some of the thoughts that have appeared within the business strategy literature. The
9 The study of location did not really catch the attention of economists until the end of the 1980s.
Before this date, the only group of economists to be concerned with location, was the urban
economists. See for instance Henderson (1974) and (1988).
10 See especially Krugman and Venables (1990).
Il See Porter (1990).
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main part of this paper will concentrate on the issues of geography and
microeconomics, and geography and trade theory.
1. Economic geography: The theory of industrial location
The study of localisation is an old one that has existed since von Thunen published his
book "Der isolierte Staat" (liThe isolated state") in 1826.12 But the first systematic
treatment of industriallocation theory was due to Alfred Weber, and did not appear
until 1909.13 It focuses on the describing of factors that may have an impact on the
allocation of economic activity, and develops principles for determining where various
economic activities take place. Important are also the methods that have been
developed for the calculation of optimal location for single facilities or systems of
facilities. The applied tools are mainly those of operations research, and not those that
are used in the common economic models.
Chapter one can be divided into two main parts: the first section summarise important
features of traditionallocation theory, while concentrating on the determinants of
industriallocation. This section is primarily based on the chapters in Ihde on location
theory.l+ Readers may find the references somewhat old, but the fact is that, although
the books were written a long time ago, they still contain some of the most important
elements of location theory.
12 See von ThUnen (1826).
13 See Weber (1922).
14 See Ihde (1984).
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As for the second part of the chapter, we look at location from a single firm's point of
view, i.e., locating as a strategic variable. This is a subject where economic
geography and business strategy overlap each other to a great extent. The literature on
geography and strategy can, in fact, be divided into an older and a newer one, of
which the newer literature has been getting the most attention by far. The older
literature is characterised by keywords such as: economic geography, logistics, and
corporate strategy. Authors who have made important contributions here are Ihde and
Timmermann among others.P In section 1.2 we try to convey some of their thoughts.
In paragraph 1.3 we tum to the "new" literature on economic geography and strategy.
As Porter published "The competitive advantage of nations" in spring 1990, the theory
of location experienced a kind of renaissance. For some reason ( if we may take the
liberty to be a bit impolite) the book became extremely popular among economists and
business managers. Following what one might call the "Porter tradition", a number of
economists have made contributions to the analysis of economic geography and
strategy during the last few years.
What is the purpose of this chapter? We hope to be able to show that economic
geography is actually concerned with many of the same topics as business
administration and economics. The difference between them being the way they
approach the problems, and which factors that are emphasised.
15 See Ihde (?); Ihde (1984); and Timmermann (1983).
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1.1 Determining the location of economic activity in space
When considering where to allocate its production, a firm has to take both advantages
and disadvantages into account. It is quite common to divide the positive and negative
factors into two groups: primary and secondary determinants. By primary we mean
natural, given or exogenous factors, as for example natural resources. As a result of
the economic activity itself, we get what is called the secondary determinants of
Iocation+s
a) Internal economies of scale
b) External economies of scale
c) Transport costs
d) Price of land
These determinants can be either agglomerative or deglomerative. Internal and external
economies of scale are thought to have a positive effect on concentration. But as for
transportation costs and the price of land, the opposite effect is presumed, i.e., they
lead to delocalisation.
The last years have been characterised by decreasing an importance of internal
economies of scale and transportation costs, and an increasing importance of external
economies and the price of land. This tendency reflects the current development of the
product markets; more specialisation than earlier is needed to satisfy the very different
preferences of the purchasers, i.e., a larger product selection is necessary. At the same
time, the product cycles are getting shorter. Transportation has become cheaper, and
16 This classifying of the detenninants is based on Losch (1962). There are actually numerous ways
of doing this classifying.
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an increasing part of the transported goods are superior goods, which means they are
not that sensible to additional costs (e.g. transport costs or more general transaction
costs). Internal economies and transport costs certainly still matter, but compared with
the two other secondary determinants of location, they do presently not receive that
much attention.
Figure 1.1 provides a short and simple summary of the influence that the internal and
external economies of scale, and transport costs have on industriallocalisation.
Transport
costs
=0 >0Internal
and external
econ. of scale
Moving towards
=0 Indifference delocalization(dispersion)
The production A kind of compromise
>0 processes tend to
between dispersion and
concentrate concentration
Figure 1.1
The table displays the possible spatial arrangements of the economic activities in a
region. A second interpretation of the table is how, depending on the magnitude of the
three variables (internal and external economies of scale and transport costs), the
decision of a single firm about how to allocate, changes.
12
Economic geography and trade-A survey o/the literature
Different authors have chosen to focus on different aspects (determinants) of
localisation. von Thunen!", and later also Alonso-'', have both developed location
theories with the price of land as the central variable (see "land use theory"). They
assume that the price discrepancies will lead to such a spatial distribution of rums, that
the production processes with the minimum need for space will be occupying the most
expensive sites.
According to the literature on location theory, the existence of external effects is
especially interesting in relation to industriallocalisation. Positive (external economies)
as well as negative (external diseconomies) effects have received much attention. The
kind of externalities that are mainly in focus, are those that arise from the distribution
of economic activities in space, known as "localisation economies" and "urbanisation
economies" .19 These may either be agglomerative (positive externalities) or
deglomerative (negative externalitiesj.w The two types of agglomeration economies
can be defined as follows.I!
Localisation economies are gained by rums in a single industry (or a set of closely
related industries) at a single location and accrue to the individual production units
through the overall enlarged output of the industryas a whole at that location. One
17 Related to his theory, von Thunen developed a geometrical model which is known as "die
Thunensche Kreise (circles)".
18 See Alonso (1964).
19 These names and ways of grouping the spatial externalities were first used by Hoover (1937). He
actually classified the agglomeration factors as:
- large scale economies (i.e. internal economies of scale),
- localisation economies, and
- urbanisation economies.
20 Positive effects are easily found, and some examples will be given later. But lately, also negative
effects have become more discussed in the literature. Pollution due to economic activity, and lacking
capacity of the infrastructure may, for example, be deglomerative.
21 See Dicken and Lloyd (1990).
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example of such an agglomeration effect is the availability of qualified labour, i.e., a
pooled labour market
Urbanisation economies apply to all firms in all industries at a single location, and
reflect external economies passed on to enterprises as a result of savings from the
large-scale operation of the agglomeration as a whole. High local demand is, for
example, a direct result of the concentration of economic activity in space.
1.2 The allocation problem of a single firm
With regard to localisation, each firm has to make two major decisions:
• Where to allocate, i.e. in which region or country.
• Concentration versus dispersion, i.e., to distribute the production or not, and to
locate together with other firms or not.
It is often emphasised in the literature, that the nature of these decisions is clearly a
strategic one, and that the decisions are part of a firm's strategic planning. What a
company requires from its location, depends on what and how it produces. Choosing
its location, a firm is concerned about close access to primary factors as well as to
secondary factors.22 Due to the economic evolution, the primary factors are, however,
of decreasing importance.
As for the first decision, the political and economic environment in the regions
(countries) in question are important. Considered are for instance: tax system,
22 See section 1.1 for an explanation of primary and secondary factors.
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infrastructure, supply of labour, access to capital, tariffs and trade policy. The political
and economic environment and the structure of the economic activity, are but
constantly changing. Hence, the ability of different regions and countries to meet the
requirements of a firm, will be altered accordingly. As a result, the firms' allocation
may need to be reconsidered. "The dynamics of allocation" can be illustrated through a
simple example: the flagging out of ships.
Between 1982 and 1987, the flagging out of ships originally sailing under Norwegian
flag, increased dramatically. Due to the advantages of the so called "flags of
convenience", several shipowners chose to change the legallocation of their ships. In
this way they were able to lower their costs significantly. After 1987 the opposite
trend was observed- the ships were "flagging in" again - not to the traditional
Norwegian register (NOR), but to the new open ship register NIS (the Norwegian
International Ship register). Altered conditions in Norway due to the establishment of
NIS was the reason for this "flagging-in".
Characteristic of the present situation is, in general, that production processes
continuously change location within one country and to other countries. As a
consequence, the structure of the spatial arrangements is altered as well. The old "core
locations" where a lot of industry was concentrated, lose their importance as new
cores appear. The change of location tends to take place at an increased speed, i.e., the
"location cycles", referring to how frequently a fum changes its location, are getting
shorter.
As for the second decision, concentration versus dispersion, the fum is actually faced
with two different decisions:
15
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• Which one of the strategic allocation alternatives illustrated in figure 1.2, should
the finn choose; concentrated or distributed production?
• What kind of location(s) should the firm choose for its production? Somewhere
with a high degree of concentration of economic activity, the opposite, or a kind of
compromise between the two extreme alternatives?
<, NO YES.
Concentrating (1) Separating the (3)
NO the production production of
("Standorteinheit") different goods(" Standortteilung")
YES
Producing the same (2) A combination of 2 (4)products at several
locations and3
("Standortspaltung") ("Standortdiversiflkation")
Figure 1.2
The letters in the figure refer to:
a): Spatial specialisation, i.e., similar goods are produced in one single location, and
not together with other kinds of goods.
b): The same kinds of production processes are carried out in several places.
Crucial to the choice of whether to concentrate or distribute the firm's production are
the kinds of goods produced, level of transport costs, the quality of the infrastructure,
and the degree of economies of scale (see also figure 1.1).
16
Economic geography and trade -A survey of the literature
In alternative (2) the transport costs are dominating, and the internal economies of
scale are of less importance. Products are typically of less value and represent "old"
goods, and the surroundings are often characterised by a very poor infrastructure. The
opposite of (2) is true for alternative (3). The spatial specialisation observed here, is a
result of the importance of decreasing average costs. Firms choosing this alternative
usually produce high-value and complex goods in regions with a superior
infrastructure. Number (4) is thought to be a result of risk aversion. The spatial
distribution of a firm's production, is considered as a way of spreading (and
restricting) risks, i.e., risks associated with the different Iocations.P
Concentrating on the western part of the world, the table also describes the historical
evolution over time; beginning with (1), moving on to (2), (3), and (4). Hence, typical
of the present situation is a kind of spatial diversification, where transport costs, as
well as the advantages of internal economies of scale, are of decreasing importance.
Turning to the question of whether to cluster together with other firms or not,
concentration may, obviously, have many advantages. A number of firms and/or
industries located together at one place, lead to positive externalities, i.e., so-called
agglomerative urbanisation and localisation economies. But, if the degree of
concentration becomes "too" high, we are likely to observe negative externalities as
well. The restricted capacity of the infrastructure system (e.g. roads and
communication), could serve as an example of such negative externalities. Advantages
and disadvantages from localisation should therefore be elaborated simultaneously. It
is desirable to find the optimal degree of concentration and allocate production in a
23 Such risks can be related to quality, delivery, exchange rates and transport.
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region where this degree exists. Figure 1.3 illustrates what is meant by "optimal
degree of concentration ".
positive and negative
externalities net effect
Optimal
degree
Degree of
concentration
Degree of
concentration
Figure 1.3
The general conclusion in literature on location as a strategic variable, is that access to
locations that satisfy the requirements of a firm, is a necessary condition for a firm to
succeed, as well as for the inter-regional and intertemporai optimal allocation of
resources.
1.3 "Thinking Clusters" - the Porter approach
The idea thatPorter was the first to "discover" the link between economic geography
and business strategy, seems to be fairly widespread. However, Porter was not the
first to consider the importance of geography for the strategic planning. One may
guess that the lack of public awareness of other economists' earlier thoughts on the
18
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subject, is either due to the new, simple, and appealing framework, as well as the way
of approach used by Porter, or due to his superior marketing knowledge.
Nevertheless, writing a paper on geography and trade, it is not possible to ignore
Porter. In this section, we concentrate on the thoughts of Porter published in "The
competitive advantage of nations", and the contributions of Enright, Reve, Lensberg
and Grønhaug to the subject.24
A question receiving frequent attention, is "why do some nations succeed and others
fail in international competition"? Governments, business managers, and researchers
have always been occupied with the reason for competitiveness. There have been
numerous attempts to explain competitiveness. According to Porter, what the
explanations are often conflicting, and neither has become the generally accepted
theory. National competitiveness has been interpreted as:
• a macroeconomic phenomenon, due to exchange rates, interest rates and
government deficits,
• a function of cheap and abundant labour,
• a result of the possessing of valuable natural resources,
• a result of government policy, including a protectional trade policy,
• a result of management practices, including labour-management relations.
None of these interpretations of competitiveness are sufficient to give a rationale for
the competitive position of a nation's industries. In search of a convincing
explanation, we probably need to revise the original question. As a first step we need
to abandon the whole notion of a "competitive nation". - No nation can be
24 See Enright (1991) and Reve, Lensberg, and Grønhaug (1992).
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competitive in the production of, and net exporter of, all types of goods and services.
Hence, seeking to explain competitiveness at the nationallevel would be the wrong
way to approach the subject. Instead, we have to focus on specific industries or
industry segments. The study of a national economy reveals significant differences in
the competitive success across industries. An international advantage is often
concentrated in a single industry or industry segment.
Worth noting is also the fact that within many industries or industry segments, firms
possessing international advantages are usually all based in just a few countries. The
influence of a nation seems to apply to industries or segments, rather than to the actual
firms. Instead of asking "why do some nations succeed and others fail in international
competition?", we should probably ask "why do firms based in particular countries
achieve international success in distinct segments and industries?".
The classical way to explain the international success of particular industries in a
country, in terms of international trade, is the theory of comparative advantage.
Comparative advantages are based on differences in access to factors of production,
i.e., national differences in factor costs. But there is a general agreement on the fact
that, the theory of comparative advantage does not explain the patterns of trade
sufficiently, and also, at least for some industries, relies on quite unrealistic
assumptions.
Porter concludes, that a new theory is needed in order to explain "which decisive
characteristic of a nation that allows its firms to create and sustain competitive
advantage in particular fields, i.e., the competitive advantage of nations".
20
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A new theory of national competitive advantage
The answer to the question of the reason for a nation's prosperity, lies in four broad
attributes of a nation: (1) factor conditions, (2) demand conditions, (3) related and
supporting industries, and (4) firm strategy, structure and rivalry. To illustrate the
determinants of national competitive advantage, the so called "Diamond" is often used
(see figure 1.4).
Finn strategy,
Structure
andRivalry
" "
Factor
Conditions
,,\
"\" Demand
Conditions..__~-__.'" \ ~--:::::r--:-,"""
\" T
~ "
Related and" "~8Supporting ~
~In;;.::d.:;:us;;.::tn~·e;:;:.s_ _,-4- -...... Chance
Figure 1.4
According to Poner, nations succeed in particular industries because their home
environment is the most forward-looking, dynamic and challenging. The importance
of the home nation is, in fact, more significant than ever. Companies benefit from
having strong domestic rivals, aggressive home-based suppliers, and demanding local
21
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customers. Emphasised is especially domestic rivalry, because it is thought to have the
most powerful and stimulating effect on all the other points of the diamond.
The points of the diamond actually constitute a system. The main forces behind this
system are domestic rivalry and geographic concentration. Geographic concentration
magnifies the interaction between the four separate influences on a nation's
competitive advantage. Crucial is, in other words, the observation that the
development of competitive advantages is a highly localised process. The more
localised the rivalry (for instance), the more intense, and therefore the better it is for
firms' competitiveness.P
Industry clusters
Typical of the nature of the diamond, is the way it creates an environment that
promotes industry clusters. In general, we do not only find one competitive industry
in a country, on the contrary, we usually find several. These industries are somehow
linked together. They influence each other, and receive mutual gains from their
interdependence. The existence of a cluster leads to a continuously competitive
upgrading and new entries. The clusters are characterised by geographic
concentration, which can be observed in numerous countries, and is vital to how the
cluster works.26
Geographic concentration reviewed
The phenomenon "geographic concentration" may be critical for how firms'
competitiveness evolves. A geographic concentration of domestic rivals is quite often
25 Examples of such geographic concentration are: Cutlery companies in Solingen, Germany,
pharmaceutical companies in Basel, Switzerland, and Italian jewellery companies in Arezzo and
ValenzaPo.
26 Examples mentioned by Porter are the Italian footwear industry and the German paper industry.
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surrounded by suppliers and located in places with a concentration of demanding
customers. This leads to a reinforcement of efficiency and specialisation, and further
innovation and improvement. Moreover, the concentration of an industry or several
related industries (clusters) attracts highly skilled labour. Today, communication and
transportation costs are decreasing, and trade barriers are reduced. As a result,
international competition is increasing and locational advantages with respect to
industry innovations are becoming even more significant than earlier.
1.4 The need for a microeconomic foundation
In this chapter we have tried to convey some insight in to what economic geography
and industriallocation are all about. Locating, as an important part of a firm's strategic
planning, has been elucidated, and ultimately, we have elaborated the relationship
between geographic concentration, a firm's competitiveness, and the competitive
advantage of nations.
Several appealing ideas and causal relations appear in the literature on which the
previous sections are based. But nevertheless, we are left with the impression that the
subject lacks a more formal foundation and structure. Through an incorporation of
geography in traditional microeconomic models one may hope, that this main
drawback of the subject of economic geography could be eliminated. Hence, in the
next chapter we shall look at what has actually been done on geography within a
microeconomic framework and by whom.
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2. Microeconomics and geography - Towards a "new" location theory
In the preceding chapter we reviewed some of the main ideas of traditionallocation
theory, and looked at how the inclusion of geographic aspects has influenced the
subject of business strategy. Bearing this in mind, we turn to the issue of
microeconomics and geography. A significant part of the literature covering this topic
is often referred to as the "new location theory". We shall concentrate on this part of
the literature, where the reasons for, and the dynamics related to, agglomeration of
firms and consumers playa crucial role.27 Especially the contributions of Krugman
have received much attention, but there have also been articles by Abdel-Rahman,
Fujita, Rivera-Batiz, Venables, a.o.28 Chapter two introduces the microeconomic
ideas and methods of the "new location theory". In chapter three the implications of
the principles of the "new location theory" for trade theory are elaborated. We provide
an overview of issues that may be (and have been) analysed by means of the tools of
the "new" location theory.
27 Models in this literature are characterized through endogenous agglomeration economies. There is a
larger literature on exogenous agglomeration economies, but for reasons mentioned in 2.1.1, this will
not be elaborated in this paper. Much work has also been done on issues such as spatial competition
and price discrimination, where implications of space for price policies and competition are discussed.
But since this work concentrates on aspects of space and economics that are not necessarily related to
those of industrial concentration and spatial equilibria, it will not be elucidated in this paper.
28 See Krugman (1991a); (1991b); and (1991c), a.o.
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2.1 Increasing returns and geographic concentration
2.1.1 A rationale for imperfectly competitive models
Summarising what we have written about geographic concentration, there are two
dimensions of concentration associated with firms: (1) A single firm can either choose
to distribute its production, or to concentrate it in one location. (2) The firm can
choose to locate together with several other firms, or to locate more or less alone. The
other firms can either be similar and related firms, or associated with quite different
industries. Hence, the firm can either try to exploit localisation economies and/or
economies of urbanisation. The existence - and degree - of internal economies of
scale are decisive for a firm's choice of number of production plants. Regarding where
to locate, external economies of scale are crucial.
The central question is, how to include geography in microeconomic models (or how
to link geography and economics), and to find the sufficient conditions for this. If we
simply want to study the clustering of firms (e.g. in urban models), this could be
compatible with the use of perfect competitive models. But such a "competitive
approach" to agglomeration economies is contingent upon direct assumptions about
the source and size of the external effects that cause the concentration. Because the
explicit modelling of externalities is analytically awkward, and based on a more or less
vague concept, it would be desirable to find another way of approaching the issue of
agglomeration within the theory of economics.-?
29 See Krugman ( 1991a), page 5.
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As to the strategic problem of whether or not a firm should divide its production, it
should be obvious, that as long as constant returns to scale are assumed, there is,
ceteris paribus, no reason why a firm should not distribute its production, in order to
gain as close access as possible to all consumers. Accordingly, it may choose to divide
its production between places with great industry concentration and more peripheral
locations. The determining of an equilibrium may thus become quite difficult.
Furthermore, it should not be ignored that in the real world the importance of scale
economies internal to the firm is significant in several industries, and consequently of
great importance to a firm's allocation decision.
Through the relaxation of the assumption of internal constant returns to scale, it is
possible to provide a better reproduction of the real world; at the same time as
agglomeration economies may be modelled without any direct assumption about
external effects. The externalities leading to concentration emerge as a consequence of
market interactions alone. In other words, a suitable model for economic geography is
one of imperfect competition, in which the firms possess technologies with increasing
returns to scale.
2.1.2 Modelling geographic concentration
We would now like to draw attention to a microeconomic model incorporating
imperfect competition and geography - the "Core-periphery" model. The model is one
of economic geography, developed by Krugman. It is published in his article
"Increasing returns and economic geography" and in his book "Geography and trade",
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in 1991.30 First we present a sketch of the model, trying to convey some intuition of
how it works, and then turn to the more formal version of the model.
However, it should be noted that Krugman was not the first to present a model
including imperfect competition and spatial agglomeration. To our knowledge, Fujita's
and Rivera-Batiz's articles in Regional Science and Urban Economics in 1988
constitute the path-breaking work in this field}1 Until these papers were ~ublished,
the models of economic geography developed by economists, were characterised
through external-economy approaches like those of Henderson. Henderson let the
centripetal force arise from assumed localised external economies in production, and
let the centrifugal force be urban land rent.
The precise way in which Krugman let agglomerations emerge from the interaction
between internal increasing returns (at firm level), transport costs and factor mobility,
without making any assumptions about localised externalities presents an appealing
and promising approach. There are two further advantages of Krugman's model: it
provides a good overview of factors decisive for how and where firms locate, and
30 Krugman has later provided an extended version of the Core-periphery model (See Krugman
(1992).), where the dynamics are modelled explicitly. Different from the original model are also the
number of agglomerations that are modelled. In the former model, just one agglomeration is possible,
but as for the latter model, the possibility of multiple agglomerations is considered. We shall
concentrate on the first version of the Core-periphery model, because it is less complex than the later
version, at the same time as it includes most the main points and results.
31 See Fujita (1988) and Rivera-Batiz (1988). The models povided by these authors may be described
as follows: Fujita provides a spatial version of the Dixit-Stiglitz model: there is a continuum of
households and firms; firms prefer to locate near households, and vice versa. Unlike Rivera-Batiz,
Fujita introduces land consumption by firms, not just by households. The paper demonstrates that
pure market processes based on price interactions alone can generate spatial agglomeration of
economic activities. Additionally, welfare implications of the equilibrium configurations of cities are
elaborated.
Rivera-Batiz applies the Dixit-stiglitz approach to both consumers and producers. An increased city
size enlarges the variety of services available locally, and leads to a higher consumer utility. Increased
city size is associated with an agglomeration of firms, which in turn raises the derived demand for
intermediate goods, allowing the suppliers of these goods or services to specialize more. A basic
source for agglomeration is therefore also the desire of the service industry to employ a variety of
intermediates to achieve a higher degree of productivity.
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explains how these may be modelled within the context of a microeconomic model.
Second, it is simple. Yet, one should note that, there is one important aspect of
economic geography, which is neglected in the model we present, namely geographic
distance.
2.1.2.1 An informal approach to the issue of geographic structure
The main idea of the "Core-periphery" model is: "what determines the firms' choice of
location, and what are the possible spatial equilibria?" In this model the importance of
a "market potential" is emphasised, so that the best locations are those with good
access to markets.
In the "Core-periphery" model increasing returns, transport costs, labour mobility,
and demand are decisive variables. They represent the centripetal and centrifugal
forces in the economy, and their interaction determines the degree of geographic
concentration. Given strong economies of scale, each firm wishes to locate in one
single place, instead of distributing its production geographically. Bearing this in
mind, a firm will choose such a location that total transport costs are minimised, i.e., it
will locate where the demand is high. Demand will obviously be high in places with a
substantial concentration of manufacturers employing much labour. In other words,
there is a clear interdependence between manufacturing concentration and demand
concentration. The consequence of this interaction is that, once a manufacturing belt
has been created, it tends to be very sustainable. It should be noted that, the reason for
a "belt" to be established in a certain place does not necessarily have anything to do
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with economics. The "belt's" location may just as well be determined by chance,
history, orself-fulfilling prophecy.R
Our model is the following: in a country there are only two possible locations, East
and West. Two kinds of goods are produced: agricultural and manufactured goods.
There are two factors of production, each of which is specific to a particular sector.
"Farmers" produce agricultural goods, and "workers" produce manufactured goods.
We let 1C be the share of the total population engaged in manufacturing, and 1- 1C the
share of the population engaged in agriculture. There is, in fact, a third factor of
production, namely land - a location specific factor. This factor is, however, not
included in our formal production function.
Farmers produce agricultural goods using the location-specific factor land, and as a
result, the agricultural population is divided exogenously between East and West. The
production is homogenous and characterised by constant returns to scale and perfect
competition. "Farmers", as the immobile factor in the economy, provide the
centrifugal force, which works against a concentration ofmanufacturers.
Manufactured goods can be produced in any location. The goods represent product
varieties, and the number of varieties is large. The firms possess a technology with
increasing returns to scale, and the market is characterised by imperfect competition. A
firm can choose to locate in East or West, but will then be faced with transport costs
due to sales in the other location. Its third alternative is to divide the production
between East and West, but this will incur increased fixed costs related to the set-up of
a second plant.
32 We shall return to the importance of history, chance, and self-fulfilling prophecy later in this
chapter, see 2.1.3.
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The manufacturing labour force in a location is proportional to the amount of
manufacturing that takes place in the location, and the demand in each location is
proportional to the population living there.
A numerical example
We assume, that 60 percent of the labour force are farmers; that the farmers are
divided equally between East and West; that total demand for manufactured goods is
10 units; that fixed costs of a manufacturing firm are 4; and that the transport cost per
unit is 1.
A typical firm is faced with three different locational strategies: East only, fifty-fifty
split between East and West, and West only. Depending on the locational strategies of
all other firms, i.e., on the distribution of manufacturing labour (which implicates
"demand"), the firm will solve its allocation problem.
It turns out that there are multiple possible equilibria:
1) If all other firms are located in the East, it will be most profitable for a single firm to
locate its total production in the East as well.
2) If the firms are equally split between East and West, each firm will also want to
split its production.
3) Ultimately, ifmanufacturing is concentrated in the West, each firm will concentrate
its production in the West.
The three possible equilibria, contingent on the different locational strategies of all
other manufacturers, represent the respective cost minimising location alternative for a
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single firm. Below we illustrate graphically the possibility of more than one
equilibrium.
Share of West
in population~------------~
M
P 1
Share of West
inmanufaturing
Figure 2.1
The horizontal axis measures the share of the manufacturing labour force employed in
the West. As for the vertical axis, it measures the share of the total population living in
the West. The two lines MM and pp can be described like this: both illustrate the
interaction between the distribution of population and the distribution of
manufacturing. MM shows how manufacturing depends on population, while pp
explains how population is dependent on manufacturing.
Bearing in mind that fr is interpreted as the share of the population engaged in
manufacturing, the share of the population living in the West, SN, can be written as a
function of the share of workers employed in the West, SM:
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This function is drawn as the line pp in the figure, and it is clear that it is increasing in
SM. Note that the part of the population that is situated in one of the locations can never
be less than (1-1&)/2.
The MM curve can be explained as follows: if one of the locations only has a very
small part of the total population, it will not be profit-maximising to produce in this
part of the country, due to the high fix cost incurred by the opening of a plant. In other
words, production will only take place in the West, given that the population here has
reached a certain size. Assuming that the fix cost is not too large relative to transport
costs, an equal division of the inhabitants between West and East will lead
manufacturers to produce in both locations.
The MM line illustrates the function SM(SN). This function can be described
mathematically in the context of SN, fix cost (F), transport costs (r) and the sales of a
typical manufacturing firm (x):
o if SN < F
tx
if F 1 FS l -<s < --
N tx N tx
lifl-F<s
tx N
If SNxt < F, it is cheaper to service the West from the East, and if (1- SN)xt < F, it is
cost-minimising to service the East from the West. The MM curve does, however,
only represent the function S~SN) correctly, provided that the fix cost is not "too" high
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relative to the transport costs. For this condition to be satisfied, F < tx/2 must be true.
If not, it will never be profit-maximising behaviour to produce in both locations.
The numbers in figure 2.1 depict the different equilibria described above. Depending
on where we start, each of these equilibria may be stable. The dynamics of locating are
illustrated by the arrows, showing how we adjust towards an equilibrium. The
original situation, in other words history, will determine which of the alternatives that
will appear as the equilibrium.
A general condition/or concentration
In the numerical example we got several equilibria, but it does not have to be like this.
Depending on the magnitude of centrifugal and centripetal forces, there might be
situations in which there is just a single possible equilibrium. If the agglomeration
economies are not strong enough, we might get just one unique stable equilibrium
where the production is split between East and West (see figure 2.2).
Share of West
in population~------------~
P
M
Share of West
in manufaturing
Figure 2.2
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This is a situation where the fix cost of setting up a plant is relatively small compared
to transport costs, and/or the share of the population that is immobile, is relatively
large.
It is possible to derive a necessary condition for concentration of manufacturing in one
location. Such a condition tells us how strong agglomeration economies have to be, to
ensure the possibility of an equilibrium with concentration. Once a manufacturing
cluster is established, the production will remain concentrated in the originallocation
as long as the condition below is satisfied:
l-lrF>--tx.
2
If this condition is not met, history does not matter. Where the production was
concentrated originally is of no importance. The distribution of agricultural activity
alone, will determine the localisation of manufacturing. But it is obvious that the
higher the fix cost (or the stronger the economies of scale), the lower the transport
costs, and the larger the share of the population engaged in manufacturing, the more
persistent is an established geographical concentration of manufacturers.
The endogeneity o/transport costs
The quality of the transport network is another factor of importance when determining
the geographical concentration (or dispersion) of an industry. One characteristic of
transport networks is great regional divergence in quality and capacity. As a result,
manufacturers located in one part of the country will have a much better market access
than those located in another part, and their basis for choice of location is a totally
different one.
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The process of economic change
Another interesting aspect of the subject of geographical concentration, is the influence
of economic change. Krugman elucidates two ideas related to the consequences of
change in the environment or underlying conditions:
a) A geographical structure may be stable for a long time, but when it changes, the
change often happens rapidly. The case of explosive change due to gradual changing
of conditions, does not seem unrealistic.
b) The reasons for change are not necessarily of an economic nature. Change may just
as well be caused by expectations - possibly self-fulfilling expectations. We will not
elaborate the issue of expectations here, but return to this later in section 2.1.4.
In order to illustrate a change in geographical structure graphically, we make the
assumption that farmers are originally unevenly divided between the two locations,
East and West. Due to a migration of farmers from East to West, a reallocation process
takes place over time, so that the earlier dominating location, say East, loses its
dominance. As a result, the pp line shifts upwards as illustrated in figure 2.3, and we
get the new line P*P*.
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Share of West
in population
Share of West
in manufaturing
Figure 2.3
Although point 2 in the figure could have been a possible equilibrium, we assume that
East, for some reason, has originallya dominating position and, as a result, all
manufacturing is concentrated in the East. Point 1 depicts, in other words, our first
equilibrium. As the dominance of the East is reduced, the population in the West
increases. This leads to increased manufacturing in the West, which in turn leads to a
further increase in western population. What we get is a cumulative process, and
ultimately we get a new equilibrium like 2*.
An example of such a process, is the one that started with the discovery of oil in
California in the late nineteenth century. Prior to this, the region had hardly had any
industry at all, due to the lack of a local market, but the oil started an explosive process
and turned California into a manufacturing centre.
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2.1.2.2 A 'formal model
This model is based on the assumptions which we described in the preceding section.
To close the model, we need some further assumptions: we let all the individuals in the
economy share the same tastes, i.e., the same utility function. The function is a Cobb-
Douglas function of the form
u=c;c~-tr (1)
with the consumption of agricultural goods (CA) and a manufactures aggregate (CM),
determining the level of utility. U can also be thought of as a welfare function since the
individuals possess the same preferences. We remember that n - the share of total
expenditure received by manufacturers - also depicts the share of the population
engaged in manufacturing. The function embodies a desirability for variety, and the
manufactures aggregate, CM, is dermed as a constant-elasticity-of-substitution function
of all the different potential product varieties,
(2)
There exists a large number of differentiated products, and due to the special kind of
utility function, the elasticity of demand for any individual manufactured good is
(J> 1, equal to the elasticity of substitution among the manufactured products.f
33 Since the utility function is a Cobb-Douglas function, the elasticity of substitution between
manufactured and agricultural goods is 1, and, in other words, less than the elasticity of substitution
among the differentiated products. The intuition behind this, is that the differentiated products should
be closer substitutes among themselves than a differentiated product and agricultural goods.
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Consistent with the assumptions we made in the preceding section, we assume that
farmers cannot move, and think of the geographical distribution of farmers as given.
Similar to our numerical example, the agriculturallabour force is split equally between
East and West, with (1-n)/2 farmers in each location. The workers always move to
the location that offers the highest wages.
The production of manufactured goods is subject to increasing returns to scale, which
is reflected through a linear cost function in terms of the manufacturing labour (LM):
(3)
Te = WLMi = wa + wf3XMi (4)
w= wage
xi= produced amount of one product variety
The transportation of agricultural goods is assumed to be costless, a simplifying
assumption that ensures that the farmer's wage rate and the price of agricultural goods
are the same in East and West. But the transport of manufactured products from one
location to the other, incurs costs. These costs take the form of Samuelson's "iceberg"
costs, which means that only a fraction 't< 1 of the transported goods arrives.
Market structure
Because there are economies of scale and the firms in the industry produce close
substitutes, the manufacturers do not have any incitement to produce more than one
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variety. Accordingly, the market structure is characterised by monopolistic
competition.H
Solving the utility-maximising problem of a typical consumer and the profit-
maximising problem of a representative firm, we get the demand for manufactured
goods and the profit-maximising price. This price is as it would have been in a pure
monopoly case, a constant mark-up over marginal costs.
Demand: Pi =U (q).<1>'(ci) (5)
u-I
with <1>(c;)= c;-a and q =L <1>( c;), where <1>( c;) is a concave function.
Market price:
(J
p:=-{3w, a-l (6)
Free entry is assumed, implying zero-profit and price equal average cost in the
industry in the long run:
Zero-profit condition: (p-{3w)x = aui. (7)
The equations (5), (6), and (7) characterise the partial equilibrium of the market for
manufactured products. Using these three equations, we find the equilibrium degree of
economies of scale in the industry, the equilibrium output of a typical manufacturing
firm, and the equilibrium number of manufactured goods (firms) in a region:
34 The model we shall use is the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, see Dixit
and Stiglitz (1971).
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Economies of scale can be measured by the ratio of average costs to marginal costs,
which gives us a/Ca-l), implying that ucan be interpreted as an inverse index of the
importance of economies of scale.
Output of a representative firm:
a(a-l)
x, =--{3-- (8)
Number of varieties produced (firms) in one region with a manufacturing labour force
of:
L Ln= M =_l!L
a+Bx au
(9)
The persistence of a core-periphery pattern
Using the developed model it is desirable to derive under which conditions an
established core will remain the place of concentration. The demand externalities from
the larger market, and the fact that each manufacturer wishes to concentrate his
production in one location due to increasing returns to scale, encourage agglomeration.
The convex preferences of the demanders (leading to the concavity of the <I> function)
embody the desire for variety, which is another centripetal force that should not be
ignored: workers want to have access to all manufactured goods, not just to those
produced by themselves. Ultimately, there is a deglomerative force at work, namely
the fact that the manufacturers also want to service the more peripheral agricultural
location.
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In order to derive a criterion for the sustainability of a core, we derive what the total
income and sales are in the two locations.
Income
It was mentioned earlier that the model ensures equal wages for farmers independent
of their location. Due to the assumption of zero-profits and the assumption that the
share of expenditure used on manufactured goods is proportional to the p.art of the
population employed in manufacturing, workers and farmers will also have equal
wage rates.
Assuming that all manufacturing is concentrated in one location, for instance in the
East, the income distribution looks like this:
Income of East yE = l+n
2
(lO)
Income of West w l-ny =-
2
(lI)
Sales
Given the situation where all manufacturing is located in the East, the sales of a
representative Eastern firm will be:
E ns =-
n
(l2)
If a manufacturer wants to open a plant in the West, he will have to pay the workers a
higher wage than in the East. Such a compensation is necessary because the other
products, for which the individuals have preferences, will have to be imported from
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Eastern firms and will incur transport costs. Only a fraction 't' of the shipped goods
will reach the West, i.e., the Eastern manufactured goods will be 1/ 't' times more
expensive in the West. The implication of this is an overall price index (= a geometric
average of manufactured and agricultural goods) in the West, that is 't'-tr times as high
as in the East Accordingly, a manufacturer in the West would have to pay his workers
a wage 't'-IC times higher than in the East, resulting in a higher price for goods
manufactured in the West:
(13)
The prices the consumers have to pay for imported goods may differ from the
producer price because of the transport cost. The relative consumer price of a Western
good to a consumer in the East, will be p" / '!pE, and the relative consumer price of a
Western good to a Western consumer, will be tp" / pE •
Remembering that o depicts the elasticity of demand, a one percent increase in the
price of the Western manufactured good will lead to a (J percent decrease of
consumption of this good. But due to the valuation effect caused by the rise in the
relative price, the expenditure (or sales value )will only be reduced by (a -1) percent.
U sing this information, it is possible to derive the value of the sales of a
manufacturing firm choosing to allocate in the West instead of in the East:
[1 ( W )-((7-1) ( W )-(0'-1)]w re +re p l-re p 't'S =- -- -- +-- --n 2 pE't' 2 pE . (14)
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The value of the sales of a single Western firm relative to that of a firm located in the
core (East), follows by dividing equation (14) by equation (12) and substituting for
p" by using equation (13):
SW 1+ te (lU)(cH) 1- te -(l-Ir)(cH)-=--'r +--'r .
SE 2 2
(15)
It may seem profitable for a firm to defect and locate in the West if SW/SE> 1. But this is
in fact, not quite true. We also have to consider the fixed cost associated with the
opening of a plant. Because of the special kind of cost function, this cost will also be
affected by the higher wages in the West, and it will only be profitable to defect if
(16)
We define a new variable, K, whose value can tell us if it is profitable to start
production in the peripherallocation:
(17)
(18)
The criterion for the sustainability of the core-periphery pattern and equilibrium is
K<1. IfK> 1, it is relatively more profitable for a firm to open a plant in the periphery
than in the core location. The variables determining the value of K are: the transport
costs, the share of income spent on "footloose" production (manufacturing), and the
degree of economies of scale in production.
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Determining the spatial equilibrium
The equation for K defines a boundary. We aim to evaluate the properties of K around
1, in order to see in what ways the three parameters transport costs, degree of
economies of scale, and share of income spent on manufactured goods, influence the
persistence of a core-periphery equilibrium.
The share of income spent on manufactured goods can be written as:
s« .y ln() 'fC11r[(U-l) -(U-l)] O- = (il\. 'f +- 'f - 'f <.
ate 2
(19)
An increase in the share of expenditure related to manufactured goods has an
unambiguously negative effect on K. It follows that an increase in p helps to sustain
the core-periphery pattern: the larger the share of income spent on manufactured
goods, the lower are the sales of a defecting firm; the smaller is K, and the more
persistent is the core. The fact that an increased te leads the workers to demand a
higher wage premium in order to be willing to move to the periphery, at the same time
as the "home market effect" in the East gets stronger, explains why an increase in te
has the described impact on K and on the sustainability of the core-periphery pattern.
Transport costs:
Equation (18) tells us that if transport costs are equal to zero (T= 1), then K=1, and the
question of location is irrelevant. But if the transport costs are very high ('f approaches
zero), then K approaches
li K = .!.(1- ) l-u(l-Ir)im '1"-+0 2 te 'f • (20)
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Unless the economies of scale are very large (øvery small) or the share of expenditure
on manufactured goods is substantial, high transport costs (low r) will incur a K> l.
More precisely, we have, that as long as 0'(1- n) > 1, for low -r values K will become
arbitrarily large, and the sustainability of the core will decline. In general, the effect of
transport costs on the nature of the spatial equilibrium is, however, ambiguous:
dK O'nK ( 1) -r07C [(1 ) a-2 (1 ) -a]-=--+ 0'- - +n-r - -n-r .
d-r -r 2
(21)
As -rapproaches 1 (transport costs lose importance), the second term of the expression
approaches n( 0'-1) >O, and since the first term is always larger than zero, dK/ d-r
will be positive for values of -r close to 1. In figure 2.4 below, the K equation is
illustrated as a function of transport cost. The two other parameters are kept constant,
and as values for O' and n we have chosen 0'=4 and n=.3. These values satisfy the
above assumption, 0'(1- n) > 1, which is crucial to the influence of transport costs on
localisation. Given that this condition is not met, i.e., 0'(1- n) < 1, this has an
important economic interpretation: the economies of scale are so strong and the share
of manufacturers relative to farmers so large, that no matter how large the transport
costs are, it will never be profitable to open a plant in the peripheral region (West).
Explained in another way: workers receive a higher real wage in the region with a
manufacturing cluster, even though the costs of transport are infinite. In other words,
0'(1- n) > 1 is necessary for transport costs to be ofrelevance to localisation, and we
shall therefore keep this assumption for the rest of the section.
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Figure 2.4
Studying the figure above, we can observe that for small values of t (i.e., high
transport costs), K>l, and it will be profitable to defect and start production in the
periphery. For some critical value of -r, K falls below the boundary (=1), and a core-
periphery pattern is sustainable. We note that when -r reaches the critical value,
depicting the boundary between dispersion and concentration, oKjo-r is negative. An
increase in -r (equivalent to a reduction of transport cost) has a positive effect on
concentration. Figure 2.4 further illustrates, that the forces for agglomeration are
greatest at the intermediate level of transport costs.
Economies of scale:
Remembering that (J is interpreted as an inverse index of the importance of scale
economies, it is possible to derive how economies of scale affectK:
(22)
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Comparing equation (22) with equation (21), it becomes obvious that they will always
have opposite signs. Given that aK/a-r <O, which is the case when t approaches the
critical value, then aK/ au> O, and a higher elasticity of substitution (implying a less
significant degree of economies of scale) has a negative effect on the sustainability of a
core-periphery pattern.
Based on the expression for K, it is possible to derive a boundary in a Jr, t space,
which marks the values at which a firm is just indifferent between staying in the
location with concentration or opening a plant in the periphery.(see figure 2.5). The
equilibrium in an economy inside this boundary will never be characterised through a
concentration of industry in just one region. But if an economy lies outside the
boundary, a core-periphery pattern will develop.
7t
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Figure 2.5
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Knowing that as f approaches the critical value (and takes on this value), aK/a'! is
negative, it is clear that the slope of the boundary in the f, n space will also be
negative:
-=af
aK/af <O
aK/an
(23)
A change in the degree of economies of scale will shift the boundary in or out,
depending on whether ahas increased or decreased:
(24)
This interdependence between n and (J implicates that, if the importance of scale
economies is reduced ((J increased), the boundary shifts out, and it becomes more
difficult to sustain a core-periphery pattern.
Conclusion
In an economy characterised by high transport costs, insignificant economies of scale,
or a small share of footloose manufacturing, the distribution of manufacturers will be
determined by the distribution of location-specific, immobile labour (farmers). But if
the scale economies are strong, transport costs low, or the share of the population
engaged in manufacturing comparatively high, then manufacturing will probably take
place in the region which, for some reason, gets a head start.
The number, type, and stability of spatial equilibria depend on the parameter values.
Parameter changes can lead to marginal as well as "catastrophic" changes in a spatial
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equilibrium. Depending on the original situation, an alteration of parameters can
induce only marginal changes of the equilibrium, but it may also incur a change from
concentration to diversification (or vice versa).
2.1.3 The importance of historyand expectations in determining an
equilibrium
A typical characteristic of a model with increasing returns and positive externalities is
the possibility of multiple equilibria. Crucial is the nature of the ultimately established
equilibrium, and how it is determined, The traditional view has been that, in a situation
with multiple possible equilibria, history determines the equilibrium. But during the
last few years, the belief that expectations or self-fulfilling prophecy have an important
impact on the establishing of an equilibrium, has also been pronounced by
economists.P The rationale for considering the role of expectations can be explained
as follows: the idea that history determines the equilibrium goes back as far as
Marshall. He assumed that resources move in response to differences in current
earnings. But due to costs of adjustment, resources move gradually, and the owners
of resources will therefore not only be interested in current, but also in future
earnings. In the presence of some kind of externality, future returns depend on the
factor allocation of other people, which in turn depends on their expectations of future
returns. There should, in other words, be a potential for self-fulfilling prophecy: if
everybody believes that the economy will end up in equilibrium 1, then it will; and
vice versa, if everybody believes that the final equilibrium will be equilibrium 2, then
it will.
35 See for instance Baldwin and Lyons (1991); and Krugman (1991c).
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A short illustration: given that all the workers expect the other workers to move from
East to West, they will assume the real wage to be higher in the West than in the East,
and will therefore decide to reallocate to the West. Due to some head start in
industrialisation in the East, the real wage is originally higher in the East than in the
West. Despite this fact, the expectations about the decisions of the other workers may
lead to a migration from East to West, and as a result, to a higher real wage in the
West.
Most economic models have tended to either consider history or expectations, but
there will clearly be cases where both determinants are relevant. The model presented
below was developed by Krugman (see Krugman (1991c», and is an attempt to
• explain what the respective roles of history and expectations are.
A simple formal model
The assumptions of the model: two regions; one mobile factor of production, namely
labour (L); the difference between the real wages in regions 1 and 2 is increasing in the
share of the total labour force located in region 1:
(25)
with L = L/2 =(~ + ~)/2.
Labour is assumed to migrate towards the region offering the highest real wages, but
moving from one location to another is not costless. This cost of migration can be
thought of as some kind of "costs of adjustment", and is convex in the aggregate rate
ofmoving.
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Consistent with the assumptions of the model, the total income of all workers will be
equal to their wages minus the costs related to migration:
1 (. )2Y=WI4 +W2~-- 4 .2r (26)
Let r be the exogenous discount rate. Given that the workers are forward looking with
perfect information about the future real wages in both regions at any time s, the
present value of being in location 1 instead of in location 2 is
..
q(s) =HWI (t) - w
2
(t)]e-r(l-s)dt. (27)
•
Differentiating q(s) we get
q=rq-(w1 -w2)
=rq-a(4 -L).
(28)
The rate of workers moving from one region to another will be such that the gain from
moving equals the marginal costs of moving
(29)
Equation (28) and (29) define a dynamic system, which illustrates the dynamics of
migration. Figure 2.6 shows how the system works, and that an equilibrium where
the labour is divided evenly between the two locations is unstable. Over time, the
whole labour force will become concentrated either in region 1 or in region 2.
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q
Figure 2.6
As for the nature of the local dynamics around the unstable equilibrium, this can be
established by solving the differential equations (28) and (29) with standard
techniques. The eigenvalues of the dynamic system are then given by:
(30)
There are two alternative solutions: either both roots are positive, or both roots are
complex. If the roots are positive, the paths leading to the long-run equilibrium are
illustrated in figure 2.7. The labour force will, in the long run, be concentrated in the
region that for historical reasons gets a head start, i.e., the region which initially has
the largest share of workers. Expectations cannot change this evolution by
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outweighing the role of history. The only way expectations might influence the long-
run equilibrium, is through reinforcing the importance of historical events.
q
Figure 2.7
But given that the roots are complex, the importance of the determinant "expectations"
should not be neglected. In this case, Le. when r2 < 4ar, the paths leading to a long-
run equilibrium will spiral outward from the middle, overlapping each other (see
figure 2.8). If L} initially takes on a value in the region where the spirals overlap,
(~,~), then there exists at least one path of self-fulfilling expectations leading to
either long-run equilibrium (i.e., concentration in 1 or 2)}6 - The nature of the
equilibrium is undetermined: although region 1 starts with more than fifty percent of
36 In a comment to Krugman (1991c), Fukao and Benabou (1993) argue that Krugman's presumption
about the terminal condition is not correct, and that the correct formula for q(s) is not the equation
T
(27), but q(s) = JrWI (t) - w2(t)]e-r(t-s)dt. From this follows that the true equilibrium paths are
"different from Krugman's, and that his analysis of the width of the "overlap" also needs to be revised.
According to Fukao and Benabou the "overlap" is much narrower than Krugman argues.
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the total labour force, it is possible that region 2 ends up as the core, if all workers
expect this to happen.
q
------,,',,,
'",
I
I
------
Figure 2.8
The factors determining the existence and the extension of an "overlap" tell us whether
self-fulfilling expectations matter or not to the evolution towards an equilibrium. By
investigating the criterion for an overlap, which is r2 < 4ay , it appears that if
• the discount rate is low;
• increasing returns are strong, so that an expected future shift in population
distribution moves the real wage differential quickly;
• the external economies, dermed as the phenomenon that makes people want to be
allocated in the same location that everyone else, are high;
• the rate at which resources can be reallocated between locations is high,
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then an overlap is likely to occur, and self-fulfilling expectations may playa decisive
role. Yet, the starting position of the two regions must not be too unequal if self-
fulfilling prophecy shall be able to outweigh history.
The subject of history versus expectations has been further discussed by Krugman in
his paper "First nature, second nature, and metropolitan location" (Krugman (1993a»,
where the role of historical accident and self-fulfilling expectations with regard to
metropolitan location is explained. Another approach to the issue of expectations has
been made by Baldwin and Lyons (1991), who try to formalise the assertion that
highly optimistic expectations about European economic and monetary integration may
prove to be self-fulfilling,
A fairly common attitude to the decisive role of expectations is that "smaller" events
may be determined by expectations, but as for phenomena of a "larger scale", as for
instance Silicon Valley, history plays the most important role.
2.2 Sources of industry clustering
In the previous sections we elucidated the forces determining the establishment and
sustainability of a cluster. The models included centripetal as well as centrifugal
forces. Significant determinants of agglomeration were internal increasing returns to
scale, transport costs, labour mobility, and the share of expenditure spent on
"footloose" production (in our model "manufacturing"). Models like this mainly
emphasise the importance of a "market potential" for final goods: the optimality of a
production location depends on its access to markets. But there are also other kinds of
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externalities leading to spatial concentration. In this section we try to provide an
overview of these external economies.
The most cited concept of external economies was presented by Alfred Marshall in his
book "Principles of Economies" in 1920. Despite its age, it still gives a very good
review of some of the most important externalities leading firms to concentrate.
Marshall mentioned three specific reasons for localisation:
1) Labour market pooling,
2) Intermediate inputs, and
3) Technological spillovers.
Labour market pooling
It is widely believed, that a spatial concentration of firms in an industry (a so-called
industrial cluster) which allows for a pooled market for labour with specialised skills,
will be beneficial to both firms and workers. A concentrated labour market is, in other
words, believed to be a significant reason for localisation. To explain why, it is
convenient to use an example.
Suppose that there are two possible locations and two firms, Both firms use the same
kind of skilled labour. The firms can produce in either region, but because of
increasing returns to scale in production, they will choose to locate in only one of the
regions. For some reason, the firms' labour demand is uncertain and imperfectly
correlated: times may be "good" or "bad". In "good" times a firm needs 125 workers,
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but in "bad" times it only demands 75 workers. The total supply of workers is 200, so
that on average demand equals supply.F
Why would both firms and workers benefit from a concentration of both firms in one
region?
• If the firms are located in two different regions, we assume that this leads to a
fifty-fifty split of the labour force between the two locations. As a consequence, a
firm will not be able to exploit good times when it needs 125 workers to satisfy the
demand. However, if both firms and all workers were located in one region, then,
at least occasionally, one firm's good times would coincide with the other firm's
bad times, so that both firms' demands for labour would be satisfied.
• Turning to the labour force, the effect of pooling in one location is similar to the
effect that is experienced by firms: if each region is dominated by one company,
then bad times for the company mean bad times for the workers too. But given that
both firms have their plants in one region, then there will be a chance that one
firm's bad times will be offset by the good times of the other. Thus, a clustered
industry implies a lower average rate of unemployment.
We may conclude that both firms and workers gain from a pooled labour market, and
that a pooling of input factors will therefore encourage concentration. But one should
be aware that this conclusion relies heavily on the assumption of increasing returns
and some kind of uncertainty.
37 The wage rate is, in other words, taken as given, and we assume that it is set at an expected
market-clearing level. But it can be shown, that a flexible wage rate would not change the importance
of a pooled labour market for the establishing of an industry concentration (See Krugman (199la), pp
44-45.): an equal division of the labour force and firms between two locations, leads to a higher wage
in good times, and a lower wage in bad times. A pooled labour market will imply a constant wage
rate equal to the average of the high and low wage rates. Each firm will be employing more people in
good times, and fewer in bad times than they would have done if they were isolated from the other
firm. Each firm's gains from a pooled labour market will therefore be larger than the losses.
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The process that leads to a concentration of firms and labour may be illustrated
graphically:
Location l' s
shMeoffmn~~s ~
'--_....,J..;...;;.... ..... Location l's
share of workers
Figure 2.9
There is a fixed number of firms possessing a technology with increasing returns to
scale, and a certain number of workers with specialised skills. The FF curve and the
WW curve show the distributions of firms and workers that will leave the typical firm
and worker respectively, indifferent between the two locations.
Point 1 depicts where the two curves cross each other, i.e., the point in the centre of
the diagram where both firms and workers Me split evenly between the two locations.
Because of the dynamics in the model, which will be explained soon, there Me three
possible equilibria: all firms and workers in location 1, all firms and workers in
location 2, or a fifty-fifty split of firms and workers between the locations.
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Due to increased competition for the available workers, the profit of a firm located in
one specific region will decrease if the share of firms located in this region increases.
The attractiveness of a location to a firm is reduced, if an increase in the number of
firms is not offset by an increase in the number of workers in the region. As a result
FF must be upward sloping.
For the workers the effect is the opposite. The workers in one location would prefer to
locate together with as many firms as possible, and as few other workers as possible,
in order to decrease the risk of becoming unemployed.P WW also has to be upward
sloping.
To see why FF must be steeper than WW, consider point 2 in the figure: at this point
the ratio of firms to workers is the same in both locations, but location 1 possesses
more of each, thereby offering a more attractive location for both firms and workers
than location 2. The "graphical" consequences are, that point 2 has to lie below FF
(implicating that location 1 is preferred by the firms); and above WW (implicating that
location 1 is also preferred by the workers). This implicates an FF curve steeper than a
WW curve at point 1.
Reviewing the dynamics of the model, we can see that the equilibrium in the centre of
the diagram is unstable. Firms and workers will choose to concentrate in only one of
the locations, i.e., we shall see a convergence towards location 1 or 2.
38 Replacing the assumption of a fixed wage rate with an assumption of flexible wages. would still
Icave the workers with a motivation for allocating close to a cluster of firms: the more firms in one
location. the higher the wages ceteris paribus.
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The results above are robust to other assumptions about the wage rate (see footnotes
41 and 42), as well as to the possibility that a firm would try to exploit its monopsony
power. Such a firm-behaviour would, in fact, only increase the effect that a pooled
factor market has on localisation.t?
Intermediate inputs and vertically linked industries
The availability of specialised inputs and services is another externality, assumed to
cause agglomeration of firms belonging to the same industry (and therefore demanding
the same kind of intermediate inputs). A geographically concentrated industry allows
for a greater variety of, and more specialised, intermediate inputs, at a lower cost, at
the same time as a substantial concentration of downstream firms provides upstream
firms with a beneficial market access. In other words, cost, variety, and demand
linkages all encourage agglomeration of vertically linked industries. That verticallinks
trigger agglomeration, does, however, depend critically on an assumption of
increasing returns to scale in production and imperfect competition.
Comparing the kinds of agglomeration economies elucidated in the "Core-periphery"
model with the one just described, we observe that in both cases the phenomenon
"market potential" is central. They differ in the way the market-size is made
endogenous. In the "Core-periphery" model, the size of the market at different
locations was endogenous due to labour mobility. But if industries are vertically
linked, it is the movement of the downstream industry that affects the market-size for
the upstream firms,
39 See Krugman (1991a), pp 46-49.
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Anthony Venables has developed a formal model considering the allocation problem of
firms in an upstream and a downstream industry that are vertically linked (see
Venables (1993». Since this model is basically quite similar to Krugman's "Core-
periphery" model, we will not elaborate it in detail here, but just provide a brief
description of framework and results.
Both industries are imperfectly competitive, and the interaction between the
downstream and the upstream industry creates a force for agglomeration. Centrifugal
forces are labour supply and final demand, which are spread across locations, and
assumed immobile. Although the specific forces working for and against concentration
are different from those in the "Core-periphery" model, the economies of
agglomeration (positive externalities) are derived from the same, single source in both
models, namely the market interactions. Technological externalities are neither
considered by Krugman, nor by Venables.
A key parameter is the costs of ffi¥ket access.s? Similarly to the results regarding the
sustainability of a core in the "Core-periphery" model, it turns out that the forces of
agglomeration are greatest at the intermediate level of these costs. A reduction in
transport costs from a high to an intermediate level, leads to agglomeration and
divergence among regions. But a further reduction in transport costs to a very low
level will, according to Venables' results, cause diversification and increased
convergence of economic structure and income among regions.
It is interesting to note that, a reduction in costs affecting the incentives to cluster, and
thereby the spatial equilibrium, may lead to reallocation in different directions,
40 Costs of market access are equal to what we have earlier referred to as "transport costs". For the
sake of simplicity, we will keep referring to these kinds of costs, as "transport costs" .
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depending on the characteristics of the industry in question and other vertically related
industries. Furthermore, depending on initial conditions and industry characteristics,
the effect of parameter changes may be small or large, incurring a slightly different
equilibrium or a dramatic change from concentration to dispersion (or vice versa).
Venables also discusses the implications of a regional "industrial base": because a
firm's choice of location depends on the allocation of other firms, like in the "Core-
periphery" model, the possibility of multiple equilibria arises. Another consequence of
this interdependence between firms is that, if one firm's (or several firms') locational
choice is altered, the whole vertically linked chain of firms may be affected, and as a
result we get a totally changed equilibrium.
Ultimately, we return to the crucial assumption of market imperfections. This
assumption is critical to the results achieved by Venables. If, for instance, the
upstream industry were perfectly competitive with all manufacturers producing the
same homogenous goods, the downstream industry would probably always use its
local supplier. But product differentiation (as Venables assumes in his model) ensures
that all downstream firms use all upstream firms' products. Due to demand linkages,
the firms in the upstream industry would, in this case, have an incentive to concentrate
their production in one location, and the price for intermediate goods will be lower the
more upstream firms there are in one location. This implies lower costs for the
downstream industry and encourages agglomeration.
Technological spillovers
This is the very "common" externality that is (almost) always mentioned among the
reasons for agglomeration in space. Silicon Valley and Boston's Route 128 are
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famous examples of industry clusters arising from knowledge spillovers between
nearby firms, The difference between these kinds of externalities and the external
economies rising from labour market pooling and intermediate goods supply, is that
knowledge spillovers are, as Krugman describes them, invisible. In other words,
technological spillovers are, difficult to measure and an economist needs to make
several assumptions about their form and size before he can include them in a model.
Comparing the modelling of spillover effects with the models in which market
interactions are responsible for agglomeration, the advantage of the latter models is
clear: explicit assumptions about the externalities are not necessary. The external
economies rise from interaction between increasing returns, factor mobility, and
transport costs.f Currently, the modelling of knowledge spillovers relies totallyon
the vague concept of external effects. As a consequence of the difficulties related to the
models with these kinds of agglomeration economies, the issue of technological
spillover effects has not received much attention within the new field of geography and
economics.
41 As, for instance, from the interaction between internal increasing returns, factor mobility, and
transport costs in the Core-periphery model.
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3. International trade and geography
3.1 The difference between a region and a nation
What is the difference between a region and a nation? The answer to this question may
seem obvious. But a proper definition of these two notions is necessary in order to
understand the relation between the subjects microeconomics and geography, and
international trade and geography.
A nation is not necessarily equal to a region. A nation may consist of several regions,
but it is also possible that a number of nations constitutes a region. The region depicts
the relevant territory where external economies leading to agglomeration and
development of core-periphery patterns, apply. Within the theory of imperfect
competition and international trade, it has been widely believed that, external
economies apply at the level of a nation, implicating that political borders have the
same function as regional boundaries.t- This presumption is, in fact, not quite correct.
We may find examples proving that, indeed, it is the borders that determine the unit,
within which the external effects work. But then, this is because of national policies,
not because of economic factors. In other words, it is the regional boundaries, not the
national ones, that are decisive for where the external effects apply.
But in spite of all we have said about a nation being unequal to a region, due to the
great importance of national governments' policies influencing the movements of
factors and goods between countries, in many cases it will be both possible and
42 Based on such an assumption, Krugman (1980), for instance, finds that allowing for increasing
returns, transport costs, and differences in country size, a large country will tend to export goods
characterised by increasing. returns in production, while a small country will tend to export goods
produced subject to constant returns to scale.
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correct to compare a nation with one region. What we wish to emphasise is that,
although there are both cases where a country is equal to just one region and cases
where it contains several regions, the framework and model structure used in chapter
two are also applicable within the theory of international trade and geography.
Actually, it is not possible to separate the subjects microeconomics and geography,
and trade and geography. Models can include two or more regions, allowing for the
study of one or multiple agglomerations (cores), independent of which of the two
subjects we are working with.
Some will probably argue that the models described in the previous chapter did not
include tariffs or any other kinds of trade barriers. However, "transport costs", which
were included, need not be interpreted as costs related to transport only. Reviewing
Venables' model of vertically integrated firms (see paragraph 2.2), we mentioned that
"costs of market access" should be considered equal to what we had earlier referred to
as "transport costs". There is no reason why we cannot think of these costs as a
mixture of transport costs, tariffs, difficulties related to communication, cultural
differences, and other kinds of trade costs: what they all have in common is that they
tend to reduce geographical concentration. The interpretation of the notion "transport
costs", is determined by whether we are studying trade between national regions or
between countries.
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3.2 The implications of the "new" location theory for trade theory
The development of what we have called a "new" location theory allows us to study
new, interesting fields within the theory of international economics. Additionally, it
may force modifications and alterations of earlier results attained in international trade.
Where production takes place is, without doubt, of great importance to the individual
nation. With respect to the welfare of its inhabitants, it is not trivial whether a large
share of the world's production is located within the country or in a neighbouring
country. Hence, it is in the own interest of a national government to conduct an
economic policy which reinforces localisation of industries within its national borders.
Typically appealing international trade issues that may be analysed employing the tools
of the "new" location are, for instance:
• The way changes in tariffs and other trade policies influence localisation and
national welfare. How, for example, the results from the GATT negotiations might
influence a country's production and welfare.
• Economic integration, and the implications of for instance the European Union
(EU).
• How changes in transport costs influence localisation and trade. Transport costs are
obviously also affected by the technological evolution, leading to for example
cheaper transportation. But the costs related to transportation may also be
influenced by a firm's or an industry's "production philosophy": currently "just in
time" is a well known notion, implicating the importance of time for the producers.
The necessity of precise (and fast) delivery, may implicate increased transport
costs.
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• The technological evolution, affecting the importance of economies of scale in
production, and thereby a firm's allocation decision.
• Endogenous growth within the context of economic integration.
• A country's regional policy. We learned in the previous chapter that immobile
factors of production, immobile suppliers, and immobile demand have a
centrifugal effect, i.e., a negative effect, on agglomeration. A government's
influence on the settling of households and firms, may have a significant effect on
localisation and on the conditions of production and trade.
• How the price of land influences agglomeration and a firm's incentives to locate
within a specific region or nation. Price of land is usually presumed to have a
negative effect on agglomeration, because localisation and urbanisation are
developments that enforce an increase in the price of land.
• How the availability and quality of public goods can have either negative or positive
effects on agglomeration (external diseconomies or external economies of scale). A
country with a good infrastructure will provide its firms with better conditions for
concentration, and better possibilities of exploiting internal and external economies
of scale.
To provide a first insight into how issues like these may be analysed, we offer an
example: considering the first two issues, it is obvious that changes in trade costs are
in focus. These changes may be analysed in the context of the "Core-periphery" model
described in the previous chapter. We only make one modifIcation: in order to be able
to study the case of multiple agglomerations or cores, we allow for more than two
regions. We assume that there are three possible geographical structures: depending on
the parameter values (increasing returns, transport costs etc.), there may be one core,
two cores or no cores at all.
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Figure 3.1
Figures 3.1 illustrates the possibilities of one and two cores respectively. (The cores
are marked in black.) Our economy is assumed to contain 6 regions. Transport
between the regions is only possible along the lines connecting the regions. In the case
with two cores, each core will have a hinterland consisting of two neighbouring
regions. (Hence, hinterland of region 1 is regions 2 and 6, and regions 3 and 5 form
the hinterland of region 4.)
Given strong economies of scale in production, low transport costs, and a large share
of the economy's industries being "footloose", the economy will probably support one
core only. If the parameters take on the reverse values, then there will probably be no
cores at all. As for intermediate levels of all the parameters, there will be a chance of
multiple (in this case: two) cores.
We now divide our economy into two countries: one country consisting of two
regions, and one country consisting of 4 regions. The broader line in figure 3.2
illustrates how the economy is divided. Between the countries there are trade barriers
causing higher transport (trading) costs internationally than nationally.
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Figure 3.2
What will happen if the transport costs between the countries are reduced, or the two
economies become fully integrated? There are more than one possible outcome.
Depending on how large "the reduction in transport costs is, there will be an
equilibrium with one or two cores. Imagining that we end up with one core, this will
probably be located in the larger country (with four regions), because of this nation's
head start caused by its larger home market. The larger nation will gain, and the
smaller willlose, due to the integration.
But if the equilibrium is characterised by two cores, this may be beneficial for the
small country, but not for the large country. The reason why being that the core in the
small country will presumably be able to gain extra hinterland, namely region 5, which
was earlier hinterland of the core in the large country, and is actually more closely
located to the core in the small country. Manufacturers in the small country will get the
opportunity to expand at the expense of the manufacturers in the larger country.
As for welfare effects of economic integration, we first need to define whose welfare
we are concerned with. If the welfare of a nation is defined as the welfare enjoyed by
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its immobile factors, the relationship between transport costs, localisation, and welfare
may be illustrated as in figure 3.3. Suppose that there are two regions, and transport
costs incurred by trade between the regions are high. The firms will not have an
incentive to cluster in just one of the regions. The core-periphery pattern will not
appear. The degree of welfare is the same in both regions.
Welfare
Periphery
~
I
Transport costs
Figure 3.3
A gradual reduction in transport costs raises welfare in both regions, until a critical
level of transport cost is reached. At this level the transport costs have declined to such
an extent that the geographical structure changes dramatically. A core emerges, and we
can observe great differences in welfare between the core-region and the periphery-
region. But as the transport costs decline even more, both regions will experience a
growing, converging welfare. As transport costs reach zero, location ceases to matter,
and the degree of welfare will be the same in both regions.
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In other words, a reduction in transport costs to an intermediate level leads to a
concentration in one region, i.e., the country possessing the core gains, whereas the
more peripheral country loses. If both nations are to gain from an economic
integration, we need a close integration with dramatically reduced transport costs, not
only a limited one. Figure 3.4 shows how welfare in the nation condemned to become
the periphery, depends on the degree of economic integration.
Welfare
Degree of integration
(Transport costs)
Figure 3.4
A few words about the implications for trade policy: being close to the criticallevel of
transport costs (see figure 3.4), only a small change in these costs will be enough to
achieve a significant raise in welfare in one of the nations. Hence, even modest policy
alterations may, under certain circumstances, be enough to incur a dramatic change in
one country's welfare, at the expense of the welfare of another country.
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3.3 Applications of economic geography within trade theory
Most of the authors who have been preoccupied with geography, international
economics and trade, have chosen to concentrate on the European integration. The
economic integration within Europe has, in fact, probably been the prime motivation
for several economists to devote themselves to the subject of geography. The
completing of the internal market raises many important questions from an
economist's point of view. Some of these cannot be elaborated or answered without
the inclusion of geography and space in traditional economic models.
The article "'Integration and the competitiveness of peripheral industry", written by
Krugman and Venables (1990) has been pathbreaking on the topic of trade and
geography. They approach a problem that has received much attention from
economists as well as politicians: how the completing of the internal market, involving
a greater economic integration of the EU countries, will affect the role played by the
Southern peripheral regions of the community.
It is quite common to consider two possible outcomes of the integration process:
• The economic integration may permit the Southern countries in Europe to exploit
their comparative advantage, and lead to an expansion of the relatively labour-
intensive industries in these economies. In other words, due to labour abundance
and lower relative wages, we might observe a process of reallocating of industries
from the North towards the Southern periphery.
In the context of trade theory, we explain this result as follows: in a situation with
restricted trade, a small.country will not be able to exploit the possibility of economies
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of scale in production at the same time as a high level of competition is achieved. This
"cost of smallness" is removed by free trade. The outcome is somehow consistent
with what we would have expected if the Heckscher-Ohlin theory had been applied to
the problem: the nations being relatively labour abundant will be net-exporters of
labour-intensive products.
• The fact that the Northern countries in the EU have a more economically central
location within the community, leads to a closer and better market access for the
firms situated in ·these countries. If the importance of "market potential" is
evaluated higher than cheap labour force by the firms, the Southern countries
might experience a relocation of its industries towards the North, as a consequence
of the economic integration.
In their article Krugman and Venables elaborate how the role of the Southern
periphery is determined, i.e., under what circumstances the different outcomes seem
likely. Their model consists of two economies, one central with a large local market,
and one small (labour abundant) economy. Each economy has an imperfectly
competitive (and labour-intensive) manufacturing sector, with firms possessing
technologies with increasing returns to scale. Intra-industry trade will occur, since
firms in both countries supply consumers in both countries. Trade between countries
incurs transport costs.
The authors conduct the following experiment: they reduce the barriers to trade
between the countries, look at how the relative competitiveness of the manufacturing
sector in each country is affected, and elucidate how production and trade may change.
Consistent with what we have written earlier, the following results appear:
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• If trade barriers are very high, markets in both economies will be served by local
firms, Le. self-sufficiency determines the location of production. Due to the
production technologies with high fixed costs, the price must be relatively higher
in the small economy.
• As trade barriers are reduced, production tends to move towards the centre, and
the periphery becomes a net importer of manufactured goods. At intermediate
levels of barriers, the advantages of greater access to the larger market are most
important, i.e., the centripetal forces are the strongest.
• If trade barriers are very low, and there are no cost differences across the
economies, location ceases to matter: firms have equally good access to all
markets, independent of location.
The importance of market access is countervailed by factor price differences between
the centre and the periphery. Assuming that the small country is relatively labour
abundant with relatively low wages, and that the manufacturing sectors are labour
intensive, this pulls production towards the peripheral country.
Integration will lead to an increased divergence in wages until an intermediate level of
transport costs is reached At this level, where the advantages of a good market access
are most important, the wages in the periphery will also be the lowest, due to their
initiallevel, and due to the country's decline in production during the first part of the
integration process. As the process of integration continues, the wages in the two
countries will converge. It appears that it is possible to draw a U-shaped curve to
explain how the wages in the periphery change as the process of economic integration
proceeds.
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In general, the relationship between output (welfare) in the peripheral country and
integration can also be described through a V-shaped curve: as integration approaches
an intermediate level, production in the periphery declines. But as we reach a very low
level of transport costs, relative factor endowment determines the direction of net
trade, and the relatively labour abundant small economy becomes net exporter of
manufactures.
The authors emphasise, that forces tending to equalise factor prices, such as
international factor mobility, will reinforce the importance of market access in
determining the location of manufacturing.
Krugman and Venables conclude that the effects of the completing of the internal
market are ambiguous. Because of lower trade costs, there could be an expansion of
the production in the Southern peripheral countries. But we might just as well observe
a concentration ofproduction in the North, leading to a reduction in peripheral wages.
Anything impeding the relative wages in the South from changing, reinforces the
tendency to concentration in the Northern centre. But since we do not know the initial
levels of trade barriers within the EV, i.e., on which side of the V-curves we are, it is
not possible to tell whether the completing of the economic integration will improve or.
worsen the competitiveness of the peripheral industry.
The two authors have later followed up the work just referred to, with Krugman and
Venables (1993c), where they demonstrate the possibility that due to the growing
integration of the European market, Europe may develop an American-style economic
geography. "American-style" in the sense that each industry only has one major centre
of production. Their main concern is that although such a development is found to
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raise real incomes in the end, there may be serious adjustment problems along the
way. Possible transition costs associated with such a shift in the economic geography
are elaborated.
Other authors have also expressed their concern about the possibility that the European
integration may lead to a divergent economic development within the Community:
Blanchard and Katz stress the problems related to a monetary union in Europe.43 The
two authors have studied how the states of the U.S. respectively, adjust after having
been affected by an adverse shock to employment. They find that the dominant
adjustment mechanism is labour mobility. Based on their results from the U.S.,
Blanchard and Katz criticise one of the common arguments for a common currency
area in Europe: once a common currency is introduced and exchange rates are fixed,
"firms and workers will no longer expect to be bailed out by monetary expansion and
depreciation". But what will now happen if the firms face a decline in
competitiveness? Due to a missing flexibility, wages will not decline enough to
prevent an increase in unemployment. According to evidence from the U.S., the
regions affected by a negative shock, will experience a labour emigration as the
economy adjusts towards equilibrium.
What Blanchard and Katz suggest, is that due to a lower labour mobility in Europe
than in the U.S., shocks may have larger and longer lasting effects on relative
unemployment in Europe.
43 See Blanchard and Katz (1992).
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Probably motivated by Baldwin (1989), who argues that economic integration may be
expected to increase the level of European production as well as the European growth
rate, Bertola emphasises that not all European regions will necessarily experience an
increased economic growth as an impact of the integration. To provide a better
understanding of his argument, he offers a model of localised endogenous growth+'
Bertola's model is based on the assumptions of two regions; increasing returns in
production, constant returns to capital in each region, which enjoys potentially
different levels and growth rates of production before integration, and free factor
mobility.
The exploitation of scale economies made possible by the economic integration, can
only be realised if the factors of production are concentrated in the region with the
highest productivity. It is stressed that as long as geographic concentration leads to
higher aggregate production, policy should not prevent factor mobility. Instead,
national governments and the EU politicians should concentrate on a distributional
policy in favour of the owners of the immobile factors (such as land) in the
underprivileged regions. Bertola actually states that a divergent economic development
does not necessarily need to be inconsistent with better efficiency and faster aggregate
growth. So far, he seems to agree with Baldwin.
But it is then argued, that due to empirical evidence about Europe, it would perhaps be
more correct to assume that returns to capital accumulation are constant in the
aggregate of two distinct localities, but decreasing if each locality is considered
44 See Bertola (1992).
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separately.v Based on this altered model where the role of externalities is emphasised,
Bertola finds that the market interactions will yield a privatelyoptimal, but probably
not a socially optimal outcome. When a geographical dimension is added to the
externalities in a model of endogenous growth, free factor mobility may not optimise
the overall performance of an integrated economy.
To influence private investment decision, and prevent undesirable side-effects of
economic integration, which lead to a slower rather than a faster growth in the
integrated economy, distortionary taxation and lump-sum redistribution are needed.
Bertola concludes that a united European tax structure ensuring the internalisation of
geographical linkages between productive activity in different localities, might be
needed to promote aggregate European economic developments.
Martin and Rogers (1994) examine the impact of public infrastructure on industrial
location, when increasing returns are present. They analyse the role of infrastructure in
the context of trade integration, and find that, not surprisingly, trade integration
implies that the sector with increasing returns to scale williocate in the countries with
the best infrastructures. As for policy implications, it turns out that if the aim of an
infrastructure policy is to foster industrial convergence between a rich and a poor
country, the infrastructure policy must be biased in favour of infrastructure that
facilitates intra-regional trade rather than international trade.
Ultimately, we would like to mention a few papers on geography and international
trade that are concerned with problems associated with the Third World, rather than
45 Bertola argues that the capital inflow experienced by the capital-poor countries Spain and Portugal
since they joined the EU, does not support the thought of constant returns to capital in all European
countries. If this were the fact, we should expect an inflow to the richer members of the EU.
78
Economic geography and trade -A survey of the literature
with the European integration. Krugman and Venables (1994), Puga (1994), as well
as Elizondo and Krugman (1992) have all been concerned with such questions.
Krugman and Venables consider how globalisation affects the location of
manufacturing and the gains from trade enjoyed by the Western and Third World
countries. In the two latter articles, the impact of trade policy on the regional structure
of a country is discussed. We shall give a short summary of the article by Elizondo
and Krugman:
Today, many of the largest cities of the world are located in developing countries. But
in the development literature little, if any, attention has been paid to the issue of
urbanisation and the growth of giant cities. When trade policies in developing
countries are discussed, the effects such policies could have on internal economic
geography in these nations, are neglected.
Elizondo and Krugman argue that this neglect is serious, if not a mistake, because the
trade policies of developing countries and their tendency to develop large metropolitan
centres are closely linked: the rise (and gradual fall) of giant cities in developing
countries can be explained by the strong backward and forward linkages that exist
when the manufacturers try to serve a small, closed domestic market.sf It is argued
that closed markets promote a centralisation of production and huge central
metropolises, whereas open markets discourage agglomeration and the emergence of
such cities.
46 Backward linkages depict access to consumer markets; and forward linkages depict access to other
firms' goods. The goods of other firms can either belong in the consumption basket of the firm's
workers, or they can be intermediates.
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The giant metropolises in the Third World may be seen as an unintended by-product of
import-substitution policies, because protection is assumed to imply stronger
backward and forward linkages enforcing concentration. As developing countries
liberalise, one might expect that the large cities in developing countries would tend to
shrink due to weaker (national) linkages. Employing a model of economic geography,
Elizondo and Krugman actually show that starting with a concentrated population, a
process of liberalisation affecting the degree of reliance on the domestic market will
reduce concentration. Increased export of final products and increased import of
intermediates decrease the importance of being close to a country's metropolitan
centre.
***
The subject of trade and geography is a newone with several unanswered questions.
Much research is still to be done: existing models may be extended and improved by
the inclusion of additional parameters and variables, and new models should be
developed in the attempt to study further aspects of economic geography and
localisation within a microeconomic framework.
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Essay 2
Uncertain trade costs and industrial localisation
- Concentration versus diversification
by
Karen Helene Midelfart Knarvik*
Introduction
Experience has showed us that uncertainty about the political and economic
environment and a fear of future policy reversal, may cause reallocation of firms and
capital flight, and have serious implications. To stimulate business and growth in a
country, commitment and irreversible policy changes are required.
This paper was inspired by the choice of a few small European countries to remain
outside the European Union (EU), in a time when the world is dividing itself into rival
trading blocks. The future of countries remaining outside these blocks may seem quite
uncertain. Three of these small European "outsider" countries chose to sign the
European Economic Area (EEA) agreement, which extends the EU's "four freedoms"
to themselves. But doubt has been expressed as to what extent this agreement provides
* I would like to thank Jan I. Haaland, Victor D. Norman, Jostein Tvedt and Anthony J. Venables for
valuable ideas and comments.
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assurance that policy changes are stable and irreversible to the same degree as EU
membership would have done.!
There are two "types" of uncertainty related to the EEA: (i) its somewhat uncertain
future and the possibility of parliaments choosing to terminate the agreement (ii) The
always existing possibility of parts of the agreement being suspended, due to
dissension about new EU measures.s The impact of such suspensions may be severe
for commercial interests. It is often suggested that the EEA agreement will therefore
probably not provide firms with sufficient assurance that policy changes are
permanent, in contrast to an EU-membership, which is widely believed to eliminate
any artificial reason for firms to relocate production from EFrA to EU.
What we seek to elucidate, is how a situation of uncertainty regarding future trade
policy, international agreements, and thereby trade costs>, may affect firms'
competitiveness, investment behaviour and allocational choice. Of main interest are the
implications uncertainty might have for the allocation of economic activity, for the
distribution of such between countries, and for international trade.
To be concerned about the impact of uncertainty does indeed not represent anything
new within the subject of international economics. There is a literature - though not a
substantial one - on international trade and uncertainty with important contributions
1 Wijnbergen (1985), a.o, demonstrate, that uncertainty about future policy reversals coupled with
irreversible investment, may lead to capital flight
2 In accordance with the political system of the EEA, the EFfAns do not actually have to approve
every new EUmeasure, but they never have the choice between status quo and accepting the new law.
In other words, the law must be accepted or the whole relevant part of the EEA agreement is
suspended. (See Baldwin (1994).)
3 Trade costs should be interpreted as a measure of an extensive range of costs, related to the export
from one country to another, and thereby including trade taxes, transport costs, costs of frontier
formalities and differing product standards. A discussion of some of these costs is found in Baldwin
(1994), p. 43; and an overview of non-tariff barriers is given in the Cecchini report (1988).
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by Helpman, Razin, Grossman and Cheng, a.o.4 Characterising most approaches to
the subject, are the assumptions of competitive firms and a degree of risk aversion.
The prevailing types of uncertainty are price uncertainty, technological uncertainty or
uncertainty in preferences. The mainstream of contributions is concerned with the
question of to what extent the fundamental theorems of the theory of international trade
carry over to uncertain environments, and studies the pattern of trade under
uncertainty.
More related to the subject of this paper is probably the work done by Baldwin, Dixit
and Krugman on how exchange rate fluctuations influence entry and exit decisions,
and may yield hysteresis.s The implications that trade cost uncertainty has for the
decision of a profit maximising, imperfectly competitive, internationally trading firm
about how and where to locate, have, however, been subject to less attention. Nor can
the traditional theory of location provide us with much insight regarding such a fmn's
allocation.s And although the issue of industriallocation coupled with the theory of
trade has recently become subject to increasing attention, uncertainty aspects still
remain pretty ignored?
The objective of our approach is to focus on how firms' choice of allocation
internationally, and thereby foreign direct investments, are influenced by uncertain
trade arrangements. We analyse how an oligopolistic firm that is critically dependent
4 See e.g. Helpman and Razin (1978a) and (1978b), Grossman and Razin (1985), Cheng (1983).
Based on a survey by these authors, Dumas (1980) offers a good overview of the subject, by
categorising the different approaches within the literature.
S See e.g. Baldwin and Krugman (1989), and Dixit (1989a) and (1989b).
6 There have been approaches to the issue of uncertainty and imperfectly competitive firms. But the
location of the firm is then confined to a set of points along a line between output and input markets,
and one solves for the optimum location on this line. (See Mai (1984), and Park and Martbur (1990).)
- In other words, an approach consistent with traditionallocation theory, but not addressing the
aspects of uncertainty, that we wish to emphasise.
7 See e.g. Krugman (1991), Venables (1993), and Krugman and Venables (1993).
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upon access to a large foreign market, may respond to uncertain trade costs. Will it
diversify investments and allocate some of its production facilities abroad in order to
avoid market foreclosure, and if so, what are the necessary conditions for a finn to
react in this way'!
This paper is organised as follows: section 1 offers an overview of the basic elements
of the model. Section 2 sets out the formal model. In section 3 the conditions for
foreign direct investment and geographically dispersed production in the absence of
uncertainty, are derived. How to distribute production capacity iritemationally under
trade cost uncertainty is considered in section 4, and the case with uncertainty is
compared with that characterised by no uncertainty. Section 5 concludes.
1. Basic elements of the model
We introduce a model of intra-industry trade between two economies with different
market size (s). In order to focus on the implications of trade cost uncertainty for the
production and welfare of a region or nation, and bring out the importance of relative
market size, comparative advantages - differences in technology and factor
endowments - are assumed away. Hence, countries only differ in relative size. The
two economies will be labelled subscripts ;=1,2. The market in economy 1 is assumed
smaller than that in economy 2, so that Sl < S2' The industry in focus is imperfectly
competitive with firms producing homogenous products. There are barriers to entry,
so that the number of firms in the industry is fixed, and exogenous to the model. One
should note that the number of firms in the two-country world does not necessarily
equate the number of plants. One finn may have one or more plants. Though it will
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never have more than one plant in each country. Thus, we have a model of
international oligopoly and possibly foreign direct investment
There are costs related to international trade that are subject to uncertainty. We imagine
that there are two possible future states: one" good" and one "bad". In a "good" state
trade costs are low - or possibly infinitely small. But in a "bad" state these costs are
so high that they may, in fact, obstruct trade completely, because foreign
manufacturers are not able to compete with domestic manufacturers. We let the
probability of low trade costs be p, O<P < l, so that the probability of high trade cost
is (1-p).8 Regarding the firms' attitude towards risk, all firms are assumed risk
neutral, and they act in order to maximise expected profits. In order to avoid the
uncertain trade costs, a firm can undertake foreign direct investment, Le. diversify.
The transition to becoming a multinational firm enables the firm to conduct foreign
manufacturing, and thereby to serve its foreign consumers from a plant in their own
country.?
Launching a two-step decision model of oligopolistic firms undertaking investment in
production facilities, we shall consider the implications of trade cost uncertainty for a
firm 's distribution of production between its home country and other countries.
8 In accordance with the "common prior assumption" (also known as the Harsanyi "doctrine"), we
assume that the probability of different policies, which should be regarded as a subjective probability
assessment, is common to all flrms, because they are all thought to have access to the same
information. However, following Kreps (1990), we argue that this is, in fact, a very strong
assumption with substantial implications for the results derived in the proceeding model
9 Within the theory of trade, there is a substantial literature on multinational firms. Four different
incentives to disperse economic activities geographically are usually considered. The emergence of
these f11lDS is explained as 1) a response to tendencies of factor rewards to differ across countries, 2) a
way to save transport costs and tariffs, 3) a way to internalise international transactions, and 4) a
response to international differences in tax systems. See e.g. Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Ethier
(1986). The emergence of multinationals may, nevertheless, also be ascribed to the existence of
uncertainty and the wish to avoid this. Although this reason for diversification has not been much
discussed within the context of trade theory, it has been widely recognised within the theory of
corporate policy under the notion of "diversification of location" - perhaps better described by the
German word "Standort-Diversifikation". See Timmermann (1973), LO.
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A two-stage game is considered: at the first stage firms decide about total production
capacity, and employ the inputs needed to exploit this capacity. If a firm wants to
divide its production between locations in order to secure access to the foreign market,
this decision will also have to be made at this stage. Each firm has two options: (l) to
establish one plant at home; (2) to establish two plants, one at home and one abroad.
This early in the game, the firms do not know what the actual trade cost will be.
However, as the second stage is reached, the trade cost has been unveiled. But since
the level of production and its localisation were already determined at a previous stage,
the only decision the firm is left with at this stage, is how to distribute the output
between the markets. In other words, at the second stage fmns face a constrained
profit maximisation problem. We assume competition at both stages to take the form
of the Cournot variety. - A simplifying assumption, but which makes the model
considerably more tractable.
A representative firm located in economy l (a "firm l" for short), has to make two
decisions before it knows what the trade costs will be: it has to decide about total
production capacity, and also what share of the capacity, if any, to locate abroad in the
larger economy 2. Regarding a representative firm in economy 2 (a "firm 2" for
short), we assume that an international diversification is not considered, since by
assumption, the export market is relatively small compared to the home market.
Hence, at the first stage, this firm only decides on total production capacity to install in
its home location.
It follows that a firm 2 will only be serving market I from its plant in location 2, i.e.
through export. As for a firm I, it will either serve market 2 from its factory in
location I, or possibly from a second plant in location 2, or from both plants if
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insufficient capacity has been invested in the plant in location 2. To simplify the
analysis. we exclude the possibility of a firm 1 serving its home market (market 1)
from a plant in location 2.
What we wish to emphasise is. under which circumstances does a finn based in the
small country ( market Sl) wish to invest in capacity abroad in order to serve the
foreign market from a local plant. Of special interest is how trade cost uncertainty
affects a firm's decision whether or not to disperse production and invest in
production facilities abroad
2. The formal model
Demand curves are assumed linear. The demand that a firm experiences in country i is
identified by the inverse demand curve
(1)
where Xii denotes the sales of a single firm located in country i in his home country.
and Xj; is the quantity produced by a single firm based in country j, and consumed in
country i.
Defining the total production capacity of a representative finn based in economy 1 as
~. the part of its capacity invested abroad as ~2' the total capacity of a representative
firm based in economy 2 as ~. and the finn i's exports as ei. we may write:
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• a firm 1's sales at home in location 1 as Xll =~ - ~2 - el
• a firm 1's sales abroad in location 2 as Xl2 = ~2 + el
• a firm 2's sales at home in location 2 as x22 = Ie,. - e2
• a flrm 2's sales abroad in location 2 as X21 =e2•
(2)
(3)
(4)
(S)
We assume that the firms are always better off exploiting their capacity completely,
since according to the model, capacity has to be installed, and inputs employed, before
trade costs are known.
The firms' production involves a constant marginal cost, CiO Since comparative
advantages are not being considered, this marginal cost is assumed the same for all
firms regardless of in which economy they are based, as long as their production takes
place in their home location.
Exporting from one economy to another involves trade cost. The trade cost (7) is
assumed to be invariant of the nationality of the exporting firm. The trade cost is
subject to an uncertainty: there is a probability of 1-p that the trade cost will tum out
as t+e, and a probability of p that the trade cost is t - e, and 0< £ St. The
expected trade cost for the shipping of one unit of output between countries is
obviously t+(1-2p)£. Iftrade costs are high, i.e., equal to t+e, international trade
does not entail profit, but if they are lower than t+e, trade is possible and profitable.
In the former case, we imagine that the firms face a situation where their optimal
export is zero, because non-negative profits from exports cannot be realised. In other
words, there is a 1-p chance of international trade being "impeded", and the two
separated markets being served from local plants alone, because foreign suppliers are
not able to compete with the domestic suppliers at such a high level of trade costs.
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Using the equations (1) - (5), and the information about the firms' costs, the profits of
the representative firms in countries 1 and 2 respectively, can, in general, be expressed
as
b depicts an additional marginal cost related to producing abroad. In other words,
marginal cost incurred when producing at a firm l's second plant would be (c +b).
One might object that, it would have been more correct to defme b as an additional
fixed cost related to the set-up of a new plant. However, in such a case, more precise
information about market size of country 2, levels of trade costs, and the size of the
additional fixed cost incurred by foreign direct investment, is required in order to
compare the different alternatives of a firm with regard to supplying a foreign market.
In order to ensure that the division of capacity between countries actually represents an
alternative to export for a firm I, b < t+e must be met. But unless t - e < b is true, a
firm will always prefer setting up a second plant abroad to the conducting of
international trade. Hence, we need to assume that
t-£<b<t+£. (8)
At the first stage the firms decide on capacity, and where to locate it. Since we mainly
wish to focus on the geographic distribution of a firm l's investments, i.e., the size of
k12, the determination of kl and ~ is left out. The total capacity of each firm is
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regarded as fixed - decided on at a stage zero. To derive k.2' we use backwards
induction, and solve the second stage of the game first: at the second stage firms
decide on how much to export, in other words, which fraction of the ex ante
determined home production that should be sold in the foreign market. The optimised
exports expressed in terms of capacities are subsequently used to substitute in the
firms' first stage maximisation problem. Firms' expected profits are now defined
solely by k., k.2 and ~.We maximise the expected profits with respect to k.2' and
find the optimal international distribution of production capacities.
3. Investing abroad in the absence or trade cost uncertainty
Before we turn to the analysing of investment abroad under trade cost uncertainty, we
take a quick look at the case in which trade costs are known and equal to the expected
trade cost, E(T] = t+ (1- 2p)e. - A case that will be referred to as the "certainty
case", and depicted by the superscript "c". For technical convenience we define
(9)
We intend to demonstrate which conditions must be satisfied. if investment abroad is
to be undertaken in a situation where trade costs are not subject to uncertainty.
In the certainty case the profits of a firm 1 and a firm 2 respectively, take the forms
(lO)
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(11)
Since trade costs are known for certain, firms possess the same information about
costs when making the decision whether or not to invest abroad, as they do when
exports are optimised. Hence, as strategic behaviour is absent, the game has a single
stage with a simultaneous choice of exports and foreign direct investments.
As for the firms based in the small market, differentiating (10) with respect to el and
kl2 while using equations (1) - (5), we obtain the necessary conditions for a profit
maximum:
(12)
(13)
From the expressions (12) and (13) it can be deduced that if, and only if, tE =b,
firms based in the small country may conduct exports as well as undertake investment
in plants abroad. In this case the outcome is ambiguous because a manufacturer will
ceteris paribus be indifferent between concentration and diversification of production.
If tE < b no investment will be undertaken abroad, and both markets will be served by
domestic and foreign suppliers. However, if tE> b, then the firms based in the small
country will choose to serve their foreign market by a local plant rather than by export.
It follows that tE =b is a necessary - though not a sufficient - condition for
investment abroad to be undertaken, while tE > b is a sufficient condition for foreign
direct investment to be pursued.
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Differentiating equation (11) with respect to e2, and using equations (1) - (5) to
substitute for prices, a firm 2's best response function in terms of capacities, is
Since the firms in country 2 never consider to invest abroad, their exports, e2• are
always positive in the case of certain trade costs. In order to concentrate on the firms
based in the small country, we shall not elaborate on the profit maximisation problem
of the large country firms any further.
From the fust order conditions, the equations characterising the demand functions,
and the firm 2's best response function, i.e., the equations (l) - (5) and (12) - (14),
profit maximising 1.2 and el can be derived. Depending on the value of b relative to
tE, a representative firm in country I will export and/or invest in production facilities
abroad in accordance with the expressions below:
(IS)
(16)
(17)
The results are illustrated graphically in figure l:
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tE
Figure 1
b
Decisive for the results obtained above, is the assumption about certainty. When
deciding how to distribute production capacity internationally, every firm knows what
the future trade cost will be. The decision how investment should be divided
geographically, is based on cost considerations. Thus, a firm invests in production
capacity abroad if, and only if, this results in costs lower than, or equal to, those that
would have been incurred if all production had taken place in its home country plant
If the profits from serving the foreign market are the same invariantly of how this
market is served - from a separate plant in the foreign market or by exports - other
variables than those considered in this model, will determine the outcome.
99
Uncertain trade costs and industrial lacalisation
4. Invesdng abroad under trade cost uncertainty
We now tum to the case where trade costs are subject to uncertainty, and may appear
as high or low. The superscript "u" depicts the presence of uncertainty, while "l" and
"hØ depict the cases with low and high trade costs respectively. If trade costs are low
the firms have access to their respective foreign markets through trade, and trade is
presumed to be profitable. Optimally chosen exports el and e2 in terms of capacities,
are found by differentiating the firms' profits. Profits under low trade costs for a fum
1 and a finn 2 respectively, are
tr; = (p;' -c)(~ -e;')+(p~ -c-t+e)e;', (19)
and the first order conditions can be written as
e~ ~O (20)
and
S n S SS "_ (ul ) ul_~1 _~ _ 12 k _ 12 (t-e)+--=:!- e +k;' -e SO
Sl+S2 (1+~)(Sl +S2) I (1+~)(Sl +S2) l+~ I 2 2 ,
e;' ~ 0.(21)
By assumption, optimised el,e2 > O if trade costs are low. From the first order
conditions we derive the firms' best response functions. Substituting for e;' and e~
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respectively. in the best response functions profit maximising exports for a fum 1 and
a firm 2 are obtained:
(22)
(23)
Using equations (1) - (5) and the expressions for the optimal exports under low trade
costs. the equilibrium prices under low trade costs can be written as functions of
capacities
(24)
(25)
However. trade costs are just as likely to tum out high. In this case the profits of a
firm 1 and a firm 2 take the forms
<= (p;" - c)(~ - e;")+ (p;m - c - t - e)e;" • (27)
and international trade is presumed never to be profitable. This assumption implies that
optimally chosen exports always equal zero. el = e2 =O. This will be true if. and only
101
Uncertain trade costs and industriallocalisation
if, the first order conditions for a finn l and a firm 2 respectively, hold with
inequality, which requires that the conditions (28) and (29) are satisfæd:
e:'" =0,
Sl ~ _ ~sa ~ +-.!!Lk" _ slsa (1+£)<0 (29)
Sl +Sa (l+naXSl +Sa) l+na la (l+naXSl +Sa) .
et =0.
When there is no trade due to trade costs obstructing foreign manufacturers from
competing with domestic manufacturers, the equilibrium prices in terms of capacities
take the forms
(30)
(31)
Having solved the firms' second stage maximisation problem, we turn to the decision
facing the firms at the first stage. The investment plan of a representative firm in
country I, which identifies how much capacity to invest at home and how much to
invest abroad, is obtained by choosing ~; to maximise expected profits. A finn 1'5
expected profits, E(ni]' may be defined in terms of capacities, using the results
generated above on trade and equilibrium prices under different levels of trade costs:
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Ernl]=
(l-p).[(p;- -c). (1. - 1."2)+(P~ - c-b). ~2]
+p.[(p'Il_cl Sl 1. + (1+2~)sIS2 (t-E»)
l 'lSl + S2 (l + n. + ~)( Sl + S2)
+(p'" -c)( Sa k _ (1+2~)sIS2 (t-E») (32)
2 Sl+ S2 l (l + ni + ~)(Sl + S2)
-(t-E).( S2 1. -1."2 - (1+2na)sIS2 (t-E»)-b1."2]
Sl+ S2 (l + n. + ~)( Sl + S2)
Substituting for the equilibrium prices using equations (24), (25), (30) and (31), and
differentiating with respect to 1.~, we obtain the necessary condition for a profit
maximum:
(33)
If a dispersion of capacities between the two countries is preferred, i.e., optimal
k~2>0, the fraction of a firm l's total capacity, which is invested in production
facilities abroad, can be derived from equation (33):
Investigation of the expressions (28), (29) and (34) tells us under what circumstances
k~2>O can be verified, i.e., under what circumstances a firm based in the small
country l will choose to diversify its investments in production facilities
internationally. The precise procedure followed in order to derive the conditions for a
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positive k.; under trade cost uncertainty is rendered in the appendix. Here we shall
concentrate on the main results.
In the certainty case, the additional marginal cost of producing abroad being equal 10
the expected trade cost (b = tE), was found to be a necessary, but not a sufficient
condition for firms to diversify. Hence, in order to derive whether the presence of
uncertainty affects a firm's investment behaviour, we may look at the investment
strategy adopted by the firm when b = tE and trade arrangements are subject to
uncertainty. Doing this we find that
~>o (35)
and
n1kl > 2~ + I . ~~
SI 3~ S2
(36)
are necessary as well as sufficient conditions for small country based firms to
diversify investments internationally under uncertainty when b = tE.
A closer inspection of expressions (36) and reveals that, the more national competitors
a manufacturer has, and the more pronounced his export dependence, i.e., the larger
the market 2, the more likely, ceteris paribus, is he to be affected by uncertain trade
arrangements and to reallocate part of his production internationally as a response to
the uncertainty. Furthermore, from (AI3) it can be derived that, if the "relative
production capacity" of small country based firms (nlk./sl) exceeds that of large
country firms (~~/S2)' and there is more than one firm based in the small country,
then small country firms will always wish to diversify investment internationally when
b=tE•
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As for the probability of high and low trade costs respectively, we find that provided
that foreign investment is conducted, the lower p, i.e., the higher the probability of
high trade costs "impeding" trade, the larger fraction of his production does a
manufacturer choose to locate abroad (see expression (34».
Comparing the results above with those obtained in the certainty case, we find that the
alternative to diversify production - implying foreign direct investment - becomes
more attractive to firms in a situation with uncertain trade costs. We remember that in
the certainty case, b S; tE was a necessary condition for firms to diversify, while
b < tE had to be satisfied for a diversification to be guaranteed. In the case of
uncertainty, we have shown that additional marginal costs related to manufacturing
abroad equal to expected trade costs, b = tE, may, in fact, be a sufficient condition for
firms to diversify geographically. Examining the expressions (35), (36) and (A14),
apart from the degree of export dependence, the number of firms based in the small
country appears as especially critical to the obtaining of these results. In order to
understand why the number of national competitors affects a firm's investment
strategy under uncertainty, we need to take a closer look at the model as well as at the
assumptions underlying it.
The main characteristics of the model are that capacities have to be decided on ex ante,
and that firms based in the same country all conduct the same investment strategy. Let
us compare the profit of a small country based firm that diversifies, with that of a firm
that concentrates production at home. Given that trade costs tum out low, it follows
from (32) that the firm will "lose" (b - (t - e») multiplied by the fraction of its capacity
that has been located abroad (k;2). However, if trade costs turn out to be high, having
invested in capacity abroad will imply increased profits relative to the alternative of
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having concentrated production at home. Why? First, because the strategy of
diversification secures access to - and profits from - the large foreign market.
Second, since the total capacity of a firm is ex ante fixed, the larger the fraction of a
firm's total capacity that is allocated abroad, the less the supply at home, and the
higher the price obtained in the home market. The more national competitors with the
same strategy as his own a manufacturer has, the larger the gains from diversifying
relatively to those obtained from concentration, since the price increase experienced in
the home market is positively correlated with the number of finns diversifying. In fact,
an increase in the number of national competitors also reduces the price obtained in the
foreign market. However, due to the difference in market size, and thereby in the
demand functions, the price reduction abroad stemming from the diversification of one
more country I firm, is less significant than the domestic price increase caused by this
firm's behaviour. (See the last section of the appendix, and in particular equations
(AI6) and (AI?).)
It follows that, while the potential losses from diversifying are independent of the
number - and behaviour - of national competitors, the potential gains from
diversifying are larger, the higher the number of such competitors.
Thus, uncertainty about future policy regimes may encourage geographical
diversification of production. Yet, although the presence of trade cost uncertainty may
provide firms with an incentive to conduct foreign direct investment, an increased
uncertainty, i.e., an increase in the variance in trade costs reduces the optimal amount
of capacity allocated abroad (see equation (34».10 - A result stemming from the fact
that there is a higher degree of flexibility connected to the alternative of concentrating
10 In statistical theory, an increased variance in trade costs depicts an increased uncertainty. A
discussion of this as a concept of increasing risk, is found in Rotschild and Stiglitz (1970).
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all production at home versus that of dividing production between the two countries,
and that the gains from this flexibility are higher the greater the variance in trade
costs.U The promoting effect of an increased trade cost variance on the "export
alternative", is reinforced by one of the assumptions underlying the model: since
export is assumed always to be impeded when trade costs are high, an increased
variance does not affect profits in the situation where trade costs resolve as high. But
with regard to the situation with low trade costs, an increased variance in trade costs
implies reduced costs of exporting, and makes export a more attractive alternative
relative to that of diversifying investments geographically.
5. Final remarks
It has been demonstrated that under trade cost uncertainty, an oligopolist with
extensive exports may diversify investments and allocate part of his production
abroad, in order to secure market access to a large export market Even though the unit
supply cost that he has to take into account when diversifying production
internationally, exceeds the expected unit supply cost associated with concentrating all
production in his home country, diversification may still occur to him as the more
attractive alternative.
It follows that uncertainty about international arrangements and their future may affect
firms' investment behaviour, no matter what their attitudes towards risk might be.
Even if a firm is risk neutral, its decisions may be affected by uncertainty. Hence, risk
Il When serving the foreign market from a local plant., a fum earns a constant profil But serving this
market through export, its profit varies with the level of trade costs. An increased variance incurs an
increase in profits in the case of low trade costs, which is more substantial than the reduction in
profits experienced if trade costs are high.
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aversion is not a necessary condition for firms' investment strategy to be influenced by
uncertainty. Finns with extensive exports may respond to uncertain international
arrangements and trade costs by reallocating production to the export market both in
fear of a market foreclosure, and in order to increase profits in the home market by
committing to an investment strategy that implies increased sales abroad and reduced
sales at home. The consequences for the remaining economic activity in the country
they "leave behind", and for the country as a whole, will be serious.
The negative effects on growth and welfare will be further enhanced if external
economies of industrial agglomeration are important. If external economies of
industrial agglomeration' are important, then a reallocation of fmns will also reduce the
competitiveness of remaining fmns and industries, and have dramatic consequences
for a country's growth and welfare.
The dependence of firms' foreign direct investments on the perceived probabilities of
low and high trade costs (Le. the size of P ) also has policy implications. Our results
suggest that, a policy aiming at avoiding or minimising the flight of firms and
production, should be framed to influence people's perception of p. Given relatively
fierce competition in the home market and a serious export dependence, it becomes
important to convey the impression that there is only a small probability of trade
becoming "impeded".
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Appendix
Expression (34), Le.,
tells us the size of ~u2' given that ~u2 is positive. It follows that t:'2>() implies
(AI) may be rewritten as
(1- p).[2"t ~ - ~ ~]- p. (t- e) >b.
Sl S2
(A2)
If b = tE = (1-p)·(t+e)+ p. (t- e) = t+ (1-2p)e, then from (A2) follows that
(A3)
must hold for k;2>() to be true.
While (34) provides us with the restriction that has to hold for kt'2 to be positive, the
expressions (28) and (29) create an interval of values within which ~u2 has to lie, for
optimal exports under high trade costs actually to be zero.
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From (28) it can be derived that
(A4)
and from (29) it can be derived that
(AS)
Using (34) to substitute for k;2 in (A4) and (AS) respectively, we get
~(I-p)(nl -1)~+s2(2n1 - p(n1 -1))t+s2(~(2 -3p)- p)e
-s2(1+~)b>0
(A6)
and
(A7)
Hence, in order for kt'2>O to be true, in addition to the inequality (A2), the inequalities
(A6) and (A7) also have to hold.
Examining the specific case where b = tE = t +(1- 2p)e, we remember that (A3) had
to hold for (A2) to be satisfied. Substituting for b = tE in (A6), we obtain
(AB)
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which holds as long as 1It > 1. Thus, (A6) will always be satisfied for b = tE provided
that there is more than one firm based in the small country. Proceeding by substituting
for b = tE in (A7) we get
(A9)
which may be rewritten as
(Al O)
Since (A7) was found always to hold for ni > 1,we have that ni > 1 together with the
inequalities (A3) and (AlO) are necessary as well as sufficient conditions for k."2 >O to
be true for b = tE. (A3) and (AlO) define an interval within which e must lie for
kt; >O to hold:
(All)
.A .B
Accordingly, we are left with merely two necessary and sufficient conditions for
k~2>O to hold, namely A<B and ni > 1. Hence, provided that these two conditions
are satisfied, k."2 >O for certain values of e: A<B is equivalent with
(AI2)
.c
.0
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and since ~ C!!: l implies C S l, (AI2) will always be satisfied for
(AI3)
A closer inspection of (AI2) reveals that
(AI4)
and
aD aD aD
a~ ,as.'a~ < o. (AlS)
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The reason why the number of countzy 1 based fluns is decisive for the Qutcome:
The model presented in this paper relies on the assumption of all firms based in a
country conducting the same investment strategy. Ifwe let Efn~] depict the expected
profit of a small country based firm that chooses to diversify investments
internationally, and Efn~] depict the profit of a small country based fmn choosing to
concentrate all its production at home, it can be derived that
Efn~] - EfnfO] =
(1-p)(2s2I1tkl-(SI +s2)n1ktIl2-SI~~ -sls2b)_I_kt; -p(b-(t-e»)kt;
S1S2
(AI6)
Differentiating with respect to Ilt, we find that
(AI7)
In other words, the more "neighbouring" firms that conduct the same strategy as his
own, the higher the small country firm's profit from diversifying, relative to
concentrating,production.
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Essay 3
Teclmological spillovers, industrial clusters and economic integration
by
KarenHeleneMidelfart Knarvik"
Introduction
National and international trade is characterised by regional specialisation and
disparities. Differences in factor endowments, like in the Heckscher-Ohlinmodel, may
be one reason for regional specialisation resulting in regional agglomeration within
certain industries. An alternative or complementary explanation, however, is the
existence of localised external economies. The most cited concept of external
economies is developed by Marshall.! Marshall identifies three distinct reasons for the
localisation of particular industries, in otherwords three bases for regional divergence:
First, industrial agglomeration offers a pooled market for workers with industry-
specific skills, ensuring a lower probability of unemployment as well as labour
shortage. Second, the availability of specialised inputs and services, i.e. vertically
linked industries, encourage concentration of upstream and downstream firms.
Finally. knowledge spillovers, such as technological spillovers, which are generated
in industrial centres, leave clustered firms with a more efficient production than
• I would like to thank Jan I.Haaland, Victor D. Norman and Anthony 1. Venables as well as Diego
Puga and Øystein Thøgersen for valuable comments and suggestions as well as inspiring ideas.
1 See Marshall (1920).
"isolated" fmns.2 Characterising the latter kind of external economies encouraging
industrial concentration, is that knowledge acquired by one firm can be used by
others, provided that they are localised within the same area. Famous examples of
clusters presumed to rely on the existence of technological spillovers, are Silicon
Valley in California, the Route 128 near Boston, and the cluster along the M4 west of
London.t
Economic geography and localised external effects as a source of economic effects
have during the last years experienced increasing attention among economists. The
emerging literature on this field, which is often referred to as the "new" location
theory, studies the geographic clustering of economic activity and regional evolution in
terms of convergence and divergence.f It is characterised through models with
endogenous agglomeration economies.I In these models agglomeration is modelled
without any direct assumptions about the existence and size of the external effects
generating concentration. The externalities leading to clustering emerge as a
consequence of market interactions alone.
Relying on the concept and tools of the "new" location theory, different models where
agglomeration is caused by "visible" external effects have been developed. "Visible" in
the sense that they arise from such tangible phenomena as for instance vertically linked
industries. In other words, the two first kinds of external economies identified by
2 Following Glaeser et al. (1992) technological spillovers are understood as some kind of knowledge
spillovers.
3 See Dicken and Lloyd (1990), pp. 173-174.
4 See CEPR (1992), p 31.
S For examples of such models see e.g. Krugman (1991a), while Baldwin (1994) may be consulted for
a brief and good survey of the literature.
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Marshall are both examples of such "visible" externalities.s But although technological
spillovers are recognised as one of the most important reasons for agglomeration in
space, they have been somehow neglected by the economists working with the "new"
location theory.? - Presumably because of the "invisibility" of such spillovers, and
the general lack of knowledge of where technological spillovers go, their form and
significance.
The aim of this paper is, within the context of the "new" location theory, to shed some
light on the "invisible" technological spillovers, and how economic integration affects
industrial structure when such spillovers are present. Focusing on intra-industry
labour mobility as one possible source of such spillovers, we build a model with
ingredients from trade theory and the "new" location theory, as well as from labour
economicsf The model allows us to study the geographic agglomeration of firms in
an industry with technological spillovers, and to elucidate reasons for regional
divergence and convergence when countries become economically integrated
Our approach to the phenomenon of technological spillovers was inspired by what
seems like a discrepancy between a substantial share of the models within the labour
market literature and empirical facts: The models we refer to, are based on an
assumption about finn-specific human capital.? Working in a finn leads to an
accumulation of job(firm)-specific human capital over time, so that a worker's
productivity increases with job-tenure. One main prediction that comes out of these
6 The distinction between visible and invisible externalities was proposed by Krugman in Krugman
(1991b). Examples of models that focus on different kinds of "visible" external economies are found
in Krugman (1991a), Krugman and Venables (1993), and Venables (1993).
7 See e.g. the evidences found by Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993).
8 It is important to recognise the difference between the kind of model we sball develop and those
considering a pooled labour market as centripetal force. Krugman (1991b) and Rotemberg and SaloDC2'
(1990) provide a good description of the latter kind of external economies.
9 Typical examples of such models are the search models. See for instance Pissarides (1992).
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models, is that wages rise with job-tenure, leaving the workers with a stake in the
value of the employment relationship. Reviewing the labour market data, this
prediction is confirmed, But due to the purely fum-specific human capital, whether or
not a worker possesses experience, and what kind of experience he has, does not
matter to another employer, and does not influence a person's wage perspectives in a
new fum. This characteristic of certain labour market models forms a sharp contrast to
the data. In the data there is evidence that experience and earnings are positively
correlated, and that job-to-job changes lead to wage-jumps.t'' If all human capital is
firm specific, there is no reason why changing jobs should incur a wage increase.
Relaxing the assumption about human capital being completely fum-specific, we hope
to be able to develop a model more consistent with empirical facts, and where job-
changing is an essential component of a worker's career planning. However, job-
mobility is not only of importance to the workers. It may be just as important to firms,
as the mobility of skilled personnel between firms represents a vehicle for the spread
of knowledge among firms, A common view, supported by empirical evidence, is that
geographical proximity facilitates transmission of knowledge. Hence, industrial
clusters and cities are institutions reckoned as providing an environment in which
ideas are quickly disseminated among firms and enhance the overall productivity.
Glaeser et al. (1992) mention three good examples of how inter-firm movement
enables ideas to flow among neighbouring firms and thereby improving the firms'
productivity: Among the microchips manufacturers in Silicon Valley, the fashion
designers in New York, and in the Bangladeshi shirt industry, the physical proximity
has promoted information transmission in the form of employees moving between
firms.
10 See e.g. Topel and Ward (1992). The authors find that wage gains at job changes account for at
least a third of early-career wage growth.
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In accordance with the empirical evidence, we shall assume that firms benefit from
other firms' knowledge through workers' movement among firms. From a worker's
point of view, geographic mobility is expensive, not just in a pecuniary sense, so
firms cannot attract experienced workers unless they locate in an industrial centre.
l. Basic elements of the model
We introduce a general equilibrium model of intra-industry trade following the line of
work on geography and trade starting with the article by Krugman and Venables
(1990). Some of the tools we shall employ here to analyse the location of economic
activity, were developed by the same authors and adopted by numerous other
economists working on the "new" location theory .11 Internal economies of scale and
trade costs are typical of this new direction within trade theory, and represent the
reasons why location matters to firms. The scale economies force firms to decide
where to locate - a question that could be ignored as long as constant returns to scale
and perfect competition were assumed. Since there are trade costs, the firms' location
will have implications for sales and profits.
Our model exhibits a tension between two kinds of forces: "centripetal" forces that
tend to pull economic activity into spatial agglomerations, and "centrifugal" forces that
tend to push such agglomerations apart. Concentration in space is encouraged by
internal economies of scale and the existence of knowledge spillovers, the latter being
ensured by labour turnover. Trade costs and spatially dispersed consumers, which
Il See Krugman (1991a), the fust of a series of influential papers where the mentioned "tools"
appear. The model we shall develop is mainly based on Venables (1993), and Krugman and Venables
(1993). .
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both discourage concentration, work in the opposite direction. Hence, the
geographicallocation of economic activity and the degree of industrial agglomeration
in space, are determined by the interaction of trade costs, internal increasing returns to
scale, market access and access to technological spillovers.
There are two economies, i=I,2, two sectors in each economy and international trade.
Economies and sectors are labelled by subscripts. One sector, sector a, is perfectly
competitive with production subject to constant returns to scale. The homogenous
goods produced in this sector are tradeable, and the trade of these goods is nationally
and internationally costless. We choose this good as numeraire.
In sector b, production is subject to increasing returns to scale internal to the firm.
Firms are heterogeneous, produce differentiated goods, and there are knowledge
spillovers between firms. In contrast to the homogenous products produced in sector
a, international trade of differentiated goods incurs trade costs.12 The market structure
in industry b is monopolistically competitive. In equilibrium all firms have the same
size and earn zero profits due to free entry and exit. We model this industry using the
monopolistic competition model developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Note that the
forces driving the model are scale economies and trade costs, not the prevailing kind
of competition.
12These trade costs have almost the same interpretation as the "trade costs" in Krugman and Venables
(1990). Thus, trade costs should be thought of as a synthetic measure of a wide range of barriers to
intemationaltrade, including trade taxes, transport costs, and costs of frontier formalities and differing
product standards. Typical of the geography and ttade models developed by Krugman and Venables (and
adopted by numerous other economists), is that costs related to intra-regional (or domestic) trade are
ignored. An exception is found in Martin and Rogers (1994), who provide a model where both intra-
regional and international trade are associated with costs.
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To simplify we assume that there is only one factor of production, labour.I3 Like
Krugman and Venables (1993) we assume labour to be geographically immobile. This
assumption characterises the so called "European" economic geography model within
the "new" location theory. It is based on the fact that labour in the European Union
and the European Economic Area is culturally and emotionally tied to its origins, and
therefore reluctant towards migrating. One should be aware that the proceeding
arguments are all based on geographical labour immobility. In the succeeding
paragraph we describe the labour market in one economy.
Each economy is endowed with a certain number of labour units. The representative
consumer in each country receives labour income only. Consumers are identical across
countries, Le. have the same utility function, and use the same share of their income
on industry b products.
Ultimately, one should note that the model adopts a static general equilibrium
approach. We concentrate on describing the range of equilibria, without elaborating
how the economies evolve during the adjustment to a newequilibrium.
2. The labour market
The modelling of each country's immobile population is based on Blanchard's model
of "Perpetual youth" .14To simplify, we shall assume that everyone starts working the
13 As we shall see later, Dotone, but in fact two factors of production emerge: Skilled and unskilled
labour. But for the time being we identify only the more general factor "labour", since we mainly
wish to make the point that capital, land a.o. input factors are ignored in the model.
14 See Blanchard et al. (1989). The "Perpetual youth" model is a continuous time version of an
overlapping generations model.
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day they are born, and that their working careers last for the rest of their lives, so that
a country's labour stock exactly equals its population. Time is continuous and each
individual, independent of age, faces a constant probability of death per unit of time,
6. (As Blanchard et al. (1989) points out, the assumption of the probability of dying
being independent of age "..is clearly made for convenience rather than realism."
(p. 149» The expected lifetime of all individuals at any point of time is thus 6-1•
The instantaneous probability 6 can take on any value between Oand infmity. At each
instant of time a new cohort, consisting of people with constant probability of death,
6, is born. We let the size of the new cohort be 6L;. Each cohort is large enough, so
that the fraction which dies each instant is also 6~. Thus, the size of the labour stock
in country i at any time is constant and equal to ~, i.e.,
(1)
In equilibrium labour is fully employed, so that
(2)
We allow for intra- as well as inter-market labour mobility. Inter-market labour
mobility occurs when firms migrate from one country to another, thereby altering the
industrial structure of the countries. In steady state there is, however, no such inter-
market mobility, and the size of the labour stock employed in each sector is constant,
i.e.,
(3)
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and there is a constant stream into each sector (6Lji, j = a.b ) exactly equal to the
constant stream out of each sector. It follows that the labour market in a country i ,
i=I,2, can be illustrated graphically as below:
Exogenous
job separations
due to death (~lw)
Exogenous
job separations
due to death (~~)
Population in
economy i
(L,)
New
entrants
(~lw)
New
entrants
(~.r...,)
Inter-market
labour mobility Intra-market
turnover
Employment
in sector a
(Lw)
Figure 1
Tenure. experience and productivity
The work in sector a does not require any specific skills, any employee in this industry
will have the same productivity, regardless of skills or experience. Nor is it possible to
acquire any firm, industry or general skills through the work in industry a.
But in the sector b, things look quite different Production here requires specific skills.
These skills are obtained through learning-by-doing. The knowledge the employees
acquire through their work is partly firm-specific and partly industry-specific.
However, it is not possible to distinguish clearly between what knowledge is firm and
what is industry specific. What we observe is an accumulation of human capital over
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time. The human capital of a representative worker is a function of job-seniority
(tenure), l.e., how long the person has been working for his current employer, and of
job-experience from other firms within the industry. The accumulating human capital
implies an increasing productivity over time. Knowing the time an employee has spent
with his current employer, as well as the time he has spent in the industry, it is
possible to deduce his current personal marginal product
Ex ante, all individuals are homogenous - all are born unskilled. But from the
moment they start working, they become heterogeneous. Those who are employed in
industry a remain unskilled, while those who get a position in industry b start
acquiring skills. So, it appears that there are actually two factors of production: skilled
and unskilled labour, but each industry only employs one of these factors.
While working within a firm in industry b, a person's productivity increases until a
certain level is reached, which happens at a tenure of -r". Provided that the worker
stays in the same firm, his marginal product can be expressed as a function of tenure,
h(-r), with h'(-r»O for -re [O,-r·), and h'(-r)=O for -re [-r·,oo]. Consistent with
empirical evidence, h( r) is an S-formed function, increasing in 't until a certain tenure
-r. is reached.P We let h(O) = h'" , and h( r) = h· for -re [ -r"oo], and illustrate h(-r)
graphically:
IS See Kostiuk and Follman (1989) a.o,
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h('t)
•'t
Figure 2
The knowledge a worker acquires while working in a firm k can be utilised not only
in the manufacturing of his current employer, but also in the manufacturing of other
employers in the industry. If h( 'f) illustrates how his ability to produce k-products
increases over time, it is possible to draw another curve, showing how his ability to
produce I-products with the manufacturer I evolves over time. H( 'f) depicts the latter
curve and is illustrated below:
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Figure 3
H( 'f) can be explained as follows: When a person starts working in a specific firm, he
starts acquiring industry- and firm-specific knowledge. In the beginning his
knowledge will be fairly poor and firm-specific. The longer he stays in the firm, the
more insights he gains and the better overview he attains. Consequently, his skills
become more general. He is able to apply what he has learned into the solving of a
wider range of problems. Until a certain tenure, -r, is reached, he is still of higher
value to his current employer than he would be to any other finn in the industry. Due
to his firm specific skills, his contribution to the production by his current employer is
higher than it would be with any other firm in the industry.
However, having worked for a firm for a period equivalent to the tenure -r, he actually
becomes more valuable to another finn in the industry, than to his current employer.
Why? Because we assume the accumulation of a person's human capital to be affected
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by the number of employers he has had, in other words, by the diversity of his
experience. Such an assumption is consistent with newer theories on personnel
management and organisational psychology, that stress the importance of diverse
training for the development of effective organisations.w Since the manufacturers in
industry b produce heterogeneous goods, the knowledge acquired through the work
with one manufacturer is never equal to the knowledge acquired with another
manufacturer in the industry. Observing two employees working in the same firm, one
of whom possesses experience from a competitor and the other not, the former worker
will be able to obtain a maximum level of productivity beyond that of the employee
who has stayed with this particular employer all his life.
The assumption about the importance of "experienced'S? workers that underlies
function H( r), is also based on the previously cited empirical evidence of job changes
and wage growth.18 From this evidence we draw the conclusion that experience from
another firm in the industry matters to an employer. If this were not true, why should
firms that advertise for experienced employees, be willing to offer an applicant a
higher wage than he can get from his current employer?
Readers might object that we are likely to see a small downward shift in a person's
productivity curve, just as he changes jobs. But we argue that when starting a new
job, due to the learning process he has accomplished, the "experienced worker" learns
16 See for instance Herriot and Pemberton (1995).
17The notion "experienced worker" is used to depict a person who has been employed by another fum
in industry b before starting the job with his current employer in this industry. An "apprentice"
depicts a worker in his first job in industry b.
18 See Topel and Ward (1992) to which we refer in the introduction.
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faster than an "apprentice", and is able to attain the necessary fmn-specific knowledge
more rapidly.19
In order to simplify the model, and focus on how a job-change affects an individual's
marginal product, we redefine the h( r) and H( r) functions as step-functions. These
functions reflect the way skills evolve over time less precisely than the original
functions, though sufficiently for our purpose.
H(t),het)
A
h ------H(t)
--het)
h .,_-------
h"'I--~
...
t •t
Figure4
19Our argument is based on Nonnan (1972), who points out that cross-sectionevidence suggests that
education facilitates rapid learning.
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In accordance with the graphics above,
(4)
H('r)=hlll for 're[O,i), H('r)=h for 're[~,oo] ,
_ • A
and we note that hill< h < h < h.
If there is just one industry b firm in a location i, intra-industry labour mobility
certainly not occurs ..However, when more than one fum is located in the economy,
intra-market turnover is generated, and reaching the tenure ~, everyone changes jobs.
To simplify the analysis and ensure that everyone stays in their second job throughout
their lives, we assume that an increase in productivity cannot be obtained by a second
job change within the industry. The workers' incentive to change jobs is elaborated in
the next section. According to their individual marginal products we may divide
workers in industry b in location i into three groups:
• 1ij = apprentices.
• q; = workers in their first job, who have reached the tenure ~,but are unable to
change jobs because there is just one b fum in the country.
• qj = experienced workers in their second job in the industry.
In steady state the distribution of the industry b labour force between these three
groups is fixed, The table below displays how the labour stock in a country i is
distributed across the three groups, depending on the number of firms in the
country( nj):
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ni=1 ni>1
T· i-
f[; J oLme -hd-r =(1- e-s« )Lm J o.!..we-okd-r =(1- e-&t )L"i
o o-• J o.!..we-h d-r ;:e-h· .!..w Oqj
T· -A
O J o.!..we-h d-r ;:e-&tL,,;qj
t
Table 1
Finally, we add the assumption that the knowledge capital accumulation of a firm's
labour force is characterised by economies of scope. Consistent with management
theories that stress the importance of diverse recruitment, a firm is assumed to gain
from having workers with qualitatively different experiences.s? It follows that, not
only does a firm prefer experienced workers, but it also prefers their respective
backgrounds to differ, i.e., a firm has preferences for a variety of experienced
workers.U Since the manufacturers in industry b produce heterogeneous goods, the
skills acquired in one firm differ from those learned in another firm. Hence, the only
way to obtain a variety of workers, is to attract people, who each has been employed
by a different firm.
20 It is the same management theories that stress the importance of diverse training. See footnote16
for references.
21 This assumption resembles that of Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990); Krugman and Venables
(1993); and Venables (1993). In these models the downstream industry has the desire to employ a
variety of intermediates. In our model the industry also has preferences for differentiated inputs. but
the inputs we focus on are people. not intermediates. (Although not an industry. a university provides
a good example of the kind of institution that seeks to obtain a variety of employees.)
132
The production of an industry b firm involves the use of apprentices as well as
experienced workers. We represent this by letting the firms employ the input
"efficiency units of labour". A.j is thereby defmed as the total number of efficiency
units oflabour employed by industry b in a country i:
Ti·q.+h·.q~ forn, =1, ,'
}
A.j= (~C )7 (5)Ti·7[; + L qj hk forn, > 1
b.} nj
with 0< £ < 1.
We assume that the value of experience is the same, regardless of in which firm it has
been obtained, i.e. hk = h 'ti k , which allows us to rewrite equation (5) as
for n, = 1
(6)
for n, > 1
A.j is increasing and concave in the number of firms in the location i, reflecting the
manufacturers' preferences for employees with divergent experiences: the marginal
product of an experienced worker is higher the more diverse the knowledge of his
experienced colleagues, i.e., the more diverse the labour stock, the higher the
productivity of each worker. And the higher the geographical concentration of firms,
the higher the chances of each firm to obtain a diversified labour stock.
The value of e tells us the degree of economies of scope characterising the firms'
knowledge capital. If ewere equal to 1, the miscellany of backgrounds is of no
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importance to the firms. But if e approaches O, there is a maximum degree of
economies of scope. Firms benefit substantially from having a varied workforce, and
the proximity to several other firms is very important to a fum.
In general, we have that as long as h· <h, location matters in the sense that whether
or not a firm has "neighbours" affects the productivity of its own labour force. - And
provided that O < £ < l, the larger the industrial agglomeration the higher the
productivity of the firms within the agglomeration.
Waees
In the constant returns to scale (CRS) sector, workers are paid a wage wo. Since the
trade of a-goods is assumed costless, this ensures that the wage rate in sector a and the
price paid for a-goods are constant and the same across countries. Choosing units
such that one unit of labour produces one unit of output gives
w.=P.=l. (7)
The labour market in the increasing returns to scale (IRS) sector is perfectly
competitive. Workers are paid a wage equal to the value of their marginal product,
which is exactly the wage that any other manufacturer in the sector would be willing to
offer him. Given such a wage structure, it is obvious that at a critical tenure i', all
workers find it profitable to start looking for a new job (see figure 4). Perfect
information in the labour market ensures that, 1) a worker does not have any incentive
to change jobs before he has reached this critical tenure; 2) having reached the tenure
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i' he will always get a new job immediately, due to the employers' preferences for
experienced employees.22
The workers' productivity evolution, the manufacturers' preferences, and the wage
structure in industry b, generate an instantaneous intra-market turnover. However,
since a second job change is assumed not to increase a person's marginal product (see
the previous section), all workers only have the incentive to change employers in
industry b once.
If we differentiate equation (6) with respect to the apprentices and experienced
workers, and multiply by the price paid for one efficiency unit of labour, we obtain
group and country specific wages. Letting the location specific price of one efficiency
unit of labour be CO;, the apprentices, i.e. the workers who have not reached the critical
tenure, earn a wage
Wj =æ, .li , (8)
while the experienced workers who have not been able to change jobs, earn the wage
• h·Wj = roj• , (9)
and the experienced workers in their second job are paid
22 Perfect information is dermed as both workers and manufacturers recognising the form of the
functions h(T) and H( T). Knowing the time he has spent in the industry, a worker can tell what
value he has to his current employer as well as his value to an alternative employer. The
manufacturers are ex ante able to perceive an applicant's level of skills, and distinguish between those
who have, and those who have not, reached the critical tenure i'.
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1-£
Wi = mi .n;e ·h. (lO)
Our model relies on the assumption that, in equilibrium, individuals ex ante do not
have any preferences for the work in one sector or the other, i.e., in steady state the
expected total income over the life time of an employee in sector a equals that of an
employee in sector b. Using (7)-(10), and assuming a zero discount rate, we derive
the condition which ensures an ex ante indifference:
je-6Td-r=mj[jiie-6-rd-r+ jnjl~£he-6-rd-r]. for np-I (12)
o o i
From equations (11) and (12) it can be deduced, that having started to work in a
particular industry, one will always prefer to stay there for the rest of one's life. The
reluctance to move to another industry is generated by differences in wage structures
across industries, from which follows that a change of industry implies a reduction in
totallife-time income.
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3. The market for goods
All consumers, regardless of nationality, are assumed to share the same tastes. Their
utility function is
0<8<1 (13)
with C. depicting the consumption goods produced in sector a, and Cb is the
aggregated consumption of goods produced in industry b in both countries. (A
description of both industries is given in the first paragraph, and will not be repeated
here.) Cb is a constant-elasticity-of-substitution function of consumption of the
differentiated goods, taking the form
(14)
with CT> I, n ="I+~,
and may be thought of as a sub-utility function or alternativelyas a quantity index. We
assume the elasticity of substitution, Cf, to be constant and independent of number of
firms.
The number of varieties produced is large enough to make oligopolistic interactions
negligible, i.e., we are left with a constant elasticity of demand equal to CT. The large
number of potential varieties and economies of scale in production imply that the
production of each variety will only be undertaken by one firm, since a potential
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entrant can always do better by introducing a new product variety than by sharing in
the production of an existing product type.
International trade of goods produced in industry b involves trade costs. These take
the Samuelson's "iceberg" form, so that in order to deliver one unit of a good from
one country to another, t ~ l units must be shipped. In other words, if a good is
exported, only 1/t of the good reaches its destination. If the countries are completely
integrated, then t = l, and trade costs equal zero.23
Dual to the quantity index we define location specific price indices:
I
Pl = [nIP:-O' +~(P2t)I-0']i=(j (15)
I
P2 = [nI (Pit ta +~p~-O']i=(j, (16)
which are in fact nothing but the location specific unit expenditure functions for
industry b products.
Due to the Dixit-Stiglitz framework we have employed, a two-stage budgeting
procedure is valid. In stage one, maximising the Cobb-Douglas utility function
allocates expenditure between sectors a and b, so that a fraction 8 of the total income
23 We define free ttade as a situation with t=I, which is equal to zero trade costs. Reviewing the
definition of "trade costs", these were dermed as: "...a synthetic measure of a wide range of barriers to
international trade ..." According to our interpretation a situation with "zero trade costs". is a situation
where the costs related to trade are independent of whether the trade is national or international. There
are still costs associated with the trade of goods, but these are primarily transport costs determined by
geographic distance. In order to include such costs, we would have to specify exactly where in a
country industry b is located - how far from borders and cities. Such an extension of the model is.
without doubt, of great relevance to the study of economic geography. trade and economic integration,
but beyond the scope of this paper.
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is spent on industry b products. In stage two, we derive the demand for a particular
variety, which can be expressed as a function of the price indices. The first subscript
refers to where the good is produced, the second to the location where it is consumed,
and the third to the manufacturer. Expenditure at location i is denoted by Ei:
-tlptl-l (}.II:'x_ = Pi i ~i (17)
l-tl -ti ptl-l (}.tp;
Xijk = t Pi i i (18)
Expenditure in a country is by assumption, determined purely by the labour income in
the country. We can derive the expenditure in country i in steady state by using
equations (7)-(10) and the information provided in table 1.
{
Løi +Wj • qj +W; .q;, for n, = 1
Ej=
Løj +wj • qj +wj • qj' for nj > 1
(19)
We substitute for the expressions for wages, solve equations (11) and (12) with
respect to 0\, substitute further, and find that the expenditure in an economy in steady
state is, moreover, equal to the economy's total labour force:
(20)
We remember that production was assumed subject to economies of scale. This is
reflected by the linear production function below, which takes a form typical of the
trade and geography models:
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(21)
The production of each variety k requires a efficiency units of labour as a fixed cost
and J3 per unit output thereafter. The cost function dual to the production function can
easily be derived, and the cost function of a firm located in country iis defmed as
(22)
with xik æ Xiik + Xijk' and O)j defmed as the price of one efficiency unit of labour.
The profits of a representative firm in country i take the fonn:
(23)
The profit maximisation condition of a finn located in country i, is given by the
equality of marginal revenue and marginal cost:
p. = (_!!_). 13m ..
I a-l I (24)
It follows that in equilibrium, where there is a constant number of firms in each
country, the price is location specific and a constant mark-up over marginal cost,
If there are free entry and exit, profits will be driven to zero. The zero profits condition
together with the condition for profit maximisation (equation (24» give us the
equilibrium output level:
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a(a-l)
Xii' =x=
fJ
(25)
As it appears, the equilibrium output level is independent of price, level of costs,
market size and number of firms, Hence, the size of the firm determined by imposing
the free entry and exit condition, is the same for all firms in the industry, and
independent of their location.
Substituting for the equilibrium output in the production function, we obtain total
demand for efficiency units of labour in country i in equilibrium:
(26)
4. Solving the model
We specify the equations for country l necessary to solve for the equilibrium, and just
note that the equations for country 2 are symmetric. Without loss of generality, and in
order to save notation, we choose a = lies and ~ = (es-l)/es, so that x = l and
P. = m..24I I
Product market equilibrium requires that the total demand for a single variety must
equal the units produced. The equilibrium condition is derived using equations (15)-
(18), (20) and (25):
24 a, f3 and a are all constants and equal across locations. As long as there is only one IRS industty
and no inter-industry comparisons are undertaken, suppressing these constant terms does not affect our
results.
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Labour market equilibrium is characterised by the workers ex ante having no
preferences for the work in one sector or the other, and the labour stock being fully
employed. Integrating and rewriting the equations (11) and (12), we have that
(28)
From equation (28) it can easily be derived that the price per efficiency unit of labour
is decreasing and convex in the number of firms in a location. Labour market clearing
additionally requires that the sum of demand for labour equals the total supply of
labour in the economy (see equation (2». Using equations (6), (26) and (28) the
equilibrium labour demand in sector b can be expressed as
(29)
and we may rewrite the labour market clearing condition (equation (2» using equation
(29) to substitute, as
(30)
In order to allow for complete specialisation we ultimately add the assumption that,
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1.; ~ B·(L, +~). for i=I.2. (31)
to ensure that each country is large enough to be able to "host" the complete industry
b. The four equations (27). (28). (29) and (30) together with the symmetric equations
for country 2 simultaneously solve for the equilibrium n/l n» m/l ~ Lbb Lb2> L.J and
Lø2• Through substitution, we can subsequently derive equilibrium wages and prices
in sector b in both countries, and the equilibrium number of apprentices and
experienced workers in both countries.
5. Equilibrium configurations
We shall consider three different cases: First, the situation where trade costs are
infinitely high so that trade is completely impeded, in other words. the autarky case.
Next, we focus on the possibility of the two countries becoming fully economically
integrated, and trade costs diminishing to zero. Finally, a situation of partly integrated
countries and intermediate trade costs is considered
(i) Autarky
Proposition 1:
Under autarky ( t -+ 00) there is a unique diversified equilibrium. The share of the
labour force engaged in each industry is the same across locations. A difference in
country size will be magnified by a productivity difference, so that the relative number
offirms in industry b does not equate the relative size of the countries.
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In other words, if country 1 is twice as big as country 2, then there are more than
twice as many b-finns in country 1 as in country 2.
Proof: From the conditions for the product market equilibrium, we get that
~ = 84/ml and ~ = 8~/m2' Substituting for the number of firms in equation (29)
and the symmetric equation for country 2, we obtain the equilibrium labour demand in
industry b: ~I = 84, 42 = 84 ~ ~1/42 = 4/4, which reflects that consumers
spend the same share of their income on b products invariant of their country of
origin. Assuming that the size of each country is large enough to support more than
one finn, and differentiating equation (28) with respect to the number of firms in the
economy to find that ami/an,. <o, it is clear that 4 ':I: ~ implies
(14 -4VL)<(I~ -~Vn) inequilibrium.
The autarky result does not only hold for infinitely high trade costs, but for relatively
high trade costs in general. Characterising the result, is that the location of firms is
primarily detennined by demand considerations and not by cost considerations.
(ii) Complete integration
Under the assumption of complete economic integration and zero trade costs (Le.
t = 1) most of the economic geography models developed within the new trade theory
("new" location theory), reach the following results: When there are zero trade costs,
the forces driving the agglomeration of firms seize to exist, and location becomes
irrelevant. The circular causation that drives the industrial agglomeration is no longer
active. The location of firms is primarily detennined by cost considerations, and firms
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may, for instance, spread out in search oflow-cost immobile factors, such as land.2S
These results apply to several kinds of external economies, but not. to the case of
technological spillovers (or knowledge spillovers in general): Regardless of the
existence of trade costs, as long as there are spillovers, firms will ceteris paribus
always gain from the proximity to other firms within the same industry. Other things
equal, clustered firms will always be more competitive than isolated firms.
Proposition 2:
A complete integration (t=l) implies three possible equilibria: Complete concentration
of industry b in country l, complete concentration in country 2, and equal division of
firms between the two countries. The diversified equilibrium implies factor price
equalisation, but unlike the two first equilibria, it is an unstable equilibrium: Through
migrating, firms will be able to reduce their own costs as well as those of their new
"neighbours".
Which country gets the core of industry b firms, will depend on the initial distribution
of firms ("history"), or possibly on people's expectations about where the core is
going to be. If the industry b firms are initially unequally distributed between the two
countries, concentration is self-reinforcing, and the country that - for some reason -
gets a head start will end up with the complete industry b. Formally expressed: If
1Zt >~ initially, then from (28) it is obvious, that producing in economy 1 implies a
lower average cost than producing in economy 2, WI <w2• Firms located in country 2
will always find migrating to the other location profitable.
2S See for instance Krugman (1991b), Venables (1993), Baldwin (1994), Amiti (1995).
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But if the economies start out with an equal division of industry b, then there is a
significant scope for self-fulfilling prophecy. Independent of the relative size of the
countries, this is the only division of production between countries which constitutes
an equilibrium. A diversified equilibrium at t = I requires that COl = CO2 (see equation
(27) and the symmetric equation for country 2), and it follows from equation (28), that
this condition can only be satisfied for ni =~. But although ~ =~ is an equilibrium,
it is unstable. Unstable - because it is always profitable for any firm to shift its
production to the other country. From equation (28) it can be derived that the price the
manufacturer would have to pay per efficiency unit of labour in location 2 will, in the
short run, never exceed, and in the long run (steady state), always be lower than, the
price he is currently paying in location 1.
The question is but, in which direction do the firms move? The outcome will depend
on factors not incorporated in our model. The more important the economies of scope
in the accumulation of knowledge capital (in other words: the stronger the external
economies), and the more rapidly firms move, the higher the chances of self-fulfilling
expectations determining the outcome.
We observe that one country specialises in the production of a-goods, and one country
specialises in the production of b-goods. In the appendix we show that, for t = 1
concentration of all manufacturing in industry b in one location is always a locally
stable equilibrium. While the production of b-goods ends up completely concentrated
in one country, depending on consumers' preferences for a relative to b goods and the
size of the countries' populations, we may still have production of a-goods in both
countries.
146
Somewhat surprisingly, we note that the relative size of a country does not detennine
whether it gets the core. Decisive is but the relative number of b-fmns located in the
country, and this does not necessarily equate the relative size of the country. Yet, a
country's size may indirectly affect whether it ends up with the high-skill industry: If
the initial situation is similar to that of autarky, and preferences are stable over time, it
is obvious that the larger country will also have the larger share of industry b initially,
and - according to our model- therefore obtains the core of b-rmns.
But the fact that the relative size of the industry (nJnj) rather than the relative size of
the country, detennines a country's opportunities of getting the core, has an important
consequence: Industrial policies supporting and protecting certain industries become
very attractive to governments. Having succeeded in the establishing of an efficient
cluster, the sustainability and growth potential of the cluster increase when borders
become eliminated and the countries integrated.
(iii) Intermediate trade costs
In order to analyse a situation characterised by such levels of trade costs, it is useful to
distinguish between different country size relations. We define
1]æ L./~ (32)
a) The two countries are fully symmetric, Le. l < t < 00 and 1]= 1.
Under the assumption that the countries have the same size, we obtain results similar
to those under free trade. There are multiple equilibria, in which the specialised
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equilibria are stable. In the appendix we prove that an equal division of manufacturers
between the two locations is an equilibrium. Analytically it is difficult to prove that this
is the only possible diversified equilibrium. Exploring the model numerically, does,
however, unveil that production in both countries may only take place if the
manufacturers are initially equally divided between the two locations. (See figure S for
an illustration of a numerical example.) But as in the case of zero trade costs, such a
diversified equilibrium is unstable (see the appendix for proof),
4,5 I11=-
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Figure S
Figure S provides an illustration of the diversified, but unstable, equilibria which
might occur for l< t < 00. We have chosen this form of presentation in order to
emphasise the dependence of an equilibrium on trade costs. The central line along
which 1] = 1 <=> ~ = 4. illustrates the fact that if the countries are of the same size,
there is only one possibl~ diversified equilibrium, namely "t =~.
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b) There is one large and one small country, i.e. l c t < 00 and ."< 1.
There are multiple equilibria, with two stable, specialised equilibria. ff n. <~
initially, then from (28) it follows that the average cost of production in country 2 is
lower than that taken into account by rums in the small country. The cost difference
together with the market access effect, will induce a migration of b-firms from the
small to the large country. Provided that the trade cost is below a criticallevel of t,
there will be a unique specialised equilibrium where, influenced by costs as well as by
demand considerations, all the manufacturers in industry b agglomerate in the large
country.
If the firms are equally distributed across countries initially, n. =~, firms' average
cost is the same across countries (see equation (28», but the rums in the smaller
country are placed at a disadvantage by their inferior market access. In the appendix,
we show that an equal division of firms between the countries is never an equilibrium.
Manufacturers located in country 1 have incentives to move to the larger country, and
in equilibrium the complete industry is agglomerated in the large country.
Finally, we assume that due to for instance a government actively conducting trade
policy, a larger share of the industry b is initially located in the smaller country
(ni > ~). These firms are faced with a lower average cost than their competitors in
country 2. But the firms located in the big country possess a superior market access. ff
the number of firms in the small country is so large, that their higher productivity
exactly compensates for the superior market access of their competitors, the initial
distribution of firms across countries is an equilibrium. The upper line in figure 5
along which ."=! ¢::> ~ < ~ illustrates the possible diversified equilibria in
2
dependence of trade costs. But as above, the diversified equilibrium is an unstable
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equilibrium (see the appendix for proof). Who gets the core is a question subject to
indetenninacy.
Reviewing the results, it appears that, as in the case of complete integration (t = 1), the
complete industry b will end up agglomerated in one location, and the big country will
always get the core, unless Ilt >~. If there are more firms in the smaller country
initially, the small country may actually get the core. But it will only obtain the core
given that economies of scope in knowledge accumulation enhancing the external
economies in industry b are very important, and trade costs are low.
One question remains to be answered: for what specific levels of trade costs does the
result above apply. "Intermediate" trade costs are, without doubt, a vague formulation.
However, it appears impossible to defme an absolute level of trade costs, beyond
which the results derived here do not apply, and a unique, stable diversified
equilibrium emerges. The criticallevel of t,below which an asymmetric equilibrium is
stable, depends on the relative size of the core market, the extent of internal economies
of scale in production, and the degree of external economies. In the appendix we show
that it is possible to define a level of t dependent upon these variables, below which a
stable asymmetric equilibrium is always ensured.
6. Final Remarks
The existence of technological spillovers implies that location in the sense of proximity
to other firms, always matters, regardless of the existence of trade costs. Applying a
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general equilibrium model. a divergent development and geographic agglomeration of
industries seem to be an inevitable result of economic integration.
The scope for policy actions is significant. because the absolute size of a country's
industrial cluster prior to a (closer) economic integration is decisive for the country's
chances of sustaining and enhancing the cluster after a completed integration. Our
analysis provides strong arguments for the support of high-technology industries. as
well as subsidies to research and development (R&D). Getting a head start within a
new industrial field appears to be decisive for a country's prospects of sustaining and
extending an industry.
We further note that the more trade costs are reduced as a consequence of integration,
the better the prospects of a small country ending up with the core. But for a larger
country the opposite is. in fact. true. The implications for the trade policy of both
small and large countries follow immediately. and should not need any further
explanation. Noteworthy is the fact. that the recommendations derived from the
analysis above resemble those that follow from traditional trade theory based on a
prevalence of perfect competition.
Although a consumer is always a worker and vice versa, in order to be able to say
something about welfare implications. it is convenient to separate between consumers
and workers. A complete economic integration, inducing firms to agglomerate.
increases the number of varieties and reduces prices (see appendix for proof), and is.
without doubt. beneficial to all consumers. As for situations with intermediate trade
cost. the implications are more ambiguous. Consumers in the country with
immigration of firms gain from the integration, whereas those in the "deserted"
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country may either benefit or lose from the integration: The number of varieties
increases, and prices are reduced due to higher productivity. On the other hand,
however, consumer prices are increased due to trade costs.
From the workers' point of view, integration may be bad or good, depending on
which country they inhabit, and whether or not they are born at the time when the
integration is completed. In the long run, i.e., in a new steady state, all workers earn
the same nominallife time income. Their real income, however, is dependent on
whether or not the countries have become completely integrated. ff trade costs equal
zero after the integration, location is irrelevant for workers' welfare. But if integration
reduces trade costs without eliminating them, the workers inhabiting the core market
will experience a higher real income than those in the "deserted" country.
In the short run, there may, however, be severe adjustment problems. In the country
which experiences an emigration of knowledge intensive firms, the workers left
behind will have to seek employment in the other sector. Due to differences in wage
structures across industries, their life time income will decrease compared to what they
would have earned if they could have stayed in the same industry throughout their
lives. Additionally, we have reason to believe that, before they get employed in the
other sector, they may even have to cope with a period of unemployment
The framework presented here suggests that integration leads to geographic
consolidation of industries and increased international specialisation. Hence, the
economic geography of regions that become integrated is likely to be severely altered.
Losses as well as gains are certain outcomes of an integration process, and the scope
for policy actions significant
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Appendix
Deteuninants of asymmetric. locally stable eQ,Uilibria
An allocation where production in industry b is completely concentrated in, say,
location I, is locally stable only if it is unprofitable for any firm to deviate and shift its
production to country 2. We let ~ =O, and derive the maximum price per efficiency
unit of labour that a deviant firm can accept in such a situation without suffering losses
from equation (27) and the symmetric equation for country 2:
(33)
In country 2, in a new steady state, the firm would have to pay a price
co2 =[ii .(1- e-s« ) +h· . e-6-r·r per efficiency unit, while in the short run, the price
that will have to be paid in order to induce workers to abandon sector a and start
working in industry b, is even higher. Thus, an allocation with industry b
agglomerated in economy l is a locally stable equilibrium if
(34)
We may rewrite the condition above as
( J
a
- 6-r·. h·=(11tl-U+tU-l). h.(I-e- )+h 'e-
V - 1-£ < 1.
11+ 1 h- (1 -6t) + hA e -It. -e ·n.·e
(35)
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From expression (35) it can be derived, that
(36)
with
(37)
is a sufficient condition for an agglomeration to be sustainable. A closer inspection of
the expression (35) or (36) reveals that for t = l an agglomeration is always
sustainable invariant of its geographic location, while for t -+ - it is never
sustainable. Provided that there is a positive number of inhabitants in each economy
0<17<00,
(38)
ensures a locally stable core-periphery equilibrium invariant of the relative size of the
core market. The more significant the economies of scope in knowledge accumulation,
the more vital is the proximity to other firms, the smaller is 1. and the less likely is it
that a firm will find it profitable to "defect". A reader familiar with the recent literature
on economic geography and trade, will be aware that the elasticity of demand, a, can
also be interpreted as an inverse index of the importance of internal increasing returns,
since one measure of economies of scale is the ratio of average cost to marginal cost,
which in equilibrium is equal to a/( a -l). From expression (38) it can then be
deduced, that - in general - the less elastic the demand or the greater the internal
economies of scale, the more sustainable is a core.
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Differentiating V with respect to Tl.we find that
(39)
Le.• the larger the relative size of the core market. the stronger the forces sustaining
the core. A bit surprising perhaps. and unlike the results obtained in other economic
geography models it appears that the share of income spent on industry b products.
does not affect the forces for agglomeration.26
Turning to trade costs. these are found to have an ambiguous effect on the "survival"
of the core.
(40)
and are illustrated for a numerical example in figure 6 below.
26 See for instance Krugmano(1'991b).
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Figure 6
Equilibrium confi~urations for inteonediate trade costs
Define
(41)
Using (27) and the symmetric equation for country 2 it can be derived that for t = 1,
A = B always, and for t> 1
(42)
Employing equation (41) it is convenient to rewrite the product market equilibrium
conditions as
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(43)
{a) Show that ~ = ~ is an equilibrium/or t> 1, 1] = 1, though unstable.
~ = ~ implies that ml = m2 (see equation (28» and A = B (see equation (42». Thus,
equilibrium requires that
A1]t1-a +A___:_-.,-- = 1,
A7]+At1-a (44)
implying that 1]= 1, which is true.
The maximum price per efficiency unit of labour that a deviant firm migrating from,
say, location 1 to 2 can afford to pay without suffering any losses, is
(45)
The price that he actually will have to pay in
( 1-£ )-1m2 = h· (1-e-M) +h· (~ +1)7. e-M ,it follows that
location 2 is
=(A1]t1-a +B);(h. (l-e-6t)+h .(~ + 1)1~£.e-6t]
K - l-a _£ <1
A1]+Bt h- (1 -6t) hA 7 -it. -e +.~ ·e
(46)
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must be true for the equilibrium to be stable. Using that the diversified equilibrium
implies 1It =~ and A = B, the condition (46) is not satisfied. Thus, we have proved
that an equal division of firms between locations will never be a stable equilibrium.
(b) Show that 1It =~ is never an equilibrium/or 7pt l, t»I,
1It = ~ implies that (1)1 = (1)2 (see equation (28» and A = B (see equation (42». Thus,
equilibrium requires that
AT]tl-a +A---=---,....- = l,
AT]+Atl-a
(47)
implying that T]= l or/and t = l which is a contradiction.
(c) Show that ni > ~ cannot be rejected as an equilibrium/or T]< 1, t>1.
1It >~ implies that (1)1 < (1)2 (see equation (27» and A < B (see equation (42».
A nt"" + B> AT] + Btl-a (48)
is obviously a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for n. >~ to be an
equilibrium. Solving the inequality, we get that AT] < B, which is always true, i.e. the
condition (48) is always satisfied.
(d) Show that n/>n2 is an unstable equilibrium/or T]< 1, t>1
Proceeding in the same way as we did under (a), we find that
158
= (A77tl-a +B);(ii. (1- e-aT)+ h. (~ + l)l~£ .e-Gt]
K - I-a 1-£ < 1
A77 +Bt h- (1 -IT) hA ... -IT. -e +.1Zt ·e
(49)
must be true for firms not to move to location 2, while
=(A77tl-a +B)-(;)(ii.(l-e-eST)+h.(n. +ll~£ .e-eST]
K - I-a _£ < 1
A77 +Bt h- (1 -aT) hA ... -eST. -e +·~·e
(50)
must be true for firms not to move in the opposite direction from 2 to 1. Using
equation (43) to substitute for the first part of the expressions for K, it is clear, that
neither of the conditions (49) and (50) can be true.
Number of firms in a core
Wedefme:
m~= the price per efficiency unit of labour if all b firms are concentrated in location 1,
m:= the price per efficiency unit of labour if firms are equally divided between the
two locations.
Setting ~ =O and solving the product market equilibrium equation (27), we find that
_ 8(t. +~)
1Zt- ,mCl
(51)
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always, regardless of the level of trade costs. Compared with the number of firms ala
diversified equilibrium at t = l,
(52)
it is obvious that the total number of firms is larger if all firms are clustered in one
location. Why? Because the price of one efficiency unit of labour is decreasing in the
number of firms in a location: (I)~< (I): .
The price to the consumers is a constant mark up over the price of one efficiency unit
oflabour, and is accordingly lower if all firms are agglomerated geographically.
Exploring equations (27) and (28) reveals that in a situation without complete
specialisation the total number of firms is always lower than it is if all fmns in the
industry were agglomerated.
Parameter values
The simulation of the figure 5 set Ii = l, it = 2, B= O.OS. i' = 10. B = O.S. e = 0.6.
a= 4; while that of figure 6 set r= 0.7. a = 2.
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Essay4
International trade, technological development and agglomeration
by
Karen Helene Midelfart Knarvik and Jostein Tvedt"
Introduction
International specialisation in the classical Heckscher-Ohlin setting is determined by
relative differences in factor endowments given equal technology. Technology is,
however, a dynamic phenomenon. New process innovations are constantly being
made, and old technologies are replaced by new and improved ones. Yet,
technological progress within a certain industry does not necessarily take place
simultaneously world wide. It is often argued that the diffusion of technology takes
less time in geographically smaller regions with a high density of production units in
the industry in question. The improved access to new knowledge is reckoned as one
of the main reasons why manufacturers tend to agglomerate and create clusters - a
view that is strongly supported by empirical findings.!
In this paper we wish to focus on the hypothesis that the creation of clusters -
which provide pools of knowledge and enable rapid transmission of information -
• We would like to thank Jan I.Haaland. Victor D. Norman and Anthony J. Venables for valuable
comments.
l See e.g Porter (1990).
International trade, technological development and agglomeration
may cause uneven technological development internationally, and contributes to
explaining regional specialisation. To do this, a dynamic setting is chosen, in which
technological advantage depends on localised knowledge spillovers, and evolves
over time. We study how uneven technological development internationally may
influence national industrial structures, trade patterns, trade volumes and welfare.
Furthermore, within the same framework, we elaborate on how different levels of
integration affect international specialisation, localisation of industries as well as
national and world welfare.
Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) show that the theoretical treatment ofknowledge is
decisive for how integration affects growth, and distinguish between two cases: one
in which flows of knowledge can be separated from flows of goods, and one in
which such a separation is impossible. One should note that our model clearly builds
on an assumption of such a separation being possible.
Crucial to our story is, obviously, an assumption of localised external economies.
Consistent with traditional endogenous growth theory, we let the degree of
innovation in a given region (or cluster) be related to the number of manufacturers.
Yet, for positive externalities to be generated, some kind of transmission mechanism
is needed. There are different kinds of such mechanisms, which all constitute
reasons for agglomeration in space.s The model presented in this paper relies on the
assumption that transmission of knowledge is due to intra-industry labour mobility:
when people change jobs, they bring with them knowledge and impulses from their
previous employer that can be utilised in the production by their new employer.P
2 SeeMarshall (1920) a.o.
3 See Knarvik (1995) for a discussion of the importance of labour mobility for the sustainability of
clusters.
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Because workers regard geographic mobility as expensive or are impeded by
immigration policies, they are mobile among firms if they are located within the
same region, but not if they are geographically departed. Hence, there is transfer of
knowledge within a cluster, but not within the industry globally.
A reader familiar with the different directions within trade theory, is likely to
recognise, that the model we shall present in the proceeding sections contains
ingredients from two different directions within trade theory: the so called "new"
location theory, as well as the literature on uneven development, less developed
countries (LDe) and leapfrogging. As for the former direction most papers occupied
with industrial agglomeration (clusters) and trade generallyassume some kind of
deviation from the hypothesis of constant return to scale and free competition+ Here
we keep these two assumptions that characterise traditional trade theory. The effect
of industrial clusters may therefore be studied in a classical general equilibrium
model.
Employing trade models of endogenous growth, the latter direction focuses on the
consequences of trade liberalisation among countries with very different
characteristics for trade patterns and welfare.f These models, and the one we present
in the proceeding section have in common the existence of external economies, that
causes internationally unequal development - but do not share the way the external
economies are modelled.
4 See e.g. Krugman and Venables (1993) and (1994).
S See e.g. Krugman (1981), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Drezis, Krugman and Tsiddon
(1993).
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The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 sets out the formal model - a general
equilibrium model where perfect competition prevails in all markets. In section 2 we
consider the case of free trade in goods, but no factor mobility, while in section 3we
look at a stage of closer integration by allowing for trade in capital as well. Section 4
concludes.
1.Themodel
We introduce a model of international trade. Our world consists of two regions
(countries), region h and regionj', Both regions produce two goods, 1 and 2. Thus,
the total production of the two goods is given by Xl = x~+x{ and x2 = x~+ x{ .
Further, we assume that each good is produced by a technology exhibiting constant
returns to scale in the two production factors nand k. We shall refer to 11 as labour
and k as capital. The total factor input in country i for production of good j is given
by {n~,kn,where i =h.f and j = 1,2. Total factor endowment in each country is
given by {ni ,kil, and we assume that {ni ,kil is fixed in time.
The assumption of constant returns to scale applies at the industry level, but not at
the fum level. Each single finn is assumed to face U-shaped average costs, and
chooses production quantity in order to minimise average costs. To simplify we let
the minimum average cost be reached when a fum produces one unit It follows that,
in each region the total number of firms in an industry is equal to the total amount of
output.
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We assume perfect competition in goods and factor markets, and free trade in goods.
Internally in both regions at any time t, there is costless mobility of both labour and
capital between the two industries. Workers are but internationally immobile, due to
immigration policies, moving costs, or cultural and emotional ties to their origins.
We let production of good 1 be intensive in the use of labour relative to the
production of good 2. We assume that the production technology used in industry 1
is constant in time and equal across locations. The technology in industry 2 may
however, change over time. The production in country i at time t of good 2 is given
by
(1)
where 'P: is a location specific productivity scalar process.
The development of the productivity scalar is influenced by two factors. We assume
that each production unit has a constant innovation trend, ,. That is" represents an
incumbent unique improvement to the production technology of each of the
production units. However, through intra-industry labour mobility this unit specific
knowledge will gradually be shared by the other production units in the region. The
stock of not yet shared knowledge in region i at time t is given by 1:, and the
diffusion from the stock of knowledge is denoted by p!. The increment of the
productivity scalar in sector 2 at time t will then be
(2)
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That is, the productivity of each production unit in sector 2 increases due to own
innovation, ø, but also by learning about innovations made by competitors located
within the same cluster through new employees, i.e. by Il;I:.
Since the number of production units is equal to aggregated production volume, total
instantaneous innovation in the industry be given by øx~,.From the stock we deduct
the shared knowledge at time t, 11;1:. Accordingly, the increment of the stock of
unshared knowledge is given by
a: = ("-xi - "it)dt, y, 2, r" (3)
Innovation in each firm, ø,may differ between the two regions, and may depend on
the level of education, the entrepreneurial and innovative spirit of the workers, and
may vary through the life cycle of the industry. The degree of innovation in a young
industry is usually different from that of an old industry, and hence it may be
reasonable to let ø be time dependent To simplify, though, we shall assume ø to be
a constant.
The diffusion variable Il; depicts the diffusion of innovations, i.e .• the knowledge
spillovers, that is generated by intra-industry labour mobility. Knowledge is
assumed sector specific, so that inter-industry labour mobility does not add to the
diffusion of knowledge, and is restricted to the firms within a region. because
workers do not to move internationally.
170
International trade, technological development and agglomeration
Each job-worker pair is faced with an exogenous separation probability due to
random shocks to the production units in both sectors.s The exogenous separation
process causes continuous labour turnover, ensuring the spread of sector specific
knowledge.
Agents are assumed so small, and so many, that they perceive the technological
development as exogenous, i.e., to be independent of their own actions. Thus, the
agents do not act strategically to enhance external economies of scale. The 'model is
based on an assumption, of instantaneous adjustment to equilibrium, which implies
that all workers in 'a region earn the same wage regardless of their industry of
employment. Hence, unemployed workers are indifferent between working in the
two sectors, and accept the first job offer they get, regardless from which industry it
comes.
If wages are perceived as equal across sectors and pay is the only criterion for
choosing between job offers, then the probability that an industry 2 worker in search
of a new job will end up in the same industry, is given by ~. Accordingly, we
have a simple expression for the diffusion rate of knowledge:
i
Jli =).} 112,, ni ' (4)
where ..:ti represents the exogenous separation probability per time unit It may also
be thought of as a constant representing the degree of mobility of the labour force in
6 A reader familiar with labour market theory will recognise the assumption of an exogenous
separation rate, which is employed in most models within the search theory and matching literature
(see e.g. Pissarides (1985».
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equilibrium. There may be differences in A/ among regions, due to for instance
differences in geographical size or cultural differences.
According to our model, both the absolute and the relative size of the industry
influence productivity. An absolutely large industry means that a "lot of talent" is
occupied within this industry, which may lead to a high number of improvements to
the sector specific technology. In accordance with endogenous growth theory, we
shall refer to this as the "growth effect". A relatively large industry implies that the
innovations of one firm are rapidly shared by others in the industry, and shall be
referred to as the "spillover effect". 7 Due to a high degree of diffusion of
innovations, the productivity level may hence be higher in a region with a high
density of firms of a given industry, even though this region has only a minor part of
total world production of the industry and of overall innovation in the world.
Consistent with the assumption that ki is fixed in time (k: = ki 'V t), we let there be
no savings, and the preferences of the representative consumer in region i are
reflected by an additive separable utility function
u: = u( c:"c~,), (5)
where cJ, is consumption of good j in region i at time t. In order to remove scale
effects, i.e., to let the marginal rate of substitution be unaffected by changes in
income, we assume that preferences are homothetic.
7 What we refer to as the "spillover effect" here, actually combines two of the types of externalities
identified by Marshall as reasons for firms to agglomerate, namely (1) a pooled labour market for
workers with specialised skills, as well as (2) information spillovers.
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To maximise utility in a region i then reduces to the maximisation of u(c:t'c~) given
the consumer's budget constraint. The budget restriction
(6)
implies that the total regional labour and capital income must be equal to total
regional consumption expenditure where w; is the wage rate, r; is the rate of return
on capital, and Pjt is the price of good i,all at time t.
2. Free trade in goods
We shall first consider the case where there is free trade in goods, but no factor
mobility. In order to simplify the discussion of the dynamics of the model, we
restrict ourselves to Cobb-Douglas production and utility functions, and suppress the
subscript indicating time.
Let the production function in industry 1 be given by
G( i Z,i) _ ia z,il-anI' "1 - ni "1 ' (7)
where O< a < 1, and let the production function in industry 2 be given by
(8)
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with 0< e < 1. We have assumed that industry 1 is intensive in the use of labour,
from which follows, that a > e, Adding the assumption that Å} is equal across
locations, Le. A.i = Å 'ti i = h.f , the external economies of scale prevailing in sector
2 take the same form across countries.
The utility of the consumer in region i at time t is expressed as
(9)
where O< r < 1, i.e., the agents have identical preferences across regions.
Factor market equilibrium requires that the sum of demands for each factor equals
the supply of each factor. With no factor mobility, the equilibrium conditions are
(10)
and
(11)
Let b; depict the unit cost in industry j in region i, and for industry 1 be given by
(12)
and for industry 2 by
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(13)
Profit maximising in the product market implies that ht(Wi .ri) = Pt and
b~(Wi, ri) = P2' while maximising utility gives the total world demand:
(14)
and
l-rc~+cf =--R
P2
(15)
where R is the value of total production, R = wAnA + rAkA+ wI nI + rI kl. Product
market equilibrium requires that total world demand equals total world supply, i.e.,
et +c{ = xt +x{ and c~+cf = x~+xf.
We use good l as numeraire, and solve for the equilibrium characterised by
diversified production in both countries initially. Employing the information
provided above, in equilibrium all endogenous variables may be expressed in terms
of parameters only. (The exact procedure followed in order to obtain the equilibrium
values of the various variables is found in appendix B.)
The equilibrium price of good 2 is given by
=(_!!_)"(I-e)£ (l-a)(A N)"-£,
P2 1- a e (1-e) K
(16)
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whereA = ((1-e)(I-r)+(I-a)r)/(e(l-r)+ ar). K is a weighted sum of total
world capital, and N is a weighted sum of the total world labour supply. The weights
depend on the productivity scalar of industry 2:
(17)
and
(18)
Turning to factor prices; equilibrium returns to capital are given by
(19)
and equilibrium wage rate is
o o.!:.!.( a )a (K)I-aw' = ,¥'a-e I-a (I-a) A-I N . (20)
In equilibrium the production volumes of the two goods are equal to
Xi _ -eriki + (1- e)wini
1- (a-e) (21)
and
(22)
In the following we seek to elucidate how the dynamic development of
technological advantage determines industrial structure and trade patterns. At time
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zero, technologies are assumed equal across regions, and industry structure and trade
are determined by factor endowments, {ni,kil. Over time, the technology in sector 2
is but subject to region specific development, and governed by two forces. A large
absolute size of the industry in question means that the total number of innovations
in a region is high, while a large relative size influences how fast innovations are
shared by competitors in a region. Both forces, the growth as well as the spillover
effect, enhance the competitiveness of the manufacturers in a cluster.
It is possible to distinguish between three different cases with regard to how trade
patterns evolve over time. In the first two cases the region that initially possesses a
comparative advantage in the production of good 2, due to relative factor
endowments, reinforces its position in industry 2 over time. In the third case, there is
a reversion of trade patterns over time, because the region that initially possessed a
relative disadvantage in the industry 2 production, gradually gains a leading position
in the industry, due to the technological development.
(i) A sustainable cluster
We shall first consider the cases where relative factor endowments are predictive of
which region that ends up being the net exporter of what product. Assume that all
firms, regardless of initial location, employ the same technology, so that
'I'~ = 'I'~ = 1, and let region h be relatively abundantly endowed with capital.
Hence, region h has initiallya comparative advantage in the production of good 2,
which is relatively intensive in the use of capital. At time zero, region h is a net
exporter of good 2, while region fis a net exporter of good 1. It follows that region h
initially has a higher percentage of the work force employed in sector 2 than region
f, and that the spillover effect is stronger in the former region.
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In what region the growth effect is most significant will, however, depend on the
international distribution of factor endowments. If region h is larger than, or equal
to, region fin terms of labour supply, not only does region h experience a stronger
spillover effect, but it experiences a stronger growth effect than region f as well.
Accordingly, the outcome is unambiguous. The uneven technological development
enhances the position of region h in industry 2 over time. We observe increased
specialisation and a trend towards complete specialisation with industry 2
concentrated in region h.
Yet, even if region h is slightly smaller than region f in terms of labour as well as
capital endowment, the same outcome as above will appear. In such a case regionf
actually experiences a more significant growth effect than region h, due to its larger
size. Because of the stronger spillover effect enjoyed by region h, region fis,
nevertheless, not able to challenge the position of region h in industry 2. How much
smaller region h may be, without the outcome being altered, depends on the
significance of the growth effect relative to the significance of the spillover effect, as
well as on the share of income spent on sector 2 goods. The smaller this share, the
smaller region h may be, without having to fear the vanishing of its industry 2
cluster.
To illustrate the dynamics in a situation where the technological development
reinforces the trade patterns initialised by relative factor endowments, we employ a
numerical example. (For parameter values and endowments, see the appendix A)
Figure 1 shows how trade develops over time. (Negative exports indicate imports.)
The cluster of industry 2 in region h is steadily growing. Region h exports good 2
and imports good 1. The technological development magnifies the comparative
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advantage that region h initially possessed in the production of good 2. There is
increased specialisation and a trend towards complete specialisation.
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Figure l: Export from region h - case (i)
As is shown in figure 2 below, an increasing part of the work force in region h
becomes employed in sector 2, and because of the spillover effect, the cluster is
thereby strengthened.
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Figure 2: Percent employed in sector 2 - case (i)
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Given free trade and equal technologies across regions, as is assumed to be the case
at time zero, factor prices are initially equalised. As time passes by, region h enjoys
a relatively advantageous technological development in the industry that is intensive
in the use of capital. As a result, returns to capital increase and the wage rate
decreases in region h, while in region f the effect is the opposite, returns to capital
fall and the wage rate rises.
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Figure 3: Factor prices - case (i)
The way industrial structure and trade patterns are affected by the uneven
technological development, may be analysed within a framework analogue to the
Rybczynski and Stolper-Samuelson theorems: one region experiences a relatively
stronger technological progress in sector 2 than does the other. In this region
production increases in the industry which is subject to technological progress, while
the production in the other sector decreases. The price of the factor that is
intensively used in the expanding sector, increases, while the price of the other
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factor decreases. It follows that the unequal technological development across
regions inhibits factor price equalisation internationally.
The technological progress is not only reflected by changes in factor prices, but also
by a decrease in the price of good 2. Using per capita utility as a measure for
welfare, we find that there is a welfare increase in both regions. The world as a
whole, and each nation, gain from the technological advancement The benefit is,
however, more substantial in the region where the industry characterised by external
economies gradually becomes concentrated: the uneven technological development
causes rising differences in welfare across regions (see figure 4).
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Figure 4: Utility per capita - case (i)
(ii) A non-sustainable cluster
Next, we consider the case where region h is still assumed to be relatively
abundantly endowed with capital, but where this region is significantly smaller than
the other region in terms of capital as well as labour endowments. In such a case, the
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growth effect experienced by region f is so strong, that although region h initially
enjoys a stronger spillover effect, its position in the industry 2 will be challenged.
Consequently, there is a reversion of trade patterns over time. Region h gradually
turns into a net importer of good 2, and there is a trend towards complete
specialisation, with all industry 2 production concentrated in region f.
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Figure 5: Export from region h - case (li)
Figure 6 shows the development of sector 2 as an employer. Due to the original
comparative advantage in capital intensive production, region h is initially net
exporter of good 2. However, since the region is too small to keep pace with the
technological development of the large region f, sector 2 eventually disappears from
region h.
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Figure 6: Percent employed in sector 2 - case (ti)
Factor prices evolve similarly to the way they did in case (i), but with opposite signs
(see figure 7). The relatively adverse development of the production technology in
region h implies that the wage rate rises and the returns to capital fall, as the labour
intensive industry in this region is enlarged. The opposite is the case in regionj. Just
like above trade does not entail international factor price equalisation.
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Figure 7: Factor prices - case (ii)
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As in the former case, the technological progress caused by positive externalities
entails a rise in world as well as in national welfare. During the first period. while
region h is still a net exporter of good 2, the inhabitants of this region experience a
more substantial increase in welfare than the inhabitants of the other region. This
period will be followed by an interval characterised by convergence in welfare
across regions. Eventually, convergence will be taken over by divergence. As long
as there is technological progress, welfare will continue rising in both regions, but
the inhabitants of the region that ends up hosting the cluster of industry 2, i.e., region
f, will enjoy a more significant increase in welfare. The divergent economic
development entailsrising national disparities in welfare.
In order to understand the difference between cases (i) and (li), it may be helpful to
consider the two diagrams below, where returns to capital are drawn as a function of
the wage rate. The superscript "A" denotes the autarky level, while "T" denotes free
trade.
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Figure 8
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In both cases, region h initially obviously possesses a comparative advantage in the
production of the capital intensive good 2. As we open for trade, factor prices
become equalised, and are determined by the intersection of ri and (r2)T. Due to the
unequal technological development, factor prices do, however, not stay equalised
over time. The technological progress is reflected by: (1) increased returns to capital,
inducing a shift to the right in the returns to capital curves, and (2) a decreasing price
of good 2, inducing the curves to shift to the left. While the price effect stemming
from the technological advancement is the same for all firms regardless of their
location, the positive effect on returns to capital depends on the prevailing localised
external economies in a country. In case (i) the external economies are relatively
more significant in region h than in region f,while the opposite is true for case (li).
Accordingly, in case (i), the price effect dominates in the region f, but not in the
region h.Until the industry 2 has possibly become concentrated in region h, returns
to capital will steadily increase and the wage rate decrease in region h, while the
opposite will happen in region f. In case (ii), however, the price effect comes to
dominate in region h rather than in region f, so although trade liberalisation induces
an increase in returns to capital originally, the technological development reverses
this trend, and causes decreasing returns to capital.
Summarising the results obtained under the assumption of free trade and no factor
mobility we find that external economies cause increased international specialisation
and concentration of the industry characterised by externalities in one single region.
Positive externalities lead to technological progress that benefits all individuals, but
especially those living in the region that attains the industrial cluster.
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3. Free trade in goods and capital
We have investigated the dynamic development of trade in the case of free trade in
goods. The world today is characterised by what one may consider as a "boom in
regionalism" 8 - set off by the EU. A number of countries seek to join existing
blocs or to create their own. In order to take into account the fact that within these
blocs. countries tend to become increasingly integrated. we shall move on to a
situation where there is free trade not just in goods. but in capital as well. We do not
include an assumption of international mobile labour, because experience has shown
that cultural and emotional ties often impede international labour mobility. Note that
capital income is assumed to be used for consumption in the region where the capital
is initially localised.
If capital is allowed to move freely across borders. and there are no technological
disparities between the two countries initially. then non-economic considerations
such as firms' expectations about what location is to become the most attractive. will
determine industrial structures and trade patterns. But if one country initially
possesses a technological advantage. free trade in goods and capital produces three
different outcomes with regard to international specialisation and economic
geography:
• The country that initially has a technological advantage in production of the
capital intensive good. is large enough in terms of labour supply. to produce
profitably the total world demand for this good. The smaller the share of the
world income spent on sector 2 goods. the smaller the labour stock needed for
this country to be able to cover total world demand for these goods.
8 See Krugman (1993).
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• The country with the leading technology is too small to cover the world demand
for the capital intensive good. and the production of this good is dispersed
between the two countries.
• The country with the leading technology is too small to cover the world demand
for the capital intensive good. Relatively to the other country. it is too small to
sustain industry 2 production. Consequently. there is a reversion of trade patterns
overtime.
There may be various reasons for one region's initial technological lead. Initial
differences in factor endowments. consumer preferences. trade policy. and economic
policy in general may all cause uneven technological development, ensuring one
region a head start as trade becomes liberalised. Uncertainty about the irreversibility
of policy reforms influencing firms' choice of location. may also be responsible for
initial differences in technology.
(iii) Complete concentration
Assume that due to relative capital abundance. region h is initially the
technologically leading region. and that it is large enough in terms of labour supply
to cover total world demand for the capital intensive good at any time. Allowing for
trade in goods and capital. region h specialises in the production of good 2. and from
the assumption of the regions' production capacity follows that xi =O. always.
International capital mobilityensures equal returns to capital across borders in
equilibrium. Production of good l in both regions entails international factor price
equalisation with respect to wages as well. Solving for the equilibrium with capital
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mobility, we get the following equilibrium prices and production volumes (see the
appendix B for the detailed procedure):
The price of good 2 is expressed by
(
a )a(l-e)£(I-a) 1 ( n)a-£
P2 = 1- a -e- (1-e)'Ph A k (23)
with n =nh +n' and k = kh +v.The international wage rate and rate of returns to
capital are given by
(
a )a (k)l-a
W = 1- a (1- a) A-I n (24)
and
(25)
Since region h is the sole producer of good 2, the total production of this good is
given by
_ h _ ark - (1- a )wn
X2-X2- ( ) •a=e P2
(26)
The production in region h of good 1 is
h -erk + (1- e)wnh e(l- a )wn'
Xl = (a-e) + a(a-e) , (27)
while the production in region/is simply given by
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wn!
X'---l - •a
(28)
Since the total world consumption of the capital intensive good continues to be
produced in the initially technologically leading region h, it follows that the other
region is completely specialised in production of the labour intensive good.
According to the model. the region that is completely specialised in the labour
intensive good will not manage to improve its technology in sector 2. Hence. region
twill not, at any stage, challenge the position of region h in the production of good
2.
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Figure 9: Export from region h - case (iii)
As shown in figure 9, production of good 2 will grow steadily in region h, due to the
technological progress. As trade become liberalised, the distribution of labour across
countries and the mobile capital allow for immediate concentration of the industry
subject to external economies in one single country. at the same time as both
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countries share in the production of the constant-returns good. The conditions for
factor price equalisations are, in other words, satisfied.
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Figure 10: Factor prices - case (iii)
As illustrated in figure 10, factor prices stay constant over time, i.e., the
technological progress leading to increased production volumes in sector 2 is purely
reflected by a decreasing price of good 2. The world as well as the national welfare
rise, but despite the factor price equalisation, location does not turn out to be
irrelevant for the individuals' welfare. Yet, the disparities in national welfare that
may be observed, are not caused by the technological development, The reason why
some regions may experience a larger absolute increase in per capita utility, is due to
differences in relative factor endowments. Since we have assumed that capital
income is used for consumption by the individuals in the region where it was
originally localised, those living in the relatively capital abundant region will enjoy a
higher absolute increase in welfare due to trade liberalisation.
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(iv) Dispersed production of good 2
We then turn to the case where region h, still assumed to be the region that is
initially relatively capital abundant and technologically leading, is too small to
profitably produce the total world demand for good 2. Reviewing case (il), we find
that with no capital mobility and insufficient production capacity to host the
complete industry 2, there will be a gradual reversion of trade patterns. But with free
capital mobility, region h may still be able to sustain an industry 2 cluster, despite its
labour stock being insufficient to cover the total production of good 2.
Yet, from the assumption about labour endowments it follows that the production of
good 1 will only come to take place in region f,Le. x~=O. As in case (iii), free
capital movements ensure international equalisation of returns to capital. But
because both regions take part in the production of good 2, thereby employing
unequal technologies, equilibrium wage rates come to differ across countries.
The equilibrium price of good 2 may be expressed as:
p =(~)a(!::!)e (1- a) 1 Aa-e(nh('Ph); +n/]a-e ke-a. (29)
2 1- a e (1- e) 'P' 'PI
Equilibrium returns to capital are in both regions given by
(30)
Further, we have that the equilibrium wage rate is
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(31)
in region J, and
h ('Ph); IW = - W'PI (32)
in region h. Total production in region h is simply given by
(33)
Region fproduces both goods, and in equilibrium the production volumes are
Xl _ ark-(l-a)wlnl _ a(l-e)whnh
2 - (a-e)p2 e(a-e)p2
(34)
(35)
Figure Il shows the export from - and import to - region h. The region's
production increases over time because of the technological progress. In a situation
like this, the technologically leading region actually experiences the strongest
possible spillover effects, because 100 percent of its labour force is engaged in the
production of good 2.
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Figure 11: Export from region h - case (iv)
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Figure 12: Percent employed in sector 2 - case (iv)
Since the size of the labour stock in region h is above a criticallevel, the spillover as
well as the growth effects created in industry 2, are stronger than those prevailing in
region f.Hence, the technologicallead of region h is not challenged at any time, and
the importance of sector 2 in region f is gradually reduced as the technology
improvements increase the production potential of region h.
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Labour is restricted in region h, the technologically leading region. As a
consequence, the technological improvements in this region entail an increasing
wage rate. As for wages in region f, these are subject to a continuous decrease,
caused by the escalating technology gap between the two regions.
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Figure 13: Factor prices - case (iv)
In order to compare case (iv) with case (iii), it may be useful once more to consider
returns to capital as a function of the wage rate. Figure 14 illustrates the fact that, in
case (iii), concentration of industry 2 in one country and production of good 1 in
both countries, entail factor price equalisation. In case (iv), trade causes factor price
equalisation in the first place. Because labour endowments inhibit a concentration of
industry 2 in the technologicalleading country, the factor prices will, however, not
stay equalised over time. Although free capital mobilityensures equal returns to
capital internationally, wages diverge over time since the positive net effect of the
technological progress is more significant in region h than in region f. Trade in
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capital entails that equilibrium returns to capital are always determined by the
intersection of r{ and (r{t, "regardless of' (r;t.
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Figure 14
The technological development is in case (iv) reflected by increasing returns to
capital, a decreasing price of good 2, and wages evolving as described in figures 13
and 14 above. Despite the diminishing wages in regionj, all individuals in the world
experience increasing welfare. The inhabitants of region h do, however, gain
considerably more over time than their neighbours in region f.Not only do returns to
capital increase in region h, but so does the wage rate, at the same time as the price
of good 2 decreases. These benefits are reinforced by the higher per capita capital
income in region h, due to the initial distribution of endowments internationally.
Hence, trade and uneven technological development trigger a highly divergent
economic development, that is enhanced by international differences in initial
relative factor endowments (see figure 15).
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Figure 15: Utility per capita - case (iv)
(v) From dispersion towards concentration
In case (ii) we saw that an increase in factor endowments in region! deprived region
h of its technologicallead, and led to a reversion of trade patterns. Ifwe do the same
numerical experiment in the case with capital mobility, this does not happen (see
case (ivj). Region h reinforces its technologicalleading position as time passes by.
Starting with the same labour to capital ratios and the same parameter values as in
case (ii), it was necessary to approximately double the size of region f, in order to
see trade patterns reversed and factor prices equalised over time (see figure 16).
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Figure 16: Factor prices - case (v)
Initially, region h specialises in sector 2 production, but as in case (iv), the region is
not large enough to cover total world demand for good 2. Relative to region f, the
labour supply in region h is below a criticallevel, so that region h is not able to
sustain the industrial cluster over time. Although the spillover effect is stronger in
country h than in country f, the growth effect is stronger in the latter country.
Gradually, the growth effect experienced by the firms in country f outweighs the
spillover effect in country h, so that the external economies prevailing in region fare
more significant than those in region h. Consequently, the smaller region loses its
technologicallead. At the time when the regions reach the same technologicallevel,
the wage rates become equalised internationally. The wage rate in region h will not
fall below the level of region f as the technological development continues, but the
sector 2 industry will move from region h to region f, while the labour in region h
will become employed in the production of good 1. Thus, the regions' industrial
structures are dramatically altered, and trade patterns are reversed.
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As for returns to capital, these decrease until factor prices are equalised
internationally. At this stage, industry 2 is completely concentrated in region/. and
in region h one shifts to the producing of good 1. It follows that, in the long run,
both regions share in the production of good 1. Figure 17 is elucidative of how
factor prices evolve before factor price equalisation is fmally attained. The shifts in
the returns to capital curves depict the net effects of the technological development
on returns to capital. It appears that in this case, the positive effect on returns to
capital caused by the technological progress is more than compensated for by the
price decrease induced by the same progress.
w
~--_._.--------------------------- r
Figure 17
The price of the good 2 is subject to constantly decrease. In the long run, the welfare
implications are the same in this case as in case (iii), where free trade in goods and
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capital also gave factor price equalisation: world and national welfare increases. and
the location of the industrial cluster becomes irrelevant to consumers' welfare.
though differences in relative factor endowments cause national disparities.
4. Summary and concluding remarks
Two effects drive the technological development in the model. the innovations in
each production unit, and the rate of diffusion of these new innovations among firms
in each region. The number of innovations in a region increases with the size of the
region's industry, while sector specific knowledge (innovations) is spread as workers
change jobs within a sector. The probability that a new employee comes from a
specific sector, is given by the number of workers in this sector relative to the total
number of workers. Innovations are therefore more rapidly spread if the sector
employs a large share of the work force in the region.
Most literature on international trade let the market size depict the size of a country.
In this paper we have employed an alternative approach.Jetting production capacity
(labour supply) denote the country size. Our definition of country size. and focus on
external instead of internal economies of scale may explain why the results we
achieve diverge from well known results in the trade literature on scale economies
and trade patterns: various authors find that, under the assumption that two countries
have the same composition of demand, the larger country specialises in goods whose
production involves economies of scale - a result that is not consistent with ours.?
We find that if the small country for some reason gets a "head start". the spillover
9 See e.g. Krugman (1980).
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effect experienced in this country may be so strong, that it outweighs a relatively
stronger growth effect in the larger country. Hence, despite its size, the small
country may specialise in goods whose production is characterised by economies of
scale.
It appears, that the size of the different countries in terms of labour and capital
supply; relative factor endowments; the share of the income spent on products
produced by the industry characterised by external economies; degree of
international integration; and the importance of growth and spillover effects - may
all be decisive for how industrial structure and trade patterns evolve. The minimum
size of a region necessary to sustain a cluster, is substantially reduced as one allows
for free trade, not just in goods, but in capital as well. Obviously, our results point in
the same direction as the "new" location theory, which argues that a small country is
better off with complete integration.
Factor price equalisation is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to secure
equal consumer welfare across regions. To achieve factor price equalisation,
concentration of the industry subject to external economies in one country is
required, and both countries must share in the production of the goods produced in
the industry without external economies. Location becomes irrelevant to consumers'
welfare if factor prices are equalised and there are no differences in relative factor
endowments across regions.
As for an efficient use of resources, we find that for the world as a whole to exploit
resources most efficiently, an industrial cluster should though be located in the
smallest region which is still large enough to cover the total world demand for the
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good in question. By locating the cluster in such a region, the strongest spillover
effects are obtained, and the most rapid and significant technological progress is
ensured.
What is not considered in this paper, is that the substantial changes in the economic
geography of nations as described here, imply serious adjustment problems.
Temporary unemployment is just one of several aspects associated with such
changes.
Finally, it is tempting to consider the results we have obtained in a more historical
context: imagine that at some point of time a small country has a comparative
advantage in the production of a specific good due to favourable factor endowments.
Over time, the transport of inputs such as natural resources, becomes cheaper and
requires less time: the trend towards "global sourcing" means that the location of
inputs has gradually become less relevant to the localisation of manufacturers.
Provided that the small country in the meantime has reached a higher technological
level than the rest of the world, because of its long experience in producing these
goods, it will be able to sustain a competitive cluster despite the increased factor
mobility. In fact, it appears that when confronted with larger regional blocks, the
more open the small country is to trade in outputs as well as inputs, the more
sustainable is its industrial cluster.
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Appendix A
Case (i): figures 1-3; base case assumptions of parameter values and endowments.
Pl 1
a 0.6
e 0.4
r 0.5
ø 0.008
A 0.008
nh 1
nI 1.5
kh 2
kl 2.5
Case (ii): figures 4-6; changes from case (i): nI = 3.75 and kl = 6.25.
Case (iii): figures 7-8; changes from case (i): r= 0.7 and trade in capital.
Case (iv): figure 9-11; changes from case (i): nI = 3.75 and kl = 6.25 and trade in
capital.
Case (v): figure 12; changes from case (i): nI = 8.4 and kl = 14 and trade in capital.
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AppendixB
Free trade in goods
Equilibrium is defined by the equations (AI) - (A8):
(
". )Ø-l (. )e-l. w' 1-a . . -l W' 1- £ .
n' = 7'---;;- x; +('1',) 7'-£- X~, V i=h,/
ki _ (Wi 1- a)Ø i (UJi)-I(Wi 1- £)e i \.I' h /- - .• -- Xl + T - .• -- X2, v 1= ,~ a ~ £
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(A2)
(A3)
(A4)
(AS)
(A6)
(A7)
(A8)
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Equations (A3), (A4), (A7) and (A8) give:
(A9)
(AlO)
Solving the four equations (A9) and (AlO) and using PI = I to substitute, gives the
equilibrium production volumes as functions of factor prices:
.. xi'= (1- e)wini - eriki
I a-e ' TI i=h,j (All)
(AI2)
where (All) appears as expression (21) in the text, and (AI2) as expression (22).
Equations (A7) and (A8) give:
. _E_( a )E': E _...!!...( .)_...!!...( E )- £~a a
r' = PIE-a 1- a (1- a)E=aP2 E-a 'P' E-a 1- E (1- Ere:;, (AI3)
TI i =h,j
l a(E-I) I E(l-a)
Wi=PI::aL ~ a)7-Ø (1- a)::~P;:: ('Pi)!:: C~E) £-a (I-E)!::, . (AI4)
TI i=h,j
Using equations (AI) to substitute in equation (AS), and equations (A2) to substitute
in equation (A6), we get two equations that can be solved to give
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(AlS)
Using equations (All) and (A12) to substitute with inequation (AlS), we get that
(A16)
Equations (AI3), (A14) and (A16) can be solved to give P2 as a function of PI; and
using PI = l to substitute, we get the equilibrium price of good 2
(A17)
(A17) appears as expression (16) in the text, and the definitions of A, K, and N are
found at pages 10 and Il.
Using equation (A17) to substitute in equations (A13) and (A14), we get the
equilibrium factor prices:
. . -2-( a )a (N)ar'=('P')a-e l-a (l-a) KA ,Vi=h,j (A18)
(A19)
where (A18) appears as expression (19) in the text, while (A19) appears as
expression (20).
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Free trade in goods and capital: case (iii)
By assumption we have that xt,x{ >0, x; >0, and x{ =0_ Equilibrium is
accordingly, defined by the equations (A20) - (A28):
(A20)
(A21)
( h )a-! (h )e-lh _ W 1-a h (Wh)-l W 1-e hn - ---_- Xl + T -.-- Xlrar e (A22)
h _(wi l_a)a-! I
n - -.-- X
r a i (A23)
(
h )a (/)a (")eW 1-a h W 1-a h -l W 1-e IIk = -._- X + _._- xl +('1') --_ X
r a i r a Ire 2
(A24)
(A2S)
(A26)
PI =r (;Tc~arc~aJ'V i=h,j (A27)
(A28)
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From equations (A27) it can be derived, that
wh =wl =w, (A29)
and we may rewrite the two equations (A27) as
(A30)
Equations (A22) - (A24), (A27) and (A28) give:
w nI = aplx{ (A32)
r k = (1- a)pl(xt + xn+(I-e)p2x~. (A33)
Solving the three equations (A31) - (A33) and using Pl = 1 to substitute, gives the
equilibrium production volumes as functions of factor prices:
h (1- e)wnh - erk e(l- a)wnl
Xl = +~_....:....-
a-e a(a-e)
(A34)
wnlx{=-- a (A3S)
h ar k-(I-a)wnx2 = ,(a-e)p2
(A36)
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where (A34) appears as expression (27) in the text, (A3S) as expression (28), and
(A36) as expression (26).
Using (A29), equations (A27) and (A30), can be solved to give:
(A37)
\
I a(e-l) I e(l-a)
e- ()- I -a I-a() I- a e-a .!=_ - h - £ e-a ....:!!.
w = p{-a 1- a (1-a)e-a pra ('I' )e-a 1-£ (1-£)e-a. (A38)
Using equations (A20) to substitute in equation (A2S), and equations (A21) to
substitute in equation (A26), we get two equations that can be solved to give
(A39)
We use (A39) to substitute for x~ in equations (A31) and (A33), add (A31) and
(A32) together, and solve this new equation as well as equation (A33), to get
k (1- r)£+ raw=_· r
n (l-r)(l-£)+r(l-a) .
(A40)
Equations (A38) and (A40), may now be solved for r, while this newexpression for
r, and (A37) can be solved to give P2 as a function of Pl' Using PI = 1 to substitute,
we get the equilibrium price of good 2:
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(A41)
(A41) appears as expression (23) in the text.
Using equation (A4I) to substitute in the expression for r that was found by using
(A38) and (A40), we get the equilibrium returns to capital:
(A42)
and substituting back into (A40), we get the equilibrium wage rate:
(
a )a (k )l-aw= l-a (l-a) ;;A-1 • (A43)
(A42) appears as expression (25) in the text, and (A43) as expression (24).
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Free trade in ~oods and capital: cases Oy) and (y)
By assumption we have that x~ =O, x{ > O, and x: ,x{ > O. Equilibrium is
accordingly, dermed by equations (A44) - (AS2):
(A44)
(A4S)
(
h )E-lh (Ulh)-1 W 1- e hn = T -.-- X. 2r e (A46)
I _ (wI 1- a)a-l I (UlI)-I( WI 1- e)E-l In - -.-- x + T -.-- Xrai r e 2 (A47)
(/)a (h)E (/)EW 1- a h -1 W 1- e II -1 W 1- ek= _.- x{ +(,¥) -._ x +(,¥I) -._ xl (A48)rar e 2 re 2
x{ =c~+c{ (A49)
(ASO)
(AS l)
(
")E E" "-1 Wi I-e 1
P2 =r'('¥') -; (-e-) C-e). 'ti i=h.] , (AS2)
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Equations (A46) - (A48), (AS1) and (AS2) give:
Solving the three equations (AS3) - (ASS) and using PI = 1 to substitute, gives the
equilibrium production volumes as functions of factor prices:
(AS6)
(AS7)
Xl _ ark - (1- a)wl nI _ a(l- e)w"n"
2 - (a-e)p2 e(a-e)p2 '
(AS8)
where (AS6) appears as expression (3S) in the article, (AS7) as expression (33), and
(AS8) as expression (34).
Equations (AS1) and (AS2) can be solved to give:
e ()..!!!... a a ( )-~- a e-a e -- -- e e-a ar = p{-a 1-a (1- a)e:a P2 e-a ('1'1) e-a 1- e (1- efHi (AS9)
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a(e-l) e(l-a)
e-l ( a )- e-l I-a I-a ( e ) I-a
W' = Ple-a 1- a e-a (1- a)';:(ipra ('I'/)e-a 1- e e-a (1- e)e-ø (A60)
(A61)
Equation (A61) should be recognised as the expression (32) in the article.
Using equations (A44) to substitute in equation (A49), and equations (A4S) to
substitute in equation (ASO), we get two equations that can be solved to give
(A62)
We use equations (AS6) - (AS8) to substitute for production volumes in equation
(A62), and solve for r to get
(A63)
Equations (AS9) - (A61) and (A63), may now be solved to give P2 as a function of
Pl. Using PI = 1 to substitute, we find the equilibrium price of good 2:
(A64) appears as expression (29) in the article.
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Using equation (A64) to substitute in equation (A59), we get the equilibrium returns
to capital:
while we get the equilibrium wage rate in country by using (A64) to substitute in
equation (A60):
(A66)
(A6S) appears as expression (30) in the article, and (A66) as expression (31).
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Essay 5
Does it matter where you are?
The importance of being localised in the academic world.
by
Karen Helene Midelfart Knarvik"
Introduction
In a time of globalisation, one might expect that "[i]nstantaneous global
telecommunications, television and computer networks will soon overthrow the
ancient tyrannies of time and space".' As a natural consequence of such a
development, geography (localisation) would cease to matter, and one would tend
towards a smooth dispersion of people, skills, economic competence, and
manufacturing across the continents. But reality proves to be otherwise. Even the
newest industries are obeying the old rule of geographicallocalisation, namely to
concentrate in regions, cities or towns. And there are no signs of this "clustering
trend" declining.
It is therefore not surprising, that during the last years Alfred Marshall's classic
economic analysis of industriallocalisation and concept of external economies have
* I would like to thank Jan I. Haaland. Victor Norman. Frode Steen. Jostein Tvedt and Anthony J.
Venables for valuable comments and suggestions.
1 The Economist, July 30th 1994, p. 11.
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experienced a renaissance: in 1990 Michael Porter introduced the phenomenon
"industrial clusters" to businessmen and academicians, thereby emphasising the link
between such clusters and international competitiveness. At approximately the same
time Paul Krugman and Anthony Venables started developing what is often called the
"new" location theory with ingredients from trade theory as well as from traditional
economic geography.I They address two fundamental questions: why and where do
firms concentrate geographically; and offer microeconomic tools to analyse problems
of localisation.
There are several reasons why rums should wish to locate close to other firms.
Marshall recognised three, which are still considered some of the most important: 1)
access to a large variety of intermediates at a low cost; 2) a pooled labour market for
workers with specialised skills; and 3) knowledge spillovers. Porter emphasises the
importance of an innovating, stimulating environment, proximity to customers and
suppliers, and rivalry for a firm's competitiveness - which (according to Porter) are
all typical characteristica of an efficient industrial cluster.
While firms' choice of location and the impact of this on productivity and
competitiveness have caught the attention of a number of economists, little has been
written about the relevance (or irrelevance) of academicians' location. How important
is an academician's, say, an economist's,location to his academic performance? May
one compare an economist with a firm in the sense that, also to an economist the
proximity to good colleagues who offer a stimulating, rival environment with a rapid
transmission of new ideas and knowledge, is of great importance? Is he able to
compete better - meet the requirements of the academic world better - given that he
2 See e.g. Krugman (1991), and Krugman and Venables (1993).
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is located in an efficient academic cluster? And if this is so, does the faculty of the
department of economics where he is employed, to some extent determine the quantity
and quality of his research, or is an economist's research productivity independent of
his geographic location? Alternatively, did the site of employment once matter, but has
become irrelevant due to the rapid technological development and expanding
international networks?
Closely related to the question about the determinants of individual "academic
performance and the incentives for academic agglomeration, is the following question:
what determines the "performance of a department of economics? Why is it that some
departments are "good", and remain good over a long period of time, while some
perform pretty poorly? One plausible answer is that good departments attract
competent people. However, an alternative explanation is that good departments
"produce" good people. The latter explanation is consistent with the school of thought
that emphasises the importance of social climate and knowledge spillovers for the
creation of inventions, which suggests that an economist's environment - and
thereby location - is decisive for his productivity.å Neither of the two explanations
does, however, exclude the relevance of the other.
Provided that location matters, and your "surroundings" are decisive for further
development of skills as well as quantity and quality of research output, an additional
question arises: how does a change of places of employment, i.e., mobility, affect
skills and productivity? Obviously, no department of economics is equal to another.
Faculty and the range of fields covered by the faculty members differ across
departments. In other words, the "surroundings" offered by one department are never
3 See e.g. Arrow (1962), and Grossman and Helpman (1992).
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equal to those offered by another. Within the management and organisational
psychology literature. the importance of diverse experience is often pronounced.
Hence, according to the theories and findings within this literature. a mobile
academician might become more successful than someone less mobile.
In this paper we aim to take a closer look at possible determinants of individual and
departmental performance, and thereby focus in particular on the importance of
localisation in the academic world. Our main hypothesis is that, being at a department
ranked as good. improves an economist's performance. so that an academic cluster
might be just as important to its incumbents as an industrial cluster to firms,
The paper is organised as follows: in section l the notion "an academician's
productivity" is dermed. In section 2 data sets and methodology are described. while
in section 3 possible indicators of academic performance are discussed and tested.
Section 4 concludes.
1. Defining the productivity or an academician
The greater institutional emphasis on research and the increasing pressure to publish in
well-known. refereed journals are probably responsible for the fact that we often tend
to equate academic performance with research productivity. "Publish or Perish" - the
title of an article by Zivney and Bertin (1992) - does, perhaps. quite accurately reflect
the way academicians have come to be evaluated. So do the lines below, which were
seen at a noticeboard at the London School of Economics and Political Science+
4 See London School of Economics and Political Science (1995).
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Why God never received tenure at the LSE:
1. because He had only one major publication;
2. and it wasn't published in a refereed journal;
3. and it had no references;
4. and it wasn't in English;
S. and verification of his results has proved impossible;
6. and it is an all-time best-seller.
Although one might object that academic productivity has more dimensions, in this
paper we shall focus solelyon research productivity. Research productivity is most
commonly measured by a person's number of published articles, by page counts of
published articles, or by number of citations. There is a considerable literature
employing and discussing these different methods.
Although the second approach to the measuring of productivity is widely applied, we
doubt whether this is a good measure of research quality and quantity. Our main
objection is that, to our knowledge, there is no evidence that the length of an article is
correlated with the value and uniqueness of the author's intellectual contribution.
Furthermore, as long as there is no such thing as a standard length of an article,
number of pages might not convey a correct impression of the number of articles, i.e.,
ideas, published. Left with the first and the third approach, we find the former the
most appropriate for our purpose. The reason being that we wish to focus on an
academician's "output" (productivity) over a specific period of time, which would be
much more complicated if the latter method were to be employed. Furthermore,
instead of counting all published articles, we shall make a selection of major journals,
and concentrate on articles published in these. Through such a selection, the strict
refereeing process pursued by top journals guarantees a high overall standard of the
counted publications. In other words, we let the refereeing process function as a
quality control mechanism.
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2. Data sets and methodology
In order to shed some light on possible determinants of individual and departmental
productivity, a cross-sectional study is conducted. 175 economists are surveyed with
regard to age, university of graduation, university of employment, job mobility and
publication record. The sample was drawn from the American Economic Association
Directory of Members.s The surveyed economists satisfy two conditions: (1) Ph.D.
completed at a United States university during the years 1970-75; (2) employment at a
United States economics. department at least from 1979 untill991. The latter period
was chosen this long in order to obtain a sample consisting of people that may be
regarded as "typical" academicians, in the sense that their stay in academia is more or
less permanent
We recorded where each academician received his Ph.D., as well as where the
economists were employed during the period 1979-81- at which time all (or at least
most) tenure decisions had most likely been made.6 Second, an appropriate ranking of
U.S. economics departments was searched for. There is a large literature on rankings
of these departments. The studies aimed at ranking economics departments apply
different ranking criteria, the three following being some of the more common:
• Opinion surveys directed at department heads and senior professors.
• Studies where departmental rankings are based on page counts of articles
published in top journals by faculty members in the respective departments.
• Studies where departments are ranked by the number of citations attributed to their
faculty.
S This on-line database is a service provided jointly by the American Economic Association and the
University of Texas at Austin.
6 According to Hamermesh (1992) tenure decisions are usually made approximately 5 years after
people have completed their PhD. thesis and started their first full-time academic job.
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While the opinion surveys usually are regarded as subjective and less reliable,
departmental ratings based on one of the two latter criteria may be used as a proxy for
the quality of the research environment Such ratings are, by some authors, also
reckoned indicative of the quality of dissertation research, i.e., indicative of the
"quality" or acumen of graduate students." Due to the previously pronounced
scepticism to page counts as a measure of research quality, we decided to employ a
ranking list based on citations. Davis and Papanek (1984) provide such rankings,
where citations include references to journals, books, and monographs.f 122 Ph.D.-
granting departments are included in the rankings, which are based on the average
number of citations for 1978 and 1981, and the departments are ranked by total
number of citations as well as by per capita citations.
A number of the surveyed economists did not work at any of the 122 universities
ranked by Davis and Papanek. Ranking lists including non-Ph.D.-granting institutions
show, however, that according to total and per capita citations, few of these
departments were able to "compete" with the Ph.D.-granting departments.? Hence,
non-Ph.D.-granting departments occurring as surveyed economists' place of
employment, were given the rank 130. As a consequence about, Il % of the sample
are ranked a bit lower than they should have been.
Using the Davis-Papanek rankings, the universities where the people in the sample (1)
graduated (sometime between 1970 and 1975), and (2) were employed 1979-81, are
evaluated. One might object that the same rankings cannot be employed to evaluate
universities at two different points of time. However, published rankings of
7 See e.g. Graves et al. (1982).
8 See table A3 in the appendix.
9 Compare Davis and Papanek (1984) with Blair et al. (1986).
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economics departments have proved remarkably consistent even though they cover
different periods of time. lO
As for the surveyed economists' research productivity, we chose to focus on two
different periods: (1) an interval of three years, starting with the year they completed
their Ph.D. work, and (2) the years 1979-83. All articles published in SO top journals
within the two periods were recorded.l! The latter period was chosen this long for
two main reasons: first, in order to avoid any bias due to fluctuations in research
output over the years. Second, to account for the length of time from submission to a
possible publication.P Consequently, we hope to cover all high standard research
output produced during the period 1979-81, for which the economists' employers are
recorded. One should note that, our selection only includes journal articles published
as "article" or "note". "Replies", "comments" and "discussions" are not counted, since
the "[c]reative essence" is small in such efforts compared to that of articles or notes.13
10 See e.g. Gibbons and Fish (1991).
11 To select SO lOP journals, two different rankings were employed. When recording publications for
the period 1979-83, we used the well known ranking list by Liebowitz and Palmer (1984), which is
based on 1980 citations to articles published 1975-79. (See table A2 in the appendix.) As for the
econonomists' early publications (the three first years after the completion of their PhD.), Laband and
Piette (1994) table I, rank a, which is based on 1970 citations to articles published 1965-1969. was
used. (See table Al in the appendix.)
12 See Hamermesh, D. S. (1992) and (1994) for information on the time il takes to gel articles
published. According to Hamermesh, maximum time from submission to a possible publication is
a~proximatelY 2 years.
1 Zivney and Bertin (1992)
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3. Explaining differences in research productivity
3.1 The model
We assume that there is a linear relationship between research output published during
the years 1979-83 and (i) age, (H) university of graduation, (iii) university of
employment from 1979 until1981 (or the main part ofthis period), (iv) mobility, and
(v) faculty size. Expressed more formally,
PUBL; = j(AGE, UNI, EMPL, MOBIliTY, FSIZE)
+ ?
(1)
where
PUBL; = publications in 50 top journals 1979-83 by economist i;
AGE = age in 1979;
UNI = university of graduation ranked according to Davis-Papanek table l, rank b,
which ranks universities by per capita citations in descending order, the best
university thereby given the rank "one";
EMPL = university of employment during the years 1979-81 ranked according to
Davis-Papanek table l, rank b;
FSIZE = size of the faculty of the department where the academician was employed
from 1979 unti11981.
MOBIliTY = mobility after the dissertation was completed and up to 1981. People
are either "mobile" or "immobile". A mobile person is dermed as
someone who has changed employers between graduation and 1981,
while an immobile person is in 1981 still with his first employer after
graduation. To indicate which category each person fits into, a dummy
variable is used (l = mobile; O= immobile).
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The expected signs of the coefficients are shown below each variable. Our
expectations about the impact of different independent variables are based on various
hypotheses, at which we shall take a closer look before turning to the results of the
regressions run.
According to findings by Tuckman and Leahey (1975) a.o., the returns to academic
publishing in terms of benefits such as direct salary increments, promotion-related
salary increments, and career-related options, are diminishing. Typically, an assistant
professor is found to have higher returns to publishing than a full professor. Thus, we
would expect age to have a negative effect on publication. Related to the variable
"age", however, are a few problems. First, it seems to be a widely shared view that
the relationship between publishing and age is a highly non-monotonic one, where the
number of publications is increasing during the first years of an academician's career,
for later to start decreasing. Assuming, as we do, a linear relationship between
publications and age, may, in other words, be a troublesome assumption, that requires
careful interpretation of the results. Second, one may question if the sample here is
suitable for testing of the influence of age on publishing. Since all surveyed
economists completed their Ph.D. between 1970 and 1975, one would not expect
them to differ that much in age. But although a closer look at the data on age shows a
pretty low standard deviation, almost 25 % of the sample are found to lie outside the
interval dermed by mean ± standard deviation. Hence, there is a dispersion in age that
opens for a test ofhow age influences publishing.
The signs below UNl and EMPL may seem rather counterintuitive, but this is simply
due to the descending order in which the departments are ranked. The lower the rank
of a university, the higher the number of its ranking, and the fewer articles graduates
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and faculty members are expected to publish. As regards the university of graduation,
we expect an academician's productivity to be higher, the better the university at which
he completed his Ph.D. thesis, since faculty ratings are often reckoned indicative of
the "quality" of graduate students. Consequently, we presume the coefficient of the
variable "university of graduation" to have a negative sign.
Consistent with the hypotheses that "good departments attract competent people", and
"good departments "produce" competent people", one would, moreover, expect the
rank of the university at ~hich a surveyed economist was employed from 1979-81, to
be indicative of his research output from 1979-83. Thus, the higher a department is
ranked, the more high standard research is presumably published by its members. In
other words, the variable EMPL is assumed to have a negative impact on publications.
Associated with the impact of the department of employment on publishing, however,
is an endogeneity problem: departments are ranked according to mean number of
citations attributed to their faculty members, and one may presume that the number of
citations they attain, depends on their number of publications. To what extent EMPL
constitutes an independent variable may, in other words, be questioned. But we argue
that only 13 % of the sample are employed in departments with less than 10 members,
implying that how the individuals in the survey performs, is not likely to significantly
affect the rank of their department Thus, one may consider the endogeneity problem
as a less serious one.
Turning to the impact of mobility, this variable is expected to be positively correlated
with research output. The assumption is based on what seems to be a prevailing view,
namely that mobility is important for the achievement - and further development -
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of skills.I'' It is also motivated by management and organisational psychology
theories, as well as by the evidence presented by Howard Marshall (1964), and Skeels
and Fairbanks (1968). Based on surveys conducted in the United States during the
1960s, the three authors conclude that academic economists in general, and major
publishers in particular, are highly mobile.
One should, however, be aware that the exact period of time, during which the
individuals' mobility was observed, may generate odd results: within this period all
tenure decisions are likely to have been made. A person's change of places of
employment may therefore not necessarily reflect voluntary mobility, but instead the
fact that he did not receive tenure. Consequently, the results about the impact of
mobility on publishing, should be interpreted carefully, as the phenomenon "tenure"
may lead to distortions.
Data on the first four independent variables described on page seven, were gathered
for all 175 economists. The fifth independent variable, faculty size (FSIZE), did,
however, cause some problems, as it appeared pretty complicated to obtain the size in
about 1980 of the faculty of a number of smaller departments. In order to test for the
influence of faculty size, a sub-sample with 131 observations was composed of those
academicians for whom all data were available.
Employing the two different samples, the two equations
PUBLj = a+f31 AGE+f32 UNI+f3J EMPL+f34MOBIUTY, (2)
and
14 See e.g. Kyvik and Tvede (1994) and the Research Council of Norway (1995).
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PUBL; = a+Pl AGE +132UNI +pJ EMPL +134MOBIliTY +Ps FSIZE (3)
were estimated.
Tables 1 and 2 give means, standard deviations, and the simple correlation matrix for
the complete as well as the "reduced" sample. When turning to the results, one should
be aware that these should be interpreted with care. We have only included four and
five exogenous variables respectively, and we may have omitted variables which are
just as decisive for academicians' publishing activity. Omitted variables may result in
biased and inconsistent estimators as well as unreliable t- and F-tests.
Table l - Summary Statistics (Sample size: 175 observations)
Variable Mean Standard
Deviation
PUBL 1.63 2.91
AGE 36.13 4.52
UNI 29.69 33.01
EMPL 87.83 47.67
Correlations:
PUBL l
AGE -.39 l
UNI -.32 .28 1
EMPL -.54 .35 .51 1
MOBILITY .002 -.01 -.14 -.12 1
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Table 2 - Summary Statistics (Sample size: 131 observations)
Variable Mean Standard
Deviation
PUBL 2.14 3.20
AGE 35.38 4.25
UNI 22.73 28.06
EMPL 73.67 47.30
FSIZE 26.72 15.60
Correlations:
PUBL l
AGE -.39 l
UNI -.29 .26 l
EMPL -.47 .31 .51 l
MOBILITY -.02 -.08 -.14 -.13 l
FSIZE .42 -.31 -.40 -.75 .04 l
3.2 Results
It appeared that a substantial share of the sample had not published any articles in
major journals between 1979 and 1983, i.e., the database contained numerous zero
observations for the dependent variable. One may argue that, zero publications cannot
be given a clear interpretation. We do not know whether a person was about to publish
an article by the end of the period we observe, or whether he did any research during
this period at all. In other words, the dependent variable may in our case be what we
call censored, meaning that information is missing for the dependent variable, whereas
the corresponding information for the independent variables is present.
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However, it is also possible to argue that in our model the value zero does not differ
from any other value. For instance, we do not know whether a person who published
three articles during the surveyed period, was just about to publish his fourth by the
end of period. Hence, whether or not we should regard the dependent variable as
censored, may be subject to discussion.
The problem of censored variables was fust recognised by lames Tobin (1958), who
showed that the use of ordinary least squares (OLS) for models with such variables
results in biased and inconsistent estimates. Instead of ordinary least squares, one
should therefore preferably employ a two-stage estimation process developed by
lames Heckman, that yields unbiased and consistent estimates of the parameters. At
the first stage, the so-called hazard rate is estimated by utilising a probit model. At the
second stage, one proceeds by adding the hazard rate as an additional explanatory
variable to the original model. The "extended model" is then estimated by OLS.ls
Considering the difference between one publication and zero publications, i.e., the
difference between publishing activity and no publishing activity, as more serious than
that between, e.g., 3 and 4 publications, we found that the existence of a censored
variable problem could not be ruled out. Consequently, the two-stage estimation
process devised by Heckman was employed. But in addition we also conducted a
normal OLS estimation, the regression results from which are reported in table AS in
the appendix. As these results were not found to differ substantially from those
obtained using the two-stage estimator, they will not be commented on further.16
IS For a more detailed description of the two-stage estimator developed by Heckman, Pindyck and
Rubinfeid (1991) may be consulted.
16 With a few exceptions. type of estimation procedure did neither affect the signs of the ooefflcients,
nor the effect exerted by the different variables in terms of significance. At a first sight, there seems to
be a discrepancy with respect to the variable UNI since. unlike in table 3. in table AS the variable
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Unfortunately, the two stage estimator involves heteroscedasticity, implying that the 1-
tests are biased. To detect heteroscedasticity and the form of heteroscedasticity, we
employed a Breusch-Pagan test. Second, the method of weighted least squares (WLS)
was used to correct for the heteroscedasticity. Two alternative functional forms of
equations (2) and (3), where heteroscedasticity has been corrected for, are reported
below in table 3.17
The linear-log form is obviously superior to the ordinary linear form, and improves
the fit of the model with ,more than ten percentage points. With regard to the three first
variables in the table, functional form does not influence the effects exerted by the
various independent variables in terms of significance. But as for the dummy variable
indicating mobility and the variable "faculty size", the linear and linear-log cases
generate different results with respect to significance.
The calculated F value does, in all four reported cases, exceed the critical F value at a
one percent level of significance. This means that we may reject the null hypothesis
that research output is not related to the four (five) variables in the table above. We
may, accordingly, assume that the independent variables jointly have an influence on
research output that is significantly different from zero.
UN! appears to have an insignificant effect on publications. However, this was found to be due to a
multicollinearity problem.
17 The regression results where heteroscedasticity has not yet been corrected fcr, are found in table A4
in the appendix.
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Table 3 - Regression results explaining research output published in major journals
PUBL PUBL PUBL
Independent variable: Linear Case
PUBL
Linear-Log Case
AGE -.98131
(-6.23; -.432)
UNI -.041402
(-4.19; -.307)
EMPL -.099619
(-7.22; -.486)
-.25385 -.63782
(-.68; -.052) (-1.33; -.118)
MOBlllTY -.74459
(-1.80; -.137)
.. -.90533
(-2.14; -.189)
FSIZE
-1.2025
(-4.75; -.392)
-.054813
(-3.35; -.288)
-.09689
(-4.66; -.387)
-1.2226
(-2.22; -.196)
-.012404
(-.49; -.044)
-17.739 -20.833
(-4.52; -.328) (-3.76; -.320)
-.69516 -.77660
(-3.23; -.241) (-2.63; -.230)
-2.7511 -2.9135
(-6.57; -.451) (-4.95; -.406)
Constant 37.193
(7.18; .483)
87.945
(4.20; .353)
.43
.42
25.93
(2)
175
Estimated equation
Numberof
observations
44.156
(5.14; .419)
.37
.34
12.37
(3)
131
73.517
(5.08; .364)
.48
.46
31.14
.45
.42
16.64
(2)
175
(3)
131
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values and partial correlation coefficients respectively.
Consistent with the a priori suspicion, age turns out to have a significant negative
impact on publishing, suggesting that an older faculty member publishes fewer articles
in major journals than younger colleagues.ts In the preceding section we mentioned
diminishing returns to academic publishing as one reason for this. Another reason may
be that as the faculty member gets older, he faces an increasing number of dudes in
fonn of, for instance, administrative work and supervision.
18 We note that, as long as the level of significance is not explicitly specified, a 5 % level of
significance is employed.
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Mobility was presumed to have a positive impact on high quality publishing. But the
regression results show, in three out of four cases mobility does not have any
significant impact on publishing at all; and that in the linear case with a reduced sample
where mobility has a significant impact on publishing, it actually has a negative
impact. Taking a closer look at the data, our findings are confirmed: only 27.4 %
changed jobs during the years that mobility was observed, i.e., within a period of 6 -
Il years. (The length of the period being determined by the year the person completed
his Ph.D.) In other words, academicians do not appear as remarkably mobile. Second,
approximately 54 % of those who did change their jobs, did not publish at all in major
journals during the years 1979-83. Third, although diverse experience from academic
as well as non-academic institutions is reckoned as important for the improvement and
further development of skills, we find no evidence that a diverse background increases
research output. 4.6 % of the academicians in the sample worked in non-academic
institutions before they entered academia at some time before 1979. Only 12.5 % of
these people did actually publish in a major journal within the period 1979-83.
Obviously, our results on mobility have little in common with previous evidence,
organisational psychology theories or prevailing views. One reason for the unexpected
results may be that the period we observe is too short. But more important are,
perhaps, the aspects related to tenure decisions, which were briefly approached in the
previous section. Since all tenure decisions are likely to have been made within the
observed interval, mobility might be the result of a person failing to get tenure.
Furthermore, before tenure decisions are made, people may have few incentives to
change jobs. Hence, the negative impact of mobility on publishing behaviour, as well
as the high degree of immobility observed here, may be explained by issues related to
the phenomenon "tenure". However, on examining the data on mobility, we found
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that only 37.5 % of the "mobile" persons are likely to have changed their place of
employment "involuntarily". In other words, because they did not receive tenure.
Moreover, left with the "voluntary" mobility, it appeared that a "mobile" person on
average published less than an "immobile" person. Thus, explaining away the negative
impact caused by mobility becomes difficult One should not neglect, however, that
there are several kinds of mobility, and we have only surveyed one of these. Other
kinds of mobility that may affect research productivity positivelyare, for instance,
temporary mobility, like visiting scholar/professor arrangements, as well as part time
posts.
Turning to the impact of faculty size, we find that in the linear-log case, faculty size
has a significant negative effect on research output - suggesting that the more
members a department has, the less each faculty member is likely to publish in major
journals. At first, this result appears as surprising, since the simple correlation matrix
and our intuition made us presume faculty size to have a positive influence on research
productivity. One would expect that a larger number of colleagues, and possibly a
larger range of fields covered by the faculty staff, would have a positive impact on a
person's publication record. In order to explain the negative influence of a larger
faculty, one may argue that faculty size may be correlated with variables such as
number of students, teaching load, secretarial support, and research assistance - all
of which are likely to be decisive for research productivity. If, for instance, a large
faculty is equivalent to a large number of students, a heavy teaching load, and little
secretarial support and research assistance on average, the results obtained here seem
less surprising.
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Consistent with earlier evidence, our results suggest that the research environment of a
department is a reliable predictor of the research acumen and publishing behaviour of
its graduates.l? But comparing the variable "university of graduation" (UNI) with the
variable "university of employment" (EMPL), the partial correlation coefficients show
that university of graduation is relatively less important than university of
employment. In other words, a larger proportion of the variation in research output is
explained by where people work than by where they completed their Ph.D.s.
Calculating the elasticities at mean for the two variables, this result is confmned: place
of employment has a much more substantial influence on people's publication record
than do their university of graduation.P
The departments of economics where the economists were working from 1979-81
(EMPL), tum out to a clear indicator of research output published in major journals
from 1979-83. The results suggest that the higher the rank of the department where an
economist is employed, the higher the productivity and quality of his research output
Bearing in mind that the universities are ranked according to mean number of citations,
it appears that the "better" his average colleague, the more successful is an economist,
and vice versa.21 But although the results suggest that there is a relationship between
an economist's research output and the evaluation of his place of employment, one
serious question remains to be answered. Why is the rank of the department where a
person is employed, suggestive of his publication record? - A question referring to
19 See e.g. Hogan (1986) and Niemi (1975).
20 The elasticities at mean are -.60 for UNI and - 4.37 for EMPL in the linear case where
heteroscedasticity has been corrected for. The calculation is straight forward: the elasticity at mean is
defined as ~ t. Table 1provides mean of the variables, while the estimated coefficients are taken
from table 3.
21 We have previously mentioned, that Davis and Papanek also offer a ranking list based on total
number of citations attributed to a department's faculty (rank a). Comparing the two rankings, they
prove to be almost perfectly correlated. We may therefore draw the conclusion that, nOl only the
average individual expertise of a person's colleagues, but also the overall "pool" of current expertise at
the department, is indicative of an economist's productivity.
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the two hypotheses presented in the introduction of this paper and mentioned in
section 3.1. One plausible reason, is that good departments mainly employ economists
reckoned as competent, while departments performing less impressively attract less
productive people. Another, and complementary, reason may be that a good
department offers a stimulating and encouraging environment for its employees, i.e.,
is capable of "producing" good researchers. Accordingly, if two academicians can be
considered ex ante in position of equal acumen, the quality of the research
environment at the department where they become employed, will be decisive for how
each of them performs,
In order to elucidate the relevance of the latter explanation of why departmental
rankings are suggestive of faculty members' publication record, we aim to find a
characteristic of economists early in their career, that can be considered a reliable
indicator of their qualifications and chances of succeeding as researchers. There is a
number of such characteristics, and which one is the better, will naturally be subject to
discussion. In addition, it is naive to believe that one characteristic alone is decisive for
a person's academic success.
Both the university where a person graduates, and his early publications, occur to us
as possible indicators of research qualifications. In order to consider early publications
as an indicator, a new variable is defined: EPUBL depicts an economist's number of
publications in 50 major journals during the interval of three years starting with the
year he completed his Ph.D. (For information about how data were recorded see
section 2.) We proceeded byestimating the equation (4), employing the two-stage
estimator devised by Heckman.
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(4)
A Breusch-Pagan test was utilised to detect heteroscedasticity. However, the test
showed that the error variances varied directly with the independent variable EPUBL.
As this variable in numerous cases takes on the value zero, correcting for
heteroscedasticity using weighted least squares (WLS) turned out to be impossible.
Thus, heteroscedasticity may be responsible for biased r-values in table 4, where the
regresssion results from the estimation of equation (4) are reported.
One might object that it should not be necessary to include both EPUBL and UNI in
the model, as it seems likely that university of graduation may affect the number of
early publications. However, estimating EPUBL as a function of UN! showed that
only 10 % of the deviations in the early publication records could be explained by the
variable "university of graduation".
Table4
Independent Estimated r-value PartiaI corr.
variable coefficient coefficient
UNI -.0031978 -.40 -.03
EMPL -.022069 -2.46 -.185
EPUBL .72013 -2.61 .197
Constant 2.8731 3.37 .250
R2 =.38 R2 =.36 F=2S.62
Number of observations: 175
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The results suggest that early publications are a reliable indicator of later publishing
performance, while the university of graduation is not. However, the latter result
contradicts the evidence obtained earlier in the paper (see table 3). The insignificant
impact of university of graduation may be explained by the presence of
heteroscedasticity .
In order to test the hypothesis that good departments "produce" good people, we
consider the partial regression coefficient and partial correlation coefficients related to
the variable "university of employment" (EMPL).22 From the definitions of partial
regression coefficient and partial correlation coefficient, it follows that if persons with
the same acumen (measured in terms of university of graduation and/or early
publications) get employed at differently ranked universities, place of employment
may explain a significant proportion of variation in publishing.
The hypothesis that a good department not only attracts good people, but also
"produces" good people cannot, in other words, be rejected. Even if a group of people
ex ante seems to have the same potential for succeeding as academicians, their success
as such may come to differ substantially. The results here indicate that among other
possible determinants of success, department of employment has a significant impact
on academic productivity and success. Hence, working in a good department does not
only entail prestige and possibly a higher salary, it may also mean:
22A partial regression coefficient measures the change in the mean value of the dependent variable per
unit change in the respective independent variable, holding all other independent variables constanL A
partial correlation coefficient measures the degree of association between the dependent variable and an
independent variable, holding ali other independent variables constant
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• access to an active and stimulating environment with highly qualified and
productive colleagues and favourableworking conditions;23
• proximity to a pool ofknowledge;
• a rapid transmission of new ideas and forthcomings within different fields of
economics.
All ofwhich enhance an academician'sproductivity.
An alternative interpretation of the results reported above is that, utilising other
characteristics than just university of graduation and early publications, good
universities are better at predicting academicians' success. Being better at predicting,
however, does not exclude the possibility that such universities might also offer a
more stimulating and favourable environment for their researchers, thereby enhancing
their productivity.
Thus, one might presume that the observed variation in publishing may partly be
ascribed to good universities being able to attract good academicians, partly to the
same universities facilitating efficient "academic clusters". and partly to these
universities' better predicting abilities.
23 The interpretation of a good department is based on the fact that the ranking list we employ is
based on average number of citations. A difficulty with this interpretation relates to the "superstar"
who pulls up an entire departmental average. But as long as the faculty of a department counts a
certain number of members (about 10 according to preliminary studies), one "superstar" is not enough
to pull up the departmental average. In the sample employed here, only a few departments (13 %) have
less than ten members.
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4. Concluding remarks
Observing the results obtained in the preceding sections, it appears that compared with
other indicators of research productivity, location (place of employment) contributes
significantly to the explanation of deviations in research output. We have reason to
believe that location matters - not only in terms of prestige and income - but also
due to spillover effects. The results indicate that academic milieus resemble the
"industrial world" in the sense that the phenomenon localised externalities/spillovers is
present in both places. These spillovers can be exploited when competent
academicians behave just like firms - and agglomerate. In the same way as
geographically concentrated firms may become more competitive than "isolated"
competitors, the "academic clusters" may enhance the research productivity of their
incumbents, and contribute to their academic success.
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Appendix
Table Al - 50 top journals
(Employed when recording the economists' "early publications".)
Amer. Econ. Rev.
Amer. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc.
Amer. J. Agri. Econ.
Bus. Hist. Rev.
Econ. Devel. Cult. Change
Econ. Hist. Rev.
Econ. Inquiry (Western Econ. I.)
Econ. I.
Econ. of Planning
Econ. Record
Econometrica
Econoutialnte~onWe
Economica
Explorations Econ. Hist.
German Econ. Rev.
Ind. Lab. Relat. Rev.
Ind. ReI.
Indian Econ. I.
Int Econ. Rev.
Int Monet Fund Staff Pap.
I.Amer. Statist. Assoc.
I.Bus.
I.Develop. Stud.
I.Econ. Hist
I.Finance
I. Ind. Econ.
I.Law. Econ.
I. of Polit. Econ.
I.Reg. Sci.
I.Roy. Statist Soc. Ser. A-Gen.
Kyklos
LandEcon.
Lloyd's Bank Rev.
Manch.Sch.Econ.Soc.Stu~
Nat. Tax I.
Oxford Econ. Pap.
Problems of Econ.
Public Finance
Quart. J. Econ.
Quart. Rev. Econ. Bus.
Rev. Econ. Statist.
Rev. Econ. Studies
Rev. Social Econ.
Scand. I.Econ.
Scottish J. Polit. Econ.
Soc. Econ. Stud.
South African J. Econ.
Southern Econ. J.
Weltwirtsch. Arch.
Yale Essays on Econ.
Source: Laband and Piette (1994): Table 1- Rankings based on citations per article.
rank a - 1970 citations to articles published 1965-1969.
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Table A2 - 50 top journals
(Employed when recording publications in the period 1979-83.)
Amer. Econ. Rev.
Amer. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc.
Amer. 1. Agri. Econ.
Bell J. Econ (Rand J. Econ)
Brit. J. of Ind. ReI.
Brookings Pap. Econ. Act.
Demography
EconGeogr.
Econ J.
Econ. Inquiry
EconomeUica
Economica
Ind. Lab. Relat. Rev.
Inquiry
Int. Econ. Rev.
J. Acc. Res.
J. Amer. Statist. Assoc.
J. Bus.
J. Cons. Res.
J. Econ. Hist
J. Econ. Theory
J. Econometrics
J. Finan. Econ.
J.Finance
J. Hum. Res.
J. Ind. Econ.
J. Int. Econ.
1. LawEcon.
J. Legal Swd.
J. Math. Econ.
J. Monet Econ.
J. Money Credit Banking
J. of Econ. Ut
J. Polit. Econ.
J. Pub. Econ.
J. Reg. Sci.
J. Roy. Statist. Soc. Ser. A~D.
J. Roy. Statist. Soc. Ser. B-Meth.
J. Urban Econ.
Michigan Law Rev.
Nat. TaxJ.
Oxford Econ. Pap.
Population Stud.
Public Pol.
Quart J. Econ.
Reg. Stud.
Rev. Econ. Statist.
Rev. Econ. Stud.
Urban Stud.
Yale Law J.
Source: Liebowitz and Palmer (1984): Table 1- Rankings based on 1980 citations to
articles published 1975-1979.
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Table A3 - University rankings
University I n Faculty University I n Faculty
Size size
Olicago 1 1 37 Florida state 62 61 24
MIT 2 3 42 Oregon 63 70 20
Haavard 3 2 60 CaseWestem 64 88 11
Rochester 4 17 16 Connecticut (at Storrs) 6S 58 30
Princeton S 5 54 WayneState 66 63 2S
Stanford 6 4 67 Georgia 67 6S 24
Penn 7 7 43 Boston coll 68 (/J 22
UCLA 8 12 32 Penn State 69 60 27
Columbia 9 9 41 Wyoming 70 83 14
Minnesota (Twin Cities) 10 18 24 SUNY-Stony Brook 71 74 19
NYU 11 13 32 Ohio U. 72 81 16
Yale 12 6 57 Iowa State 73 48 49
Northwestern 13 14 32 Purdue 74 34 79
Wis-Madison .14 8 41 Nebraska Lincoln 7S 82 20
UC-Berkeley 15 10 47 American 76 89 17
Duke 16 23 16 LSU (Louisiana State U) 77 90 16
USC (Southern Calif.) 17 16 37 Washington state 78 76 2S
Johns Hopkins 18 28 18 Utah 79 78 24
VPI 19 19 28 Georgetown 80 7S 30
Michigan 20 11 SS Tennessee 81 79 26
Cal Tech 21 26 23 N. Carolina State Raleigh 82 54 62
Washington 22 20 30 Ill.-Chigaco Circle 83 91 19
Mass.-Amherst 23 24 26 NotreDame 84 8S 23
Cornell 24 27 26 St. Louis 8S 104 11
UC-Riverside 2S 80 S Kentucky 86 86 26
Brown 26 39 20 South Carolina 87 TI 32
Maryland 27 IS 62 N. Illinois 88 92 22
New School 28 42 19 Iowa 89 84 27
Claremont 29 29 29 Temple 90 73 41
Virginia 30 30 29 SUNY-Albany 91 94 24
TexasA&M 31 44 20 Oklahoma State 92 68 S2
UC-Santa Barbara 32 35 26 Missouri-Columbia 93 71 54
Arizona 33 37 26 Colorado state 94 66 60
Washington-St. Louis 34 38 26 Georgia state 9S 9S 27
Carnegie Mellon 35 47 22 Tufts 96 102 16
SUNY-Buffalo 36 59 14 Montana state 97 97 24
Colorado boulder 37 36 30 Illinois State 98 lOS 16
Dl. -Urbana 38 21 52 Miami 99 117 6
George Washington 39 2S 49 Oklahoma 100 106 14
Texas Austin 40 32 36 BrynMwar 101 119 4
Houston 41 56 19 TexasTecb 102 103 18
Vanderbilt 42 41 31 Texas Dallas 103 96 40
Boston 43 31 44 Rensselaer 104 87 40
Rice 44 64 16 Catholic lOS 98 2S
Indiana 45 Sl 2S Cincinnati 106 99 22
Ohio State 46 40 36 Kansas 107 100 23
UC-Davis 47 57 21 Rutgers Newark 108 107 17
(continued)
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SUNY-Binghamton 48 49 28 So. Illinois 109 109 15
Tulane 49 93 7 W. Virginia 110 101 24
New Mexico SO 53 25 Oark 111 116 9
CUNY 51 43 34 New Hampshire 112 110 18
SMU (Southern Methodist) 52 62 19 Mississippi 113 114 17
UC-San Diego 53 33 47 Northeastern 114 112 22
Rorida 54 50 30 Utah State 115 108 28
Wis.-Milwaukee 55 72 16 Kansas state 116 115 18
Michigan State 56 22 76 Howard 117 113 23
Arizona State 57 55 29 Arkansas 119 111 33
North Carolina 58 46 38 Rhode Island 119 120 12
Rutgers-New Bnmswick 59 52 32 Lehigh 120 118 18
Pittsburgh 60 45 40 Fordbam 121 121 18
Syracuse 61 67 20 Alabama 122 122 9
Sources:
I: Davis and Papanek (1984): Table 1 - University ranking, by total and per capita
citations (1978 and 1981)", Rank b ("Rank by mean number").
II: Davis and Papanek (1984): Table 1- University ranking, by total and per capita
citations (1978 and 1981), Rank a ("Rank by total number of citations").
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Table A4 - Regression results explaining research output published in major journals
without correcting for heteroscedasticity
Independentvariable: Linear Case
PUBL PUBL
AGE -.92041 -1.U99
(-6.35; -.439) (-4.84; -.399)
UNI -.038321 -.050347
(-4.42; -.322) (-3.44; -.295)
EMPL -.094201 -.086827
(-7.48; -.499) (-4.88; -.401)
MOBILlTY -.66958 -1.U64
(-1.76; -.134) (-2.16; -.190)
FSIZE -.015182
(-.63; -.057)
Constant 35.252 41.731
(7.31; .490) (5.24; .426)
R2 .44 .38
R2 .43 .35
F 26.86 12.92
Estimatedequation (2) (3)
Numberof 175 131
observations
Linear-Log Case
PUBL PUBL
-17.545 -20.718
(-4.57; -.332) (-3.81; -.324)
-.68996 -.77587
(-3.30; -.246) (-2.69; -.235)
-2.7581 -2.9441
(-6.68; ;..458) (-5.07; -.414)
-.24066 -.62760
(-.66; -.051) (-1.33; -.118)
-.89782
(-2.16; -.191)
72.837
(5.15; .368)
87.558
(4.26; .357)
.48
.47
31.58
.45
.42
16.89
(2) (3)
175 131
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values and partial correlation coefficients respectively.
246
Does it matter where you are?
Table A5 - Regression results explaining research output published in major journals
when a standard OLS procedure is used to estimate the model.
Independent variable: Linear Case LInear-Lo! ~ase
:PUBL PUBL :PUBL :PUl3LAGE -.13978 -.19540 -5.0614 -7.4029
(-3.22; -.2402 ~-3.24; -.2792 ~-3.33; -.2472 ~-3.54; -.3022
UNI -.0029569 -.0041717 -.14736 -.20351
~-.46; -.0352 ~-.42;-.0372 ~-1.01; -.0772 ~-1.05; -.0932
EMPL -.027660 -.020966 -1.4512 -1.5665
~-6.02; -.4192 ~-2.53; -.2212 ~-7.78; -.5122 ~-5.95; -.4702
MOBll..ITY -.42007 -.63540 -.32468 -.54085
~-1.02; -.078} ~-1.19; -.106) ~-.89; -.066) ~-1.12; -.lOO}
FSlZE .020300 -.56772
(.86; .0762 ~-1.40; -.1242
Constant 9.3166 10.340 26.242 36.986
~6.256; .433) ~4.20; .3512 ~5.00; .3582 ~4.81; .3952
R2 .34 .30 .45 .42
R2 .32 .27 .43 .40
F 21.80 10.74 34.08 18.01
Estimated equation (2) (3) (2) (3)
Numberof 175 131 175 131
observations
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values and partial correlation coefficients respectively.
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